Michael Walzer's Persecution Of War

The purpose of the War Convention is to establish the duties of the persons engaged in the act of aggression. Michael Walzer defined the War Convention as the articulated norms, customs, professional codes, precepts, religious, philosophical principles and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgement of military conduct. Thus, the War Convention may be interpreted as the multitude of non-binding moral criteria by which the justice of actions within the prosecution of conflict may be judged. The concern is with jus in bello, justice in war, and not jus ad bellum, which regards the just initiation of war. The distinction between the justice of war and the just prosecution of war is significant for the purpose of this essay, for it is the
epicentre of Walzer’s revision to the War Convention’s principle which contends that once hostilities commence, soldiers are subject to harm at any time. The objective of this essay is to explain the War Convention’s assertion that short of capture or wound, soldiers are always subject to harm. Then, I will present Walzer’s critique of this principle, and the rationale for this defence, and finally, I will argue that the War Convention’s principle to attack soldiers at any time is unfair and defend Walzer’s revision.
May the following quote by Jean Jacques Rousseau be the guiding rationale of my argument:
“... War is a relation between State and State, both sides have a right to kill its defenders, while they bear arms. But as soon as they lay down their arms, they cease to be instruments of the enemy State and become, once again, merely men, whose life no one has any right to take.” The distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is a significant, because soldiers are not responsible for the initiation of aggression, however, there remains a small sphere of responsibility, wherein the soldiers are responsible for their actions. Walzer provides the example of Erwin Rommel, the german officer who defied Hitler’s Commando Order in1942 and did not let an unjust war, defile his individual character. Moreover, whilst war is an intentional human activity governed by prohibitive and permissive rules, war is precisely not a relationship between individual beings. Rather, war is a relationship between political entities and their human instruments. Not only is war a relationship between States, the combatants who prosecute the war on behalf of their country are furthermore directly or indirectly coerced through war-time propaganda, conscription, or merely by the duty to obey the State. Thus, modern warfare is no longer voluntary or subject to codes of chivalry. Modern soldiers are nationalized and sent to die in their masses. Finally, soldiers are complex beings; some do not identify as warriors at all, and whilst others may identify themselves as such, war is not their personal enterprise and soldiers engage in various activities which have absolutely no relation to war, but are merely human activities. This is significant because Walzer will appeal to such harmless activity, or human acts which do not contribute to the sentiments of alienation felt by combatants, and use such acts as a defence to sometimes retract from doing what is permissible, namely, killing the enemy. The principle of Discrimination and Noncombatant Immunity refer to the permissive and prohibitive elements which devise the War Convention.
The principles contend that in the prosecution of aggression, there are legitimate or permissible targets which are combatants, whether their cause be just or unjust. Conversely, noncombatants are prohibited and illegitimate targets. Both of these principles are significant, however, for our purposes, I will address the permissible element, as it that which Walzer deems unfair and, thus subjects to revision. The War Convention maintains that soldiers may be subjected to harm as soon as hostilities begin, as soldiers are a class set apart from the realm of peaceful activity. The reason for this belief is based on the rationale of the surrender of civilian rights and the gain of war rights. Civilians have the right to life and liberty. They ought to be immune from harm, and they also do not have the right to kill, nor to be killed. However, soldier’s war rights involve gaining the right to kill and to be killed. Thus, by merely engaging in war, soldiers lose the right to life and liberty and the as well as the immunity from harm. Finally, the remains the refusal to impose any limits on harming enemy soldiers based on “reason of war” which contends that certain actions are necessary to compel the submission of the enemy without extending the expenditure of time, life, and money. This permissiveness is problematic for, if the purpose of the
Just War tradition is to limit excessive harm and minimize instances of suffering, having a blanket permission to engage in aggression may be counterintuitive. However, one may critique my objection on the grounds that by merely engaging in war, soldiers give up their right to life to the State and their life is no longer their own. This objection will be addressed by Walzer, and will be rejected on historical grounds and more importantly, by arguing that sometimes morality requires doing less than is permitted. One may critique Walzer’s attempt to reconcile an absolute prohibition with a relativity, however, deeper understanding of Walzer’s revision provide clarity. Now that I have presented the reasons for belief in accordance to the War Convention, I will present Walzer’s critique of the permissive principle. The examples used by Walzer are instances in history as well an appeal to passion, to sentiments regarding the deeper moral quality of soldiers, as human beings. These two methods of argument are sufficient to defend Walzer’s claim that sometimes, morality involves doing less than is permitted. Although one may critique Walzer’s attempt to reconcile an absolute permission with a relativity, greater analysis of Walzer’s argument points to the the focal and pertinent fact that remains relevant even in the midst of hell; that once soldiers lay down their arms, they cease to be instruments of the enemy State. They cease to be beings alienated from one’s own being, and become, by virtue of their harmless activity, human beings whose life it would be unfair to take, whose termination would be simply cruel and murder. There are various instances throughout the history of war and conflict wherein soldiers regained their right to life merely by engaging in activities which do not contribute to military threat. The argument of the Naked Soldier is both literal and figurative; literal because it points to actual historical events, and figurative insomuch as it works as a symbolism for refraining to kill individuals who engage in harmless conditions, say, taking a bath. Walzer’s argument is defended through appeals to historical instances wherein soldiers deemed or felt like killing an enemy soldier did not feel right. This is represented in the five instances of a goofy soldier, one mesmerizing at a sunrise, lighting a cigarette, taking a bath, or running with one’s trousers down. Such instances are not in themselves harmful or conducive to the war effort, thus to take their lives is unfair. Although one sergeant critiqued its soldiers failure to kill the enemy, for it may have compromised their trenches’ location. The second significant argument made by Walzer is that during actual combat, soldiers have a false consciousness or a condition of alienation vis à vis their enemy. Soldiers perceive the enemy as inanimate, estranged, or “…like isolate buildings uninhabited by men”. However, Walzer argues that this alienation is temporary, and humanity imminent. This essential being is restored through acts of humanity; which is precisely why Walzer appealed to the five instances above. It is important to note that Walzer contends that his revision is not a normative claim, but rather an appeal to passion over principle, and appeal to a deeper human consciousness which led soldiers to refrain from doing what was permissible under the War Convention. This is represented in the manner that George Orwell explicated himself, he did not shoot the enemy because he ought not to have, but rather, because Orwell did not feel like shooting the enemy. Or, Emilio Lussu who drew the line between soldiers as a member of army who engage in war collectively, versus a lone individual who stands alone. Emilio objected to stalk a human prey. Walzer also presents the nineteenth century convention which tried to exempt lone sentinels from harm, for to kill such guards would be nothing short of murder. Another example presented by Walzer is from Francis Lieber draft for the union Army during the revolution of 1776, wherein outposts, sentinels, and pickets were not to be killed. The significance of Walzer’s five examples, Lieber’s draft or simple attempts to exempt Naked Soldiers all have at the heart of their rationale a deeper moral recognition of the equal moral status of soldiers. These historical instances and codes of restrictions are based on a moral recognition regarding the inextricable quality of soldiers as primarily human beings, as moral agents with the right to life. This sentiment is not derived from abstract theory or normative claim, but merely and thus, most importantly, a deeper moral sentiment which binds and unites mankind in common. In direct opposition to Walzer’s revision is the “reason of war” doctrine which contends that it is sometimes necessary to compel the submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. This doctrine contends that soldiers are a class apart from the world of peaceful activity, and are thus, liable to harm because soldiers are already fighters. Moreover, contrary to Walzer, “reason of war” argues that although individual soldiers are not always engaged directly in war, war is nonetheless, the enterprise of their class. Thus, soldiers may personally be attacked insomuch as the attack would be conducive to military necessity or leading to the submission of the enemy. Although, I wonder to what extent such killings would have to promptly end wars. For, State do not simply initiate aggression, States also maintain the power to bring an end to hostilities. Thus, I reject the attempt to place such a heavy burden upon soldiers. This rationale is absurd, insomuch as those who wield the power to initiate war and end hostilities are never themselves subject to the hellish condition of war. I maintain that Walzer’s revision to the War Convention is a sufficient defence to prove that the permissive principle is unfair.
I argue this on the grounds that by forcing soldiers to kill, even within instances, wherein the individual at the end of the barrel is merely conducting human activity, does not expedite the end of hostilities. I have already refuted that claim. More importantly, the permissive principle does not merely steal the enemy’s right to life. It also corrupts the moral character of the soldier wielding the weapon, for it is one’s consciousness itself that refuses to kill an enemy that does not pose a military threat. To disregard one’s consciousness is to corrupt one’s essential being. And, since war is not a relationship between individual soldiers, but rather between political entities, the permissive element is furthermore a violation to human nature itself. Finally, no matter how many theories of war rights or conventions are presented, one fact which cannot be refuted is the inextricable quality of soldiers as human beings. It is for this reason that I agree with Walzer’s defence that sometimes morality involves doing less than is
permitted.