Landrum Griffin Act Case Analysis
Issue: Are union members protected in their role as officers under the Landrum-Griffin Act (LMRDA) of 1959?
Arguments for dismissal The central principle against protection for union officers is grounded in the statuary language of § 101(a)(1) and (2) of the LMRDA, which states that “every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges.” 29 U.S.C. § 411. Section 101(a)(1) and (2) explicitly contains the language of “every member” with no direct reference to officers. As noted in Sheridan v. Carpenters, 50 LRRM 2637 (1962), the court found that legislative history shows that Congress intended the protection of equal rights to be applicable to officers As a result of ambiguities in the statutory language and legislative …show more content…
history, the court recognized held that the scope of protection in the LMRDA did not extend to the union-officer relationship. This is because the bill that originally passed by the Senate contained the phrase “the right of any member or officer”, but the “corresponding provision of the bill that was subsequently passed by the House did not contain the word officer.” (pg. 2641). Since the “Conference Committee adopted the House version” that “speaks only of the right of members”, there is congressional intent that officers would be excluded from the LMRDA. (pg. 2641). Therefore, if Congress intended the act to protect union officers, they would have included specific terminology that referred to officers. The second argument against protection for union officers is that there is a distinction between union membership and employment in the union. Since union officials are in a position of authority within the union, they have greater duties to the organization as well as the general membership. While a person is free as a union member to exercise certain rights, once he becomes a union official, he is obligated to uphold and implement the union’s values and policies. The court in Newman v. Communication Workers, 101 LRRM 2265 (1979) recognized that “the management of a union…command[s] a reasonable degree of loyalty and support from its representatives.” (pg. 2266). Comparing a union to other enterprises, the court recognized that, unlike ordinary members, union officers have different duties and rights that are needed for ensure the proper function of the union. In order to carry out those duties, union officials have to display loyalty and conviction to the organization. As shown in Navarro v. Leu, 101 LRRM 2057 (1979), the district court reasoned that union officers are expected to “engage in conduct consistent with the leadership’s established policies.” (pg. 2058). Since loyalty is a core function to unity and success of the union, officers have to give up certain rights in order serve the organization. By giving up rights such as free speech, officials become fundamentally different than ordinary members. Therefore, in order to fulfill their responsibilities to the organization, union officers have to surrender certain rights so they should not be protected under the act.
Argument against dismissal The central principle in favor of protection for union officers is rooted in the primary objective of the LMRDA to strengthen union democracy and the need for dissenting opinions.
In Grand Lodge v. King, 56 LRRM 2639 (1964), the court found no evidence that Congress intended to exclude officers from protection under the act because they are best equipped to further the union democratic process through their uninhibited exercise of free speech. As evinced in King, protection for union officers “keep[s] union government vigorously and effectively democratic.” (pg. 2641). It is essential for union officers to possess the right of free speech because they have a greater obligation and responsibility to voice opposing opinions and offer alternatives suggestions to their constituencies. Furthermore, open discussions and criticism will promote accountability and help combat abuse of power and corruption within the union. If officers were not protected under the act, they will be reluctant to express dissenting views, which will discourage others from seeking office and weaken union democracy. This “chilling effect” of free speech is recognized in Maceira v. Pagan, 107 LRRM 2408 (pg. 2411). The court concluded in Maceira that rights of expression would mean very little if union were able to freely remove any officials who expressed dissenting points of view. In order to safeguard the free circulation of expression and uphold Congress’s intent to strengthen union democracy, officers should be protected under the
LMRDA. Another fundamental justification for protection of union officials is centered on the broad statuary language and its failure to explicitly exclude officers from the phrase “every member” in § 101(a)(1) and (2) of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. § 411. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grand Lodge v. King, 56 LRRM 2639 (1964) addressed Congress’s intent to include officers because there was no specific language to exclude union officials. If Congress wanted to deny protection to officers, they would have inserted language to do so. Instead, the act states “every member” and officials are also members of the unions. 29 U.S.C. § 411. Since officers are members, they are protected under the LMRDA. Furthermore, the court in Maceira v. Pagan, 107 LRRM 2408 noted that there was no need for Congress to explicitly include officers because the statutory language was written to be flexible without the requirement for a broad blanket exemption. Given that Congress did not intent to exclude union officials under the LMRDA, they should be protected like any and all members.
Issue: Does the removal of union officers constitute discipline under the Landrum-Griffin Act (LMRDA) of 1959?
Argument for dismissal Section 101(a)(5) of LMRDA, which provides guarantees against certain disciplinary action by the union, has been a source of contention with many different judicial interpretations. The salient proposition against the removal of union officers to be considered as discipline stems from the exegesis of the phrase "fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined” and its relationship to membership status in the organization. 29 U.S.C. §529. The majority opinion in Sheridan v. Carpenters, 50 LRRM 2637 (1962) concluded that the three disciplinary sanctions (fine, suspension, and expulsion) evince Congressional intent to protect members against members. Since Congress designated the purpose of the act to apply specifically to all members, the removal of union officials should not be considered discipline because it only impacts a limited group of members. Furthermore, when a union official is removed from their position, they are no longer members of the organization. This demonstrates that removal has no affect on the union-member relationship, which is needed to constitute discipline. The court in Seeley v. Brotherhood, 51 LRRM 2042 (1962) reaffirmed the premise that discipline only includes actions that affect membership status in the union. Since the act only encompasses disciplinary measure relating to membership status in the union, removal is not considered as a sanction that falls under “otherwise discipline”. 29 U.S.C. §529
Argument against dismissal The primary argument for removal of union officers to be considered as discipline arises from the phraseology of the term “otherwise discipline” in § 609 of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. §529. As noted in Bradford v. Textile Workers, 96 LRRM 2690 (1977), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that every word or phrase in a statue is written with an intentional purpose. Since term “otherwise discipline” has an ambiguous scope, it demonstrates that Congress must have deliberately written the act to have a broad provision. Therefore, if Congress intended the phrase to have a liberal limitation, the court concluded that it must encompass the removal of union officials in retaliation for free speech.
Arguments for dismissal The central principle against protection for union officers is grounded in the statuary language of § 101(a)(1) and (2) of the LMRDA, which states that “every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges.” 29 U.S.C. § 411. Section 101(a)(1) and (2) explicitly contains the language of “every member” with no direct reference to officers. As noted in Sheridan v. Carpenters, 50 LRRM 2637 (1962), the court found that legislative history shows that Congress intended the protection of equal rights to be applicable to officers As a result of ambiguities in the statutory language and legislative …show more content…
history, the court recognized held that the scope of protection in the LMRDA did not extend to the union-officer relationship. This is because the bill that originally passed by the Senate contained the phrase “the right of any member or officer”, but the “corresponding provision of the bill that was subsequently passed by the House did not contain the word officer.” (pg. 2641). Since the “Conference Committee adopted the House version” that “speaks only of the right of members”, there is congressional intent that officers would be excluded from the LMRDA. (pg. 2641). Therefore, if Congress intended the act to protect union officers, they would have included specific terminology that referred to officers. The second argument against protection for union officers is that there is a distinction between union membership and employment in the union. Since union officials are in a position of authority within the union, they have greater duties to the organization as well as the general membership. While a person is free as a union member to exercise certain rights, once he becomes a union official, he is obligated to uphold and implement the union’s values and policies. The court in Newman v. Communication Workers, 101 LRRM 2265 (1979) recognized that “the management of a union…command[s] a reasonable degree of loyalty and support from its representatives.” (pg. 2266). Comparing a union to other enterprises, the court recognized that, unlike ordinary members, union officers have different duties and rights that are needed for ensure the proper function of the union. In order to carry out those duties, union officials have to display loyalty and conviction to the organization. As shown in Navarro v. Leu, 101 LRRM 2057 (1979), the district court reasoned that union officers are expected to “engage in conduct consistent with the leadership’s established policies.” (pg. 2058). Since loyalty is a core function to unity and success of the union, officers have to give up certain rights in order serve the organization. By giving up rights such as free speech, officials become fundamentally different than ordinary members. Therefore, in order to fulfill their responsibilities to the organization, union officers have to surrender certain rights so they should not be protected under the act.
Argument against dismissal The central principle in favor of protection for union officers is rooted in the primary objective of the LMRDA to strengthen union democracy and the need for dissenting opinions.
In Grand Lodge v. King, 56 LRRM 2639 (1964), the court found no evidence that Congress intended to exclude officers from protection under the act because they are best equipped to further the union democratic process through their uninhibited exercise of free speech. As evinced in King, protection for union officers “keep[s] union government vigorously and effectively democratic.” (pg. 2641). It is essential for union officers to possess the right of free speech because they have a greater obligation and responsibility to voice opposing opinions and offer alternatives suggestions to their constituencies. Furthermore, open discussions and criticism will promote accountability and help combat abuse of power and corruption within the union. If officers were not protected under the act, they will be reluctant to express dissenting views, which will discourage others from seeking office and weaken union democracy. This “chilling effect” of free speech is recognized in Maceira v. Pagan, 107 LRRM 2408 (pg. 2411). The court concluded in Maceira that rights of expression would mean very little if union were able to freely remove any officials who expressed dissenting points of view. In order to safeguard the free circulation of expression and uphold Congress’s intent to strengthen union democracy, officers should be protected under the
LMRDA. Another fundamental justification for protection of union officials is centered on the broad statuary language and its failure to explicitly exclude officers from the phrase “every member” in § 101(a)(1) and (2) of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. § 411. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grand Lodge v. King, 56 LRRM 2639 (1964) addressed Congress’s intent to include officers because there was no specific language to exclude union officials. If Congress wanted to deny protection to officers, they would have inserted language to do so. Instead, the act states “every member” and officials are also members of the unions. 29 U.S.C. § 411. Since officers are members, they are protected under the LMRDA. Furthermore, the court in Maceira v. Pagan, 107 LRRM 2408 noted that there was no need for Congress to explicitly include officers because the statutory language was written to be flexible without the requirement for a broad blanket exemption. Given that Congress did not intent to exclude union officials under the LMRDA, they should be protected like any and all members.
Issue: Does the removal of union officers constitute discipline under the Landrum-Griffin Act (LMRDA) of 1959?
Argument for dismissal Section 101(a)(5) of LMRDA, which provides guarantees against certain disciplinary action by the union, has been a source of contention with many different judicial interpretations. The salient proposition against the removal of union officers to be considered as discipline stems from the exegesis of the phrase "fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined” and its relationship to membership status in the organization. 29 U.S.C. §529. The majority opinion in Sheridan v. Carpenters, 50 LRRM 2637 (1962) concluded that the three disciplinary sanctions (fine, suspension, and expulsion) evince Congressional intent to protect members against members. Since Congress designated the purpose of the act to apply specifically to all members, the removal of union officials should not be considered discipline because it only impacts a limited group of members. Furthermore, when a union official is removed from their position, they are no longer members of the organization. This demonstrates that removal has no affect on the union-member relationship, which is needed to constitute discipline. The court in Seeley v. Brotherhood, 51 LRRM 2042 (1962) reaffirmed the premise that discipline only includes actions that affect membership status in the union. Since the act only encompasses disciplinary measure relating to membership status in the union, removal is not considered as a sanction that falls under “otherwise discipline”. 29 U.S.C. §529
Argument against dismissal The primary argument for removal of union officers to be considered as discipline arises from the phraseology of the term “otherwise discipline” in § 609 of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. §529. As noted in Bradford v. Textile Workers, 96 LRRM 2690 (1977), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that every word or phrase in a statue is written with an intentional purpose. Since term “otherwise discipline” has an ambiguous scope, it demonstrates that Congress must have deliberately written the act to have a broad provision. Therefore, if Congress intended the phrase to have a liberal limitation, the court concluded that it must encompass the removal of union officials in retaliation for free speech.