India’s approach to Naxalite problem
India’s approach to Naxalite problem
When India got its independence in 1947, it became the largest democracy in the world. Since independence, it has steadily sought to establish a predominant presence in South East Asia and in the global context, seeking a greater role among the developed countries in the West1. In recent years, it has become widely acknowledged as a world power, largely because of its high economic growth rate, which was a result of government policies towards economic liberalization in 1990s1,2. However, the high economic growth and increasing presence in the international stage has been paralleled by that of indigenous Maoist insurgency, which has challenged the politics upon which this growth has rested, for the past six decades3,4. The insurgency has challenged the legitimacy of the Indian government--which has abandoned the legal and constitutional duties as set in the constitution to the most disenfranchised and politically vulnerable social groups5. In refuting the authority and legitimacy of the Indian government, the Maoist groups (also known as Naxalites) has been able to achieve a great deal of popular support of the populations which it represents4. By early 2000, the extent of the political control of the Maoist insurgency was so vast, especially in the central region of India, that the government banned most Maoist organizations and declared them as terrorist organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of India (1967)6. The Indian Prime Minister then declared the insurgency as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country” in 20062.
Naxalites have strongly supported struggles by villagers against displacement as a result of the construction of special economic zones and large-scale industrial projects7. In turn, popular support for Naxalism has increased in response to the continued iniquity of government policy towards the Adivasis and lower castes3,7. In its 2010-11 Annual Report,
When India got its independence in 1947, it became the largest democracy in the world. Since independence, it has steadily sought to establish a predominant presence in South East Asia and in the global context, seeking a greater role among the developed countries in the West1. In recent years, it has become widely acknowledged as a world power, largely because of its high economic growth rate, which was a result of government policies towards economic liberalization in 1990s1,2. However, the high economic growth and increasing presence in the international stage has been paralleled by that of indigenous Maoist insurgency, which has challenged the politics upon which this growth has rested, for the past six decades3,4. The insurgency has challenged the legitimacy of the Indian government--which has abandoned the legal and constitutional duties as set in the constitution to the most disenfranchised and politically vulnerable social groups5. In refuting the authority and legitimacy of the Indian government, the Maoist groups (also known as Naxalites) has been able to achieve a great deal of popular support of the populations which it represents4. By early 2000, the extent of the political control of the Maoist insurgency was so vast, especially in the central region of India, that the government banned most Maoist organizations and declared them as terrorist organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of India (1967)6. The Indian Prime Minister then declared the insurgency as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country” in 20062.
Naxalites have strongly supported struggles by villagers against displacement as a result of the construction of special economic zones and large-scale industrial projects7. In turn, popular support for Naxalism has increased in response to the continued iniquity of government policy towards the Adivasis and lower castes3,7. In its 2010-11 Annual Report,
Bibliography: 1. Zaman, S. Naxalism – A Drag on India’s Quest for Great Power Status. Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College (2012). 8. Commission, P. Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas. New Delhi: Government of India (2008).at 9. Harnetiaux, K 12. Ganguly, S. Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects. (2009).at 13. Parashar, S 14. Gulati, M. Terrorism Life Cycle and Criminalisation: Implcations for Curbing Insurgency in India. 4th JTCDM ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE (2012).at 15. Chadha, V 16. Ramana, P. The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages, and Policy Options. (2008).at 17. Pelly, G 18. Lalwani, S. India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem. New America Foundation (2009). 19. Borooah, V. Deprivation, violence, and conflict: An analysis of Naxalite activity in the districts of India. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (2008).at 20. Bajpai, K 21. Pradhan, P. K. Evaluation of Extremisim in Central India. (2009). 22. Morrison, C. Grievance, Mobilisation and State Response: An examination of the Naxalite Insurgency in India. Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security (2012). 23. Mehra, A. Naxalism in India: Revolution or terror? Terrorism and Political Violence (2000).at 24. Lange, K 25. Miklian, J. The purification hunt: the Salwa Judum counterinsurgency in Chhattisgarh, India. Dialectical anthropology (2009).at 26. Sundar, N 27. Mohanty, M. Challenges of revolutionary violence: The Naxalite movement in perspective. Economic and Political Weekly (2006).at 28. Chas Morrison Root causes of Naxalism 29. Gupta, D. The Naxalites and the Maoist Movement in India: Birth, Demise, and Reincarnation. Democracy and Security (2007).at 30. Rao, L