All of the social and political theories discussed in the previous sections agree that good leadership must be in the interests of followers. Where they disagree is on how much inequality between leaders and followers can be justified in pursuit of the common interest. Thus far we have equated the common interest with the interests of leaders and followers alone.[11] We turn now to a second main question about inequality that arises when we notice that outsiders also have interests, which sometimes compete with the interests of leaders and followers. Liberal moral theory, of which utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigm examples, is committed to the claim that individuals count equally, regardless of group membership. On these theories at least, it is hard to see how leaders and followers might be justified in putting their interests and projects ahead of the interests and projects of members of the outgroup. For example, utilitarianism holds that the capacity for happiness and suffering is the only morally relevant characteristic, and we can assume that this capacity does not differ with membership in social groups.[12] The same can be said for the central characteristic that Kantians find morally relevant, namely, the capacity for rationality. On the face of it, then, both moral theories conflict with what many see as a defining characteristic of leadership as we know it: leaders and followers must be willing to put the interests and projects of group members ahead of the interests and projects of outsiders. In most cases, without this kind of unequal consideration, leadership would not be recognizable to us (Price 2006, ch. 4).
Utilitarian moral theory, as developed by philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-73), R.M. Hare (1919-2002) and Peter Singer (1946-), holds that the morality of an action is determined by the overall happiness or