Kansas Vs. Cheever: Supreme Court Case
Kansas V. Cheever
Karina Garcia
CJ 400 Constitutional Law
Judge Sue Kurita
May 8, 2014
Abstract
In today’s society, the death penalty is still a very controversial topic on its own however, add the possibility of a Fifth Amendment violation makes it worse. For the people in the State of Kansas, it something for significant since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1994. The case of Kansas V. Cheever involves just that, the sentence of death for a man accused of killing a Kansas Sherriff. During the trial the defendant declared a voluntary intoxication defense due to the consumption of methamphetamines at the time of the killing. A mental health exam was ordered to see if Cheever’s mental capacity made him incapable of premeditation …show more content…
3d, at 1023, it reasoned that voluntary intoxication is not a “mental disease or defect” as a matter of state law. Id., at 250, 284 P. 3d, at 1023–1024 (citing State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 40 P. 3d 139 (2001)). The court therefore concluded that “Cheever did not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege and thus permit his court ordered examination by Dr. Welner to be used against him at trial.” 295 Kan., at 251, 284 P. 3d, at 1024. This reasoning misconstrues our precedents. Although Kansas law defines “mental disease or defect” narrowly, exclude voluntary intoxication, that phrase is actually not the salient one under our precedents. In Buchanan, we permitted rebuttal testimony where the defendant presented evidence of “the mental status’ defense of extreme emotional disturbance.” 483 U. S., at 423. And “mental status” is a broader term than “mental disease or defect,” at least to the extent that Kansas law excludes voluntary intoxication from that definition. Mental-status defenses include those based on psychological expert evidence as to a defendant’s mens rea, mental capacity to commit the crime, or ability to premeditate. Defendants need not assert a “mental disease or defect” in order to assert a defense based on “mental status.” To the extent that the Kansas Supreme Court declined to apply Buchanan because Cheever’s intoxication was “temporary,” our precedents are again not so narrowly circumscribed. Like voluntary intoxication, extreme emotional disturbance is a “temporary” condition, at least according to the Kentucky state courts where Buchanan was tried. See McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S. W. 2d 464, 468–469 (Ky. 1986) (defining extreme emotional disturbance
Karina Garcia
CJ 400 Constitutional Law
Judge Sue Kurita
May 8, 2014
Abstract
In today’s society, the death penalty is still a very controversial topic on its own however, add the possibility of a Fifth Amendment violation makes it worse. For the people in the State of Kansas, it something for significant since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1994. The case of Kansas V. Cheever involves just that, the sentence of death for a man accused of killing a Kansas Sherriff. During the trial the defendant declared a voluntary intoxication defense due to the consumption of methamphetamines at the time of the killing. A mental health exam was ordered to see if Cheever’s mental capacity made him incapable of premeditation …show more content…
3d, at 1023, it reasoned that voluntary intoxication is not a “mental disease or defect” as a matter of state law. Id., at 250, 284 P. 3d, at 1023–1024 (citing State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 40 P. 3d 139 (2001)). The court therefore concluded that “Cheever did not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege and thus permit his court ordered examination by Dr. Welner to be used against him at trial.” 295 Kan., at 251, 284 P. 3d, at 1024. This reasoning misconstrues our precedents. Although Kansas law defines “mental disease or defect” narrowly, exclude voluntary intoxication, that phrase is actually not the salient one under our precedents. In Buchanan, we permitted rebuttal testimony where the defendant presented evidence of “the mental status’ defense of extreme emotional disturbance.” 483 U. S., at 423. And “mental status” is a broader term than “mental disease or defect,” at least to the extent that Kansas law excludes voluntary intoxication from that definition. Mental-status defenses include those based on psychological expert evidence as to a defendant’s mens rea, mental capacity to commit the crime, or ability to premeditate. Defendants need not assert a “mental disease or defect” in order to assert a defense based on “mental status.” To the extent that the Kansas Supreme Court declined to apply Buchanan because Cheever’s intoxication was “temporary,” our precedents are again not so narrowly circumscribed. Like voluntary intoxication, extreme emotional disturbance is a “temporary” condition, at least according to the Kentucky state courts where Buchanan was tried. See McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S. W. 2d 464, 468–469 (Ky. 1986) (defining extreme emotional disturbance