Investigating Functionalism

Investigating Functionalism
Functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states. According to functionalism, mental states are functional states that are defined by their functional roles (causal relations to other things) rather than their intrinsic qualities. To illustrate the difference between the two ways of defining something, entities such as clocks (to display time) and calculators (to manipulate numbers) are defined functionally, whereas entities such as water (H2O) and gold (Au) are defined by their physical structures. In the case of mental states, what it is to have a particular mental state is to have a state that plays a particular functional role. To put it in another way, functionalism compares mental states to black
For example, for someone to believe that it is raining is for the person to be in a state such that the state is caused by the perception of rain (perceptual input), and, along with the desire to stay dry (another black box), causes the person to carry an umbrella (behavioral output). While the functionalist theory of mental states clearly explains mental states’ connections to other things, some philosophers would fret over what exactly is inside the black boxes: many have argued that functionalism cannot account for the subjective feel of conscious experience such as “the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches,” and “the smell of a rose” (Jackson, p. 311). Gilbert Harman, in “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” considers and rebuts three such arguments against functionalism. In this paper, I will specifically explain (a) the second anti-functionalism argument about color perception, (b) how Harman exploits the functionalist theory of mental representations and concepts (not just mental states) to refute the argument, and (c) why Harman’s
Harman suggests that according to the functionalist theory of the content of mental representations and concepts, (3) and (5) are true. If (2) is true, then (4) logically follows from (2) and (3), and (1) in turn follows from (4) and (5). Now the only task left for Harman to prove (1) is to prove (2), which is not an easy task. To see how Harman proves (2), we need to take a closer look at the functionalist theory of mental representations and concepts.
Similar to the functionalist theory of mental states, the functionalist theory of concepts supposes that what it is to have a particular concept is to have a concept that plays a particular functional role. Someone has the full concept of something’s being red if and only if the person has available a concept that functions in the appropriate way, which requires that the person must be disposed to use that concept in forming visual representations as the natural and immediate consequence of seeing something red. Harman assumes that a person blind from birth has “no concept of something’s being red that could be immediately brought into service in visual representations of the environment if the person were suddenly to acquire sight” (p. 651). If that is the case, then the requirement for the person to have the full concept of something’s being red is not satisfied, and thus (2) is true. However, in the next section, I will show that Harman’s line of thought in proving (2)