Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run
INSTITUTIONS AS A FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF LONG-RUN GROWTH
DARON ACEMOGLU
1 ,
Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive E52-3806, Cambridge, MA 02142 e-mail: damn@mit.edu
SIMON JOHNSON
Sloan School o f h f a ~ g e m e n t , MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142 e-mail: sjohnson@mit.edu
JAMES A. ROBINSON
Deparhnent of Government, WCFIA, Harvard University, 1033 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138 e-mail: jmbinson@gov.harvard.edu
Contents
Abstract Keywords 1. Introduction
1.1. The question 1.2. The argument 1.3. Outline
2. Fundamental causes of income differences
2.1. Three fundamental causes 2.1.1. Economic institutions 2.1.2. Geography 2.1.3. Culture
3. Institutions matter
3.1. The Korean experiment 3.2. The colonial experiment
4. The Reversal of Fortune i I
4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4.
The reversal among the former colonies Timing of the reversal Interpreting the reversal Economic institutions and the reversal
Handbook ofEconomic Gmwth, Volume IA. Edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf O 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved 0 0 1 : lO.l016/Sl574-W84(05)OloW-3
D. Acemoglu er al.
4.5. Understanding the colonial experience 4.6. Settlements, mortality and development
5. Why do institutions differ?
5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4.
The efficient institutions view - the Political Coase Theorem The ideology view The incidental institutions view The social conflict view Hold-up Political losers Economic losers The inseparability of efficiency and distribution Comparative statics The colonial experiencein light of the comparative statics Reassessment of the social conflict view Labor markets Financial markets Regulation of prices Political power and economic institutions
6. Sources of inefficiencies
7. The social conflict view in action
'
8. A theory of institutions
8.1. Sources of political power 8.2. Political power and political institutions 8.3. A
DARON ACEMOGLU
1 ,
Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive E52-3806, Cambridge, MA 02142 e-mail: damn@mit.edu
SIMON JOHNSON
Sloan School o f h f a ~ g e m e n t , MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142 e-mail: sjohnson@mit.edu
JAMES A. ROBINSON
Deparhnent of Government, WCFIA, Harvard University, 1033 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138 e-mail: jmbinson@gov.harvard.edu
Contents
Abstract Keywords 1. Introduction
1.1. The question 1.2. The argument 1.3. Outline
2. Fundamental causes of income differences
2.1. Three fundamental causes 2.1.1. Economic institutions 2.1.2. Geography 2.1.3. Culture
3. Institutions matter
3.1. The Korean experiment 3.2. The colonial experiment
4. The Reversal of Fortune i I
4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4.
The reversal among the former colonies Timing of the reversal Interpreting the reversal Economic institutions and the reversal
Handbook ofEconomic Gmwth, Volume IA. Edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf O 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved 0 0 1 : lO.l016/Sl574-W84(05)OloW-3
D. Acemoglu er al.
4.5. Understanding the colonial experience 4.6. Settlements, mortality and development
5. Why do institutions differ?
5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4.
The efficient institutions view - the Political Coase Theorem The ideology view The incidental institutions view The social conflict view Hold-up Political losers Economic losers The inseparability of efficiency and distribution Comparative statics The colonial experiencein light of the comparative statics Reassessment of the social conflict view Labor markets Financial markets Regulation of prices Political power and economic institutions
6. Sources of inefficiencies
7. The social conflict view in action
'
8. A theory of institutions
8.1. Sources of political power 8.2. Political power and political institutions 8.3. A