Ia Drang Valley Battle Analysis
The Ia Drang Valley, a Communist sanctuary, allowed People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN/NVA) the ability to filter troops, gather supplies, and gain strength near the Cambodian border, beyond U.S. forces control. Its strategic importance was underlined by indicators that an entire division was camped in the Chu Pong Mastiff, adding to the necessity of a U.S. response. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Howard Moore, commander of 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment, was chosen and received orders for an air assault mission on November 10, 1965. With the possibility of encountering overwhelming numbers, LTC Moore, and his Air Assault unit, was to be put to the test in one of the earliest and arguably most important battle of the Vietnam War. This paper will analyze
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The ultimate goal during these first months of the war with the United States was to learn how American forces operated. (Galloway, 1992) General Chu Huy Man severely overestimated the effectiveness of his troops in phase one and two, and was forced to order the retreat of his 320th and 33rd regiments. The 320th remained unscathed during its retreat but the 33rd “would endure additional blows on its retreat west” by American 1st brigade troops. (Galloway, 1992) The third phase, however, would go according to plan, as LTC Moore’s troops would land amongst General Man’s freshest troops, the PAVN 66th regiment. (Galloway, …show more content…
forces had tested and proven the effectiveness of a well-trained airmobile unit. LTC Moore’s effective leadership throughout the battle, and conscious decision to levy risk where appropriate, led to the success and survival of many of his troops. The lack of intelligence and understanding of the area had LTC Moore’s unit directly on top of an overwhelming enemy force; an underestimation of the enemy’s ability to mass effectively. For the PAVN, this battle was strategically significant in that it gave promise of victory in the combating high-tech U.S. weapons and new airmobile tactic. They tested and knew what U.S. force were capable of achieving; the fact they were able to maintain an effective fight in this battle was significant motivation for the remaining battles such as the Tet offensive in the following
The ultimate goal during these first months of the war with the United States was to learn how American forces operated. (Galloway, 1992) General Chu Huy Man severely overestimated the effectiveness of his troops in phase one and two, and was forced to order the retreat of his 320th and 33rd regiments. The 320th remained unscathed during its retreat but the 33rd “would endure additional blows on its retreat west” by American 1st brigade troops. (Galloway, 1992) The third phase, however, would go according to plan, as LTC Moore’s troops would land amongst General Man’s freshest troops, the PAVN 66th regiment. (Galloway, …show more content…
forces had tested and proven the effectiveness of a well-trained airmobile unit. LTC Moore’s effective leadership throughout the battle, and conscious decision to levy risk where appropriate, led to the success and survival of many of his troops. The lack of intelligence and understanding of the area had LTC Moore’s unit directly on top of an overwhelming enemy force; an underestimation of the enemy’s ability to mass effectively. For the PAVN, this battle was strategically significant in that it gave promise of victory in the combating high-tech U.S. weapons and new airmobile tactic. They tested and knew what U.S. force were capable of achieving; the fact they were able to maintain an effective fight in this battle was significant motivation for the remaining battles such as the Tet offensive in the following