embraces hegemonic masculinities is not necessarily occupying its lofty social bearing, for “hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual” (2014 139). From this hegemonic stage, one can trace domineering trajectories of power to subsequent interrelated masculinities.
For example, masculinity that finds itself oppressed by the ideologies and mechanisms of hegemony, such as homosexuality is to heterosexuality – can be said to be subordinated; those who can draw ‘dividends’ of privilege and entitlement from hegemonic masculinity even though they may not occupy its social space are said to be complicit; and finally, those who masculinities can be said to have been relegated to at upmost downgraded social position can be said to have had their masculinity “marginalized” (for example, as men of color are in relations to those who are white in current day Global North.) (2014 140 141). Each of these masculinities are defined by their embrace of various power dynamics which puts them in various orbits to each other. For example, as Connell notes, a particular subordinated masculinity may in fact be marginalized (2014 141) and even marginalized masculinities may be afforded some dividends of privilege from hegemonic masculinity that femininities would not (in turn, making them by definition, complicit.) To reiterate, Connell reminds us that hegemonic masculinity is never any one biologically determined-person or group but a hierarchial position which can be occupied by anyone at any given time. Given the supposedly ubiquity that Connell argues exists for hegemonic masculinity, we can see if it ever defined Kate Bornstein prior
to, during and after gender-reassignment.