Just War Theory

* Just war & Crisis decision making *
The closest we have ever come to nuclear war – the Cuban missile crisis
Kevin Cossner saves the day!

Introduced to the theory of just war
How just war theory is somewhat of a compromise between a Machiavellian view that justifies all means to a more pacifist view that views war as evil regardless of the reason
Just war theory – something that tries to limit the damages of war as much as possible
Usually divided into 4 pieces
Jus Ad Bellum – justice before war
Jus in Bello – justice during war
Jus post beluum – justice after war

Jus ad Bellum
Just cause – self defense (UN Charter)
Issues like collective security, pre-emption, prevention – what is our view of self defense
We have
to try every other thing short of war before we can justify going to war
Declared publicly by a legitimate authority * Only states can declare war, and therefore any war declared by a non state actor is therefore unjust – non state actors cannot declare war * Proportionality – we need to make sure that the benefit outweighs the harm, and we need to make sure that the war is winnable – wars that are not winnable and are not proportional and therefore are unjust * These are the questions we ask before we go to war – now we need to ask questions about the conduct of war itself * * Jus in Bello * Few principles, though they are important * Hague (1899, 1907); Geneva (1949) * Limit the types of actions that are legitimate in war * Types of targets that can be selected to attack * How POWs and injured soldiers should be treated * Cultureand occupied territories – a lot of examples for the principles of jus in bello * Discrimination: protecting civilians (Geneva; nuclear weapons?
(deterrence) aerial bombing (‘smart bombs’)? Terrorism)
Discriminate between civilians and the fighting parties
In order to be protected by the geneva convention as a POW you have to wear uniforms – they allow us to disciriminate between civilians and non-civilians
When you don’t wear a uniform it becomes more difficult to distinguish between civilians and non
civilians
Nuclear weapons
Cannot discriminate because they create mass damage and mass casualties – in this view, they are unjust because they fail the test of discrimination
If nukes are unjust, then what is deterrence?
If you can’t use nukes ethically, is it even ethical to threaten with them?
What about with air power? Obviously we have better technology with smart bombs and drones
At what percentage does it become unjust?
Proportionality: double effect (Agent orange)
Jus ad bellum
The benefit brought by the war needs to outweigh the harm done by the war
Not about the balance of casualties
(double effect) For almost every effect we engage in in war, there are two consequences – during the attack, we hurt civilians attack has two effects: the one that was intended (blowing up the headquarters of the enemy) and the one that was unintended – killing civilians if we want to understand proportionality, we need to understand both effects the good that we intend to get needs to outweigh the potential benefits of our attacks proportionality is not counting casualities, but rather balancing the good and the bad that every act we engage in might bring about in this case there is a difference between bombing the headquarters of your enemy to end the war (might be just, because the good might outweigh the harm) to another type of attack, such as blowing up a school to terrorise while the first satisfies the test of the double effect, the second would not
Agent Orange – environmental conditions that would make trees in Vietnam drop leaves, so the americans would be able to see their enemies
Spreading this chemical all over the forest
In principle, this seems legitimate because it is directed at the enemy and has clear strategic reason
Problems with the double effect: is not discriminatory (hurting the environment for the civilians) difficult to justify the good, given the level of destruction and its level of discrimination
The use of agent orange is a good example of the double effect

From a documentary on Robert MacNamara (Secretary of Defense during Vietnam, during WWII he worked at the headquarters of the air force) – thinking back on the war in the pacific and some of the issues faced by just war

MacNamara raises important questions – how we think about proportionality, but how we think about justice post hoc
It is never the losers who decide what justice is
If you win, you get off scot free

Jus post Bello
Justice in Nuremburg, Israel, the Hague, Iraq, Rwanda (Gacaca, pcj)
We find out who violated international law
Who will pay for the damages caused by the war?
Common for the winning side to impose reparations on the losing side
Reparations are out of fashion today, especially after the disasterous effect of WWI
The “justice” of the winners? – when we think about justice post war, many accusations are that it is the justice of the winners
Maybe that is problematic – justice connected to issues of power
What happens after the war? Canada’s responsibilities towards Afghanistan and
You break it, you own it
Treatment of occupied territory and populations – several treaties that deal with this issue
Just occupation (humanitarian interventions)
Go to war in order to protect a certain population
Can an unjust war lead to a just post-bellum? Can a just war lead to anunust post-bellum?
Does it even matter?
“The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer.” – Kissinger at the end of the day, countries do whatever they want if they need to
Realists: at best what we see is organized hypocrisy (Krasner)
Justify everything in somewhat of a legal sense, but we find our way around things

However; decision makers and generals use the language of just war theory; certain strategies of war are less acceptable today; indication of changing norms? Changing technology? Does it affect policy?
Does this all affect policy? Do politicians really think about ethical considerations, or do they think about it solely in utilitarian terms, without worrying about the impact of their decisions?

New rules for just war? With insurgency and terrorism – do we need new rules, or are the old rules enough to provide us with ethical direction that can lead us to a more just war on terror?

International Crisis
CRISIS EVERYWHERE
Most wars are preceded by crisis and escalation
If we want to understand war, we need to understand international crisis, and particularly decision making during crisis
If we wish to avoid war we need to improve crisis management skills
Bipolarity, nuclear weapons, the cold war
Two great powers, the friction is high and there was a series of crisis through the cold war – with the threat of nuclear weapons, every crisis can be the end of humanity
During that time we have a lot of studies of crisis – today somewhat less so
What is a crisis?
What is an international Crisis
Hermann – surprise, high level of threat, short decision time
Combination of three components is what creates a crisis
Hermann takes these three variables and turns them into the decision cube

Decision cube
Has three dimensions – one follows level of threat, one follows decision time, and one follows level of surprise
The most dangerous occasions approach the bottom left corner – high level of threat, short decision time, high level of surprise

Cuban Missile Crisis * 1959 – Castro takes over cuba * November 1960 – JFK elected * Jaunary 1961 – Bay of Pigs * Soviet union is the main supporter of the Cubans, though they promise the americans that they won’t do anything crazy * Then in June of 1962 the USSR decides to introduce nuclear missiles to Cuba * The americans had nuclear weapons in Europe * Americans could target soviets, but not vice versa * 16 October 1962 – U2 Images crisis: surprise; limited time;
threat * only way to get missiles out of cuba is to attack before they are operational – had very little time * all components for the perfect storm * JFK set up Ex-Comm: 20 senior decision makers; secret; constant meetings; JFK not a member; recordings; 13 days
People might tell him or her things they want to hear – wanted to make sure that discussion was open as possible
Crisis lasts 13 days
ExComm meets and needs to decide

Possible American Response
Ignore the missiles
At the end of the day, they have nukes directed at the soviets and it does not change the grand scheme of things – so we should not care
Can try and use diplomacy – talk to the soviets and the Cubans
Surgical Bombing – try and take the missiles out by bombing those bases
Invasion – get rid of castro and the missiles
Blockade – not allow anything in or out of the country until the missiles are removed
Went with this option
Why didn’t we choose any of the other options? Each had advantages and disadvantages
If we want to understand the decision making, we have to understand why the blockade was chose
At the time, it was not a foregone conclusion

Alison’s Three Conceptual Models
Rational; Organizational; Bureaucratic
(cognitive)
like levels of analysis – these models provide us with competing explanations for political outcomes – competing descriptions of the process of decision making each captures just some of what the crisis was all about

The Rational Model
Follows the idea that when we think of a crises we do not care about who the decision makers are, it is the soviets vs the americans – it is the interests of the countries that we care about
Unitary model of decision making
Same definition of rationality as in rational choice
Describes the process of decision making rather than the outcome
Collect information; list all policy alternatives; asses cost/benefit; opt for the policy option that maximizes utility while minimizing cost/risk.
Are decision makers rational? Can they be rational in time of crisis?

The Organizational Model
Big organizations that have procedures and ways of making decisions – and it is these organizations that make decisions and decide what to do
We have to look at the way information flows inside the organization, and examine its operating procedures
The state is a collection of organizations – breaks the unitary actor
Acknowledging that the state is built out of different procedures
Navy and the air force are on the same side, but they run differently and have different cultures, structures and operating procedures which can put them in conflict with eachother
When a crisis happens, organizations follow procedures - prepared in advance for such an event
They will use the most appropriate/most easily available/most salient preset procedure/scenario to deal with the crisis (standard operating procedures)
At best – bounded rationality

The Bureaucratic Model
Rejects the notion of the unitary actor – states do not make decisions, bureaucrats make them
The generals, the secretary of state, the ambassadors, the officers and the president – they are the ones who make the decisiosn
Each of them has bureaucratic interests
The rule for bureaucratic models is that while we are all on the same side, there is competition over power and resources
The outcome reflects the balance of power within the government
Where you sit is also your stand
Explaining the Cuban missile crisis: power between different bureaucracies in the administration in 1962

Watch an example of crisis in action
Yes Prime Minister