Marquis's Arguments Against Abortion

Warren states that the anti-abortionist must show that the fetus is a person in the full moral sense, not just in a genetic sense. The moral community, she believes, consists of all and only people, rather than merely human beings. She finds a distinction between a human being (someone genetically human) and a person (someone we have included in our moral community). She gives the example of finding life forms on another planet, and questions how humanity would decide if they should be treated as persons, or as potential sources of food. The determining factors she decides on are five traits of personhood: consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate, and self-awareness. While a being need not have all five
to qualify as a person, a being that lacks any of the qualities is not a person. Therefore, a genetic sense of humanity (having human genes) is neither sufficient nor necessary to show personhood. Thus, having a certain resemblance to a person physically is not grounds for personhood, nor is the emotional response of others. Therefore, despite genetics or possible physical appearance, a fetus is not a person. And, as only people have moral rights, fetuses do not have moral rights, and thus killing them (ie. abortion) is morally permissible. Abortion is still morally permissible, Warren maintains, even when presented with the argument of “potential personhood”. We as a society do not need to assume that such a potential person has no rights, she argues, but it does not have full rights, which the mother does have. Thus, a woman’s right to protect her health, happiness, freedom, and even her life by terminating an unwanted pregnancy will always override any rights we ascribe to the non-person in the moral sense, making abortion morally permissible.
Don Marquis view of abortion not only differs from Thompson and Warren, but he also takes a different method to structure his arguments than most anti-abortion advocates. He believes a more theoretical account of why killing is wrong is essential to the abortion debate. Why, he asks, is it wrong to kill human beings? The answer, he believes, lies not merely in the inherent loss of biological life. Instead, the deprivation of a “valuable human future” must be taken into account. This consists of all the experiences activities, projects, and enjoyments that would have constituted their future without their death. The loss of this, Marquis argues, makes killing prima facie seriously wrong (in other words, killing is so wrong that it cannot be trumped by any other duties making it morally permissible). A fetus, regardless of whether or not it is yet a “person” has a future like that of a human person, Marquis believes. The crucial category here is whether a being has a “valuable human future”, not personhood. Therefore, as a fetus has this future, it follows that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill a fetus, and thus abortion is morally wrong. This argument differs from many abortion arguments as it avoids the issue of classifying what qualifies as a “person” or “human being”. It also differs from many anti-abortion arguments, as it does not make contraception wrong, as there is no being yet with a unique and meaningful future, only possible beings. The same holds true with ending the life of human cells, if those cells lack the essential property of future. Further, though Marquis’ argument makes killing a fetus just as morally wrong as killing any other person, he does admit that there may be rare exceptions to this rule. Marquis’ argument also comes with several important implications related to abortion.
With his moral viewpoint, it is not only wrong to kill biological humans, but also possible other life forms similar to us (contrary to biological anti-abortion views). It is also wrong to kill certain nonhuman mammals in our own planet that are very like us (supporting animal rights). Further, killing infants is clearly wrong (in contrast to personhood theories that self-awareness constitutes human personhood). Finally, Marquis’ argument rules that euthanasia can be moral (unlike sanctity of life theories) if the person’s future only contains pain and suffering. While I am pro-choice like Warren, I do not agree with the entirety of her argument. Her qualifications for personhood exclude several groups from the moral community, such as infants and young toddlers. Through her reasoning, there would be just as little harm in killing an two year old child as in killing a three month old fetus. Therefore, I don’t think her qualifications to be included into the moral community are acceptable. I do agree with her point about a fetus’ potential rights, though- that they have some rights, but not full rights, and therefore the woman’s right to her own body override
them.
I prefer Warren’s approach of partial rights to Marquis’ view that fetus’ have full rights. To me, the combination of the definitive future of the mother and the fact that she currently has a valuable human life, not just a potential one, grant the mother greater rights over the fetus. Further, Marquis’ argument works on the theory that the fetus will have a valuable human future, but it does not take into account the effect having a child will have a mother’s life. It could make her future invaluable, thus making her life, through his logic, permissible to be ended. Marquis never takes into account the rights of the mother, or her bodily autonomy, choosing instead to focus solely on the rights he perceives the fetus to have. I don’t think any argument about abortion can be complete unless the mother is discussed, as she is the one who will be forced to carry the fetus, with her life ultimately disrupted and changed.
For these reasons, I find Thompson's argument most convincing.
By treating the fetus as a person, she takes into account the rights of both the mother and the fetus. However, she doesn’t base her arguments on possible futures, like Marquis- instead she compares their situations (one party growing within, the other being forced to house it), personal rights, and responsibilities to one another (if any). What was particularly convincing to me about her argument was how she argued that abortion does not need to be decent or unselfish to be morally permissible. This removes a lot of the responsibility of a mother to keep an unwanted fetus just to be a “good person”, rather than end their unwanted pregnancy. Thompson’s definition of the right to life was also significant to me. That a fetus has the right not to be killed unjustly, not not be killed, and the right to life, but not whatever it takes to sustain that life (such as in the example of the kidney donor), and this is an important distinction. This view protects the rights of the fetus, but also protects the rights and autonomy of the mother. Further, it recognizes that some rights are stronger than other rights, giving the mother the proper moral rights as not only a fully realized person, but one that would have to give the fetus life as well. Due to these reasons, I find Thompson’s argument as to why abortion is morally permissible the most
convincing.
Viewing abortion is morally permissible is the right moral position to hold for a number of reasons. Even when including Thompson’s argument, a newly conceived fetus (or one in the first or second trimester) is not a person yet. Therefore it lacks the rights that should be ascribed to the mother. Even if the fetus has potential humanhood or rights, the right of the mother to her own body and life far outweighs them. Though a woman may consent to sex, they are not necessarily consenting to pregnancy. To say that they do is to act as though the potential consequences of every action should be treated as mandatory. Even in the case of consensual sex without contraceptives, the woman should not have the requirement to carry a pregnancy to term. The woman should have no “special responsibility” to pregnancy simply because they had sex. For these reasons, abortion is a morally permissible action.