Justice In Plato's The Republic
In The Republic by Plato, a meta-ethical question is raised “What is justice?” The meaning of justice may mean almost anything in today’s society. During Plato’s time, however, justice is intimately connected with fairness. It is the idea that people should get what they deserve. Benevolence and mercy may lead us to give people more than they deserve but justice insists on them getting all and only what they deserve: nothing more, nothing less. In his infamous passage where Thrasymachus argues that Justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger, Socrates particularly portrays that injustices not be done, that people be treated according to the law and not according to the whims or desires of leaders or people in general. To further
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analyze the idea of justice, one must truly understand the reasoning behind both arguments. Thrasymachu’s presents his argument at line 339:
And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, [339a] which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.
(Plato, 380 BC, para. 28)
“The Stronger” in this case is clearly the “established government” which has control of the society and the ability to impose punishment on those who do not follow the rules. Justice is then applied through power by people in power. These people, or “the established government”, in power make the laws, the weaker party are then supposed to obey such laws. That is justice in the eyes of Thrasymachu. Obedience to laws made by the rulers in the interest of the rulers. Socrates, then, refutes this position by pointing out that rulers of a society make mistakes. Through a series of questions, he achieves admittance from Thrasymachu that “rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice” (Plato, 380 BC, para. 45). Rulers are, as humans, bound to make mistakes then and to confuse their disadvantage with their advantage on occasion. In this case, just obedience to laws would work to the rulers’
disadvantage. It is then that Thrasymachus responds promptly by saying that a man who makes mistakes in ruling is not that moment a ruler in the strict sense, supporting his idea with an analogy of a craftsman (Plato, 380 BC). In his analogy he makes clear that mistakes are rooted in ignorance and can only occur when a man’s knowledge of his craft is incomplete (Plato, 380 BC). His argument is basically that errors are never made by rulers as rulers. Thrasymachus has then twisted himself into a contradictory position, changing the position of the argument in Socrates favor. One could say that the argument turned earlier when Thrasymachus agreed to Socrates idea that rulers may be mistaken of their own interest. The argument, however, makes stronger presence in Socrates’ favor at this point where Thrasymachus has contradicted himself entirely:
But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, [341a] in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger. (Plato, 380 BC, para. 58)
This statement is then applied to several analogies to which Thrasymachus agrees: the doctor’s interest is that of the body, a horseman’s interest is that of the horse, the art of anything is in interest of the subject of the art (Plato, 380 BC). It is through his agreeing to these analogies that Thrasymachus further turns the favor to Socrates in the dispute of justice. It is important to note that Socrates has moved away from the common ground which previously supported the argument. Before, Socrates’ examples were not crucial to the support of the argument from one viewpoint. Socrates tried to demonstrate the illogicalities within Thrasymachus’ position, and this gave much to be gained. During their last argument, nevertheless, Socrates bases his argument on the analogy of the craftsman not the examples or the guides. Thus, Thrasymachus’ argument suffers and is questionable at the very least. It is here that the question of what is justice is truly answered. Thrasymachus could’ve argued at this point that justice is more a manner of acting rather than a craft in its own right. In this position, one could argue that justice is considered a measure of how well an action is performed than the action itself. Instead, he agreed with Socrates to no point in end until Socrates used the same questioning to the example of the rulers.
But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers [342d] of their own subjects? To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance. Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker? He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced. (Plato, 380 BC, para. 87-90)
It is here that Thrasymachus denied any and all of what he previously agreed to. Although much of the conversation continued, with the argument going back and forth, Thrasymachus could no longer truly hold his argument. Socrates, in the sense of competition, has won. His argument on justice was debated marvelously while Thrasymachus only made himself look like a fool as the conversation continued on.
analyze the idea of justice, one must truly understand the reasoning behind both arguments. Thrasymachu’s presents his argument at line 339:
And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, [339a] which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.
(Plato, 380 BC, para. 28)
“The Stronger” in this case is clearly the “established government” which has control of the society and the ability to impose punishment on those who do not follow the rules. Justice is then applied through power by people in power. These people, or “the established government”, in power make the laws, the weaker party are then supposed to obey such laws. That is justice in the eyes of Thrasymachu. Obedience to laws made by the rulers in the interest of the rulers. Socrates, then, refutes this position by pointing out that rulers of a society make mistakes. Through a series of questions, he achieves admittance from Thrasymachu that “rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice” (Plato, 380 BC, para. 45). Rulers are, as humans, bound to make mistakes then and to confuse their disadvantage with their advantage on occasion. In this case, just obedience to laws would work to the rulers’
disadvantage. It is then that Thrasymachus responds promptly by saying that a man who makes mistakes in ruling is not that moment a ruler in the strict sense, supporting his idea with an analogy of a craftsman (Plato, 380 BC). In his analogy he makes clear that mistakes are rooted in ignorance and can only occur when a man’s knowledge of his craft is incomplete (Plato, 380 BC). His argument is basically that errors are never made by rulers as rulers. Thrasymachus has then twisted himself into a contradictory position, changing the position of the argument in Socrates favor. One could say that the argument turned earlier when Thrasymachus agreed to Socrates idea that rulers may be mistaken of their own interest. The argument, however, makes stronger presence in Socrates’ favor at this point where Thrasymachus has contradicted himself entirely:
But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, [341a] in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger. (Plato, 380 BC, para. 58)
This statement is then applied to several analogies to which Thrasymachus agrees: the doctor’s interest is that of the body, a horseman’s interest is that of the horse, the art of anything is in interest of the subject of the art (Plato, 380 BC). It is through his agreeing to these analogies that Thrasymachus further turns the favor to Socrates in the dispute of justice. It is important to note that Socrates has moved away from the common ground which previously supported the argument. Before, Socrates’ examples were not crucial to the support of the argument from one viewpoint. Socrates tried to demonstrate the illogicalities within Thrasymachus’ position, and this gave much to be gained. During their last argument, nevertheless, Socrates bases his argument on the analogy of the craftsman not the examples or the guides. Thus, Thrasymachus’ argument suffers and is questionable at the very least. It is here that the question of what is justice is truly answered. Thrasymachus could’ve argued at this point that justice is more a manner of acting rather than a craft in its own right. In this position, one could argue that justice is considered a measure of how well an action is performed than the action itself. Instead, he agreed with Socrates to no point in end until Socrates used the same questioning to the example of the rulers.
But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers [342d] of their own subjects? To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance. Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker? He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced. (Plato, 380 BC, para. 87-90)
It is here that Thrasymachus denied any and all of what he previously agreed to. Although much of the conversation continued, with the argument going back and forth, Thrasymachus could no longer truly hold his argument. Socrates, in the sense of competition, has won. His argument on justice was debated marvelously while Thrasymachus only made himself look like a fool as the conversation continued on.