Opinions differ greatly about how a Middle Class shall be determined.31 Since income isn't reported consistently and living costs and wages differ greatly between cities and across regions, I will rely on occupation as a criteria of the middle class stratum. As noted by many scholars, there's no monolithic middle class in China due to its heterogeneity in terms of employment, relation to the state (Li, 2010) and political behaviour (Li He, 2010). Li Chunling (2010) describes subgroups within the middle class based on their employment.32 Yet it can be argued that a so-called middle class stratum exists and Wang (2006) identifies common characteristics irrespective of possibly differing identities of the subgroups. …show more content…
In contrast to an active civil society that was assumed to be a harbinger of democratisation during Europe's industrialisation (Wang, 2014) or in Taiwan (Hurtado, 2014), until now the Chinese middle class hasn't constituted itself as an initiator akin to countries’ substantial middle classes as described by S. Huntington’s "third wave" of democratisation (Huntington, 1993).33
What about the middle class's relation to the Party-State? As beneficiaries of economic growth reforms and seeking to improve their material living standards, one can perceive a dependency of the middle class on the current regime and continuous economic growth.34 Some scholars argue that the middle class was
"created by" (Chen and Lu, 2011) and "enacted by the regime itself" (Hurtado, 2014).
As political and economic spheres are intertwined, e.g. referring to employment
31
Kharas (2010) provides an overview of qualitative aspects, including educational opportunities, housing, healthcare, employment security and discretionary income. Economic criteria include for example household's purchasing power (McKinsey Global Institute defines the range of PP of …show more content…
Moreover, due to structural features of China's political system, the current decision-making process is based on collective decision-making and bargaining processes across all levels within the government, functioning like constraints to every governance level.
Instead of a procedural legitimacy, the sustenance of the Party's ruling position seems to be based on its economic growth performance. As analysed in the first part, by now economic growth as a common objective of the Party and the society ensures employment and increasing social welfare for the majority of population. Whereas the elite is highly affiliated with the Party and thus seeks continuation of its power position; large parts of the middle class are dependent on the Party and by now seem to prioritise material interests over political participation rights and thus don’t constitute an active role in terms of a "western" civil society. Lastly, the lower class of peasants and migrants also benefits from economic growth; though seeking more political participation rights, little power impedes