Hannibal Second Punic War Analysis
From 218 to 202 BCE, the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca launched his brutal campaign to crush the early Roman republic and would ultimately be defeated on the plains of Zama. Despite these individual events being separated by a century, Hannibal’s second Punic war against Rome generated the factors necessary for the Republic to professionalize her military. The war brought about massive political discourse, social discourse, and a more rampant depletion of the overall manpower in Italy than before. This chaos would allow the Gracchi brothers Tiberius and Gaius to be elected as tribunes in the Roman Senate. Their combined attempts at agrarian reforms, in turn, would brew even greater political uproar between the people and the Senate. The
…show more content…
Romans would then be forced to turn to the charismatic leadership of military leaders, electing consulship to the general Gaius Marius ten years later. Marius would then restructure the Roman army by recruiting paid volunteers instead of conscripting militiamen to stabilize the Republic. By looking at how the first event influenced the other two in Antiquity, the connection is made between the second Punic War as the catalyst to the early Roman military reforms. In order to analyze the connection between the Second Punic War and military reforms put into place almost a century later, what must first be taken into account is the structure of the Roman army before and during the conflict.
Similar to the hoplite phalanxes of the ancient Greek poleis, the army of Rome primarily consisted of common citizens serving originally as light infantry, then as heavy infantry. These citizen-militias were not paid by monetary means, but were bound by duty to both protect the Republic and their own collective interest in times of war. Each soldier was also expected to provide his own equipment and his age determined which rank he served in the legions. “The military of the Roman republic was under strict control of the Senate, which had the ultimate authority to declare war, finance the war, and appoint commanders of the army” (Verlic, p.7). This role later met challenges as the second Punic War ensued and the Senate elected a dictator over the army, taking the first step towards reliance on generals to establish …show more content…
stability. Moving on to the conflict itself, the Carthaginian general Hannibal’s campaign into Italy began with the siege and destruction of Saguntum in 219 B.C.E. According to the Greek historian Appian, the people of Saguntum requested the aid of Rome and an agreement of a temporary ceasefire brokered between the two Mediterranean powers, but “the Carthaginians, under the lead of Hannibal, violated this treaty by crossing the stream, and having done so Hannibal marched against Italy” (Livius, 2005, p. 6). During the following year in 218 B.C.E, Hannibal set out along the Iberian Peninsula with a strike force of around fifty thousand soldiers and thirty seven elephants. The majority of his army were professional mercenaries from Spain, Numidia, Libya and Gaul. Because the Romans forced him to leave what little navy Carthage had sustained after the first Punic War, Hannibal marched through France toward Massilia, while a Roman army under the Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio pursued by sea. These two vastly different forces finally met in a skirmish between their cavalry units near the Rhone River, forcing Hannibal to alter his route to Rome. “In one of the great military feats of history, Hannibal crossed the Alps into northwestern Italy in early winter. Despite huge losses in the heavy snows, he arrived with 30,000 men, 6,000 horses, and 15 elephants” (Scipio, trans. Roberts). Not too long after arriving in Italy, Scipio officially engaged him at the Ticinus River and was defeated losing two-thousand men in the process. Wounded during the battle, Scipio was replaced by the Consul Sempronius Longus and ordered to attack Spain later during the war. Sempronius faced Hannibal at the Trebia River in and deployed the army’s usual formation called a Legio. A Legio was made up of multiple groups of soldiers call maniples (basically a checkerboard layout), purpose-built for flexibility and meant for full-forward assault. Unfortunately at Trebia, the Romans’ weakness in their formation and tactics, including the fact that they had to cross an ice-cold river to engage the Carthaginians, were exploited by the hidden Carthaginian cavalry which decimated the Roman rear. Thirty-thousand citizen-soldiers, trained to go straight at the enemy with less experience, were slain by the Hannibal’s professional warriors and tactics which could hit them in multiple different ways. Accordingly, Hannibal took advantage of this weakness for the second time, as well as turn the Roman numerical advantage, against the newly elected co-Consul Gaius Flaminius at Lake Trasimene.
Flaminius at first hunkered down behind the walls of the Roman city Arretium, but Hannibal coerced him to meet on the battlefield by torching the surrounding landscape. Devastating the land also sent the psychological message of Rome’s incompetence and futility to her other allies. Flaminius finally surrendered to his rage and chased the Carthaginians to Trasimene. According to the Greek historian Polybius, Hannibal made preparations the previous night to trap the Consul’s conscripted army through a defile, or natural choke point between the lake and the opposing cliffs. “As soon as the greater part of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the same time sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point at once” (Polybius, p. 309). Fifteen thousand Romans were slaughtered, including Flaminius himself in this surprise attack. Compared to Hannibal’s loss of only fifteen hundred men during Trasimene and the combined total number of Roman deaths from Ticinus and Trebia, this was humiliating to both the Senate and the Republic
itself. With Hannibal carving a path of destruction through the Italian countryside and fear erupting amongst the people, the Senate made the bold decision of electing Quintus Fabius Maximus as temporary dictator to stop Hannibal in his tracks. Fabius ordered the conscription and mobilization of ninety thousand new soldiers, but his strategy focused on containing the Carthaginian general by means of several policies; harassing Hannibal’s troops when foraging for supplies, choosing not to engage Hannibal in an open battle, and having the Romans torch their own fields to render the land useless to Hannibal. This containment strategy began to show signs of success, but the problem arose as to whether or not the Senate would have the political willpower to continue for several years. Consequently, Fabius resigned after his term was up and the Senate returned to its typical mode of governance. They elected two new co-consuls, Varro and Paullus, who switched off command of the massive Roman army and were ordered to end Hannibal by any means necessary. Out of the two generals, Varro pursued a more aggressive strategy, while Paullus embraced caution. Hannibal utilized his strength in conventional warfare and knew which consul he would rather engage in battle. After instigating the Romans into combat as soon as Varro took command, Hannibal led the aggressive general and his allies through a series of battles across southern Italy. Both armies eventually met in a final stand-off near the small town of Cannae. Hannibal led his forty thousand warriors against the ninety thousand soldiers of Rome and her allies on the flat terrain. Varro deployed his massive force in the typical Roman Legio formation, but increased the thickness of its depth by condensing the maniples, sacrificing their all-around flexibility. Hannibal deployed his professional force of Gauls, Spaniards, and Numidians in a concave bow facing the Romans. “The Roman manipular order and their own training kept the line straight, and so only the center group of Spaniards and Gauls would have been engaged” (O’Connell, p. 153). While the center held against and began giving ground to the inexperienced Roman soldiers, the Carthaginian cavalry engaged the outnumbered Roman citizen cavalry. Hannibal then sprung his trap against Varro and Paullus. The concave bow formation drew further back, allowing the Carthaginian troops to envelop the condensed Romans. The Numidian and Spanish cavalry turned on the Roman rear, jamming Varus’s ninety thousand men into Hannibal’s kill box. Based on how long it would take to kill seventy thousand people without mechanical weapons, the more experienced professional Carthaginian army defeated the numerically superior Romans within six hours. Despite leaving the landscape of Italy torched and slaughtering over one hundred thousand Romans, Hannibal was unable to defeat Rome during the war. The Senate ended up returning to the strategy of containment devised by the dictator Fabius. Ultimately, Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) pushed Hannibal back to Carthage and defeated him on the plains of Zama. Scipio Africanus’ victories in Spain and Carthage demonstrated an important element in regard to the aftermath of the war. Rome would never again call for “ill-experienced short term generals to combat her enemies and would look to charismatic long term commanders as a necessity” (O’Connell, pg. 259). The defeated Carthaginian general’s campaign also not only further depleted Rome’s manpower, but depleted the overall farming capability in southern Italy. The full recovery of the land’s resources did not take place for another one to two thousand years due to over a decade of devastation. Militia soldiers returning from the conflict, lacking the means to retain their lands to farm, could not sustain their families’ lives and were forced to leave to the cities.
Bibliography
~"Appian, the Punic Wars." - Livius. 2005. Web. 04 Apr. 2016. .
~Plutarch, Rex Warner, and Robin Seager. Fall of the Roman Republic. London: Penguin, 2005. Print.
~ O'Connell, Robert L. The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.
~Ligt, De. "Poverty and Demography: The Case of the Gracchan Land Reforms." Mnemosyne 57.6 (2004): 725-57. Web.
~ Polybius, and W. R. (translator) Paton. Polybius: The Histories, Vol. 1, Translated by W.r. Paton. Vol. 1. S.l.: Heinemann, 1922. Print.
~ Claiborne, Michael. The Gracchan Agrarian Reform and the Italians. Thesis. Washington University in St. Louis, 2011. Print.
~ Verlic, Robert. From Citizen Militia to Professional Military: Transformation of the Roman Army. Thesis. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007. Print.
~ Scipio, Publius Cornelius. "Against Hannibal." Primary Source Documents: 0 to 999. Facts On File, 2014. Ancient and Medieval History Online. Web. 6 Apr. 2016.
Romans would then be forced to turn to the charismatic leadership of military leaders, electing consulship to the general Gaius Marius ten years later. Marius would then restructure the Roman army by recruiting paid volunteers instead of conscripting militiamen to stabilize the Republic. By looking at how the first event influenced the other two in Antiquity, the connection is made between the second Punic War as the catalyst to the early Roman military reforms. In order to analyze the connection between the Second Punic War and military reforms put into place almost a century later, what must first be taken into account is the structure of the Roman army before and during the conflict.
Similar to the hoplite phalanxes of the ancient Greek poleis, the army of Rome primarily consisted of common citizens serving originally as light infantry, then as heavy infantry. These citizen-militias were not paid by monetary means, but were bound by duty to both protect the Republic and their own collective interest in times of war. Each soldier was also expected to provide his own equipment and his age determined which rank he served in the legions. “The military of the Roman republic was under strict control of the Senate, which had the ultimate authority to declare war, finance the war, and appoint commanders of the army” (Verlic, p.7). This role later met challenges as the second Punic War ensued and the Senate elected a dictator over the army, taking the first step towards reliance on generals to establish …show more content…
stability. Moving on to the conflict itself, the Carthaginian general Hannibal’s campaign into Italy began with the siege and destruction of Saguntum in 219 B.C.E. According to the Greek historian Appian, the people of Saguntum requested the aid of Rome and an agreement of a temporary ceasefire brokered between the two Mediterranean powers, but “the Carthaginians, under the lead of Hannibal, violated this treaty by crossing the stream, and having done so Hannibal marched against Italy” (Livius, 2005, p. 6). During the following year in 218 B.C.E, Hannibal set out along the Iberian Peninsula with a strike force of around fifty thousand soldiers and thirty seven elephants. The majority of his army were professional mercenaries from Spain, Numidia, Libya and Gaul. Because the Romans forced him to leave what little navy Carthage had sustained after the first Punic War, Hannibal marched through France toward Massilia, while a Roman army under the Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio pursued by sea. These two vastly different forces finally met in a skirmish between their cavalry units near the Rhone River, forcing Hannibal to alter his route to Rome. “In one of the great military feats of history, Hannibal crossed the Alps into northwestern Italy in early winter. Despite huge losses in the heavy snows, he arrived with 30,000 men, 6,000 horses, and 15 elephants” (Scipio, trans. Roberts). Not too long after arriving in Italy, Scipio officially engaged him at the Ticinus River and was defeated losing two-thousand men in the process. Wounded during the battle, Scipio was replaced by the Consul Sempronius Longus and ordered to attack Spain later during the war. Sempronius faced Hannibal at the Trebia River in and deployed the army’s usual formation called a Legio. A Legio was made up of multiple groups of soldiers call maniples (basically a checkerboard layout), purpose-built for flexibility and meant for full-forward assault. Unfortunately at Trebia, the Romans’ weakness in their formation and tactics, including the fact that they had to cross an ice-cold river to engage the Carthaginians, were exploited by the hidden Carthaginian cavalry which decimated the Roman rear. Thirty-thousand citizen-soldiers, trained to go straight at the enemy with less experience, were slain by the Hannibal’s professional warriors and tactics which could hit them in multiple different ways. Accordingly, Hannibal took advantage of this weakness for the second time, as well as turn the Roman numerical advantage, against the newly elected co-Consul Gaius Flaminius at Lake Trasimene.
Flaminius at first hunkered down behind the walls of the Roman city Arretium, but Hannibal coerced him to meet on the battlefield by torching the surrounding landscape. Devastating the land also sent the psychological message of Rome’s incompetence and futility to her other allies. Flaminius finally surrendered to his rage and chased the Carthaginians to Trasimene. According to the Greek historian Polybius, Hannibal made preparations the previous night to trap the Consul’s conscripted army through a defile, or natural choke point between the lake and the opposing cliffs. “As soon as the greater part of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the same time sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point at once” (Polybius, p. 309). Fifteen thousand Romans were slaughtered, including Flaminius himself in this surprise attack. Compared to Hannibal’s loss of only fifteen hundred men during Trasimene and the combined total number of Roman deaths from Ticinus and Trebia, this was humiliating to both the Senate and the Republic
itself. With Hannibal carving a path of destruction through the Italian countryside and fear erupting amongst the people, the Senate made the bold decision of electing Quintus Fabius Maximus as temporary dictator to stop Hannibal in his tracks. Fabius ordered the conscription and mobilization of ninety thousand new soldiers, but his strategy focused on containing the Carthaginian general by means of several policies; harassing Hannibal’s troops when foraging for supplies, choosing not to engage Hannibal in an open battle, and having the Romans torch their own fields to render the land useless to Hannibal. This containment strategy began to show signs of success, but the problem arose as to whether or not the Senate would have the political willpower to continue for several years. Consequently, Fabius resigned after his term was up and the Senate returned to its typical mode of governance. They elected two new co-consuls, Varro and Paullus, who switched off command of the massive Roman army and were ordered to end Hannibal by any means necessary. Out of the two generals, Varro pursued a more aggressive strategy, while Paullus embraced caution. Hannibal utilized his strength in conventional warfare and knew which consul he would rather engage in battle. After instigating the Romans into combat as soon as Varro took command, Hannibal led the aggressive general and his allies through a series of battles across southern Italy. Both armies eventually met in a final stand-off near the small town of Cannae. Hannibal led his forty thousand warriors against the ninety thousand soldiers of Rome and her allies on the flat terrain. Varro deployed his massive force in the typical Roman Legio formation, but increased the thickness of its depth by condensing the maniples, sacrificing their all-around flexibility. Hannibal deployed his professional force of Gauls, Spaniards, and Numidians in a concave bow facing the Romans. “The Roman manipular order and their own training kept the line straight, and so only the center group of Spaniards and Gauls would have been engaged” (O’Connell, p. 153). While the center held against and began giving ground to the inexperienced Roman soldiers, the Carthaginian cavalry engaged the outnumbered Roman citizen cavalry. Hannibal then sprung his trap against Varro and Paullus. The concave bow formation drew further back, allowing the Carthaginian troops to envelop the condensed Romans. The Numidian and Spanish cavalry turned on the Roman rear, jamming Varus’s ninety thousand men into Hannibal’s kill box. Based on how long it would take to kill seventy thousand people without mechanical weapons, the more experienced professional Carthaginian army defeated the numerically superior Romans within six hours. Despite leaving the landscape of Italy torched and slaughtering over one hundred thousand Romans, Hannibal was unable to defeat Rome during the war. The Senate ended up returning to the strategy of containment devised by the dictator Fabius. Ultimately, Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) pushed Hannibal back to Carthage and defeated him on the plains of Zama. Scipio Africanus’ victories in Spain and Carthage demonstrated an important element in regard to the aftermath of the war. Rome would never again call for “ill-experienced short term generals to combat her enemies and would look to charismatic long term commanders as a necessity” (O’Connell, pg. 259). The defeated Carthaginian general’s campaign also not only further depleted Rome’s manpower, but depleted the overall farming capability in southern Italy. The full recovery of the land’s resources did not take place for another one to two thousand years due to over a decade of devastation. Militia soldiers returning from the conflict, lacking the means to retain their lands to farm, could not sustain their families’ lives and were forced to leave to the cities.
Bibliography
~"Appian, the Punic Wars." - Livius. 2005. Web. 04 Apr. 2016. .
~Plutarch, Rex Warner, and Robin Seager. Fall of the Roman Republic. London: Penguin, 2005. Print.
~ O'Connell, Robert L. The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.
~Ligt, De. "Poverty and Demography: The Case of the Gracchan Land Reforms." Mnemosyne 57.6 (2004): 725-57. Web.
~ Polybius, and W. R. (translator) Paton. Polybius: The Histories, Vol. 1, Translated by W.r. Paton. Vol. 1. S.l.: Heinemann, 1922. Print.
~ Claiborne, Michael. The Gracchan Agrarian Reform and the Italians. Thesis. Washington University in St. Louis, 2011. Print.
~ Verlic, Robert. From Citizen Militia to Professional Military: Transformation of the Roman Army. Thesis. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007. Print.
~ Scipio, Publius Cornelius. "Against Hannibal." Primary Source Documents: 0 to 999. Facts On File, 2014. Ancient and Medieval History Online. Web. 6 Apr. 2016.