Ministerial Bureaucracy´S Influence on Policy Making
Table of Contents
1. Introduction – Normative assessment of delegation 1
2. Theory ………………………………………………………………………………2 2.1 The Principal-Agent-Theory 2 2.2 Application of Principal-Agent logics to Bureaucracies 3 2.3 Hypotheses 4 2.3.1 Efficiency 4 2.3.2 Depoliticization 5 2.3.3 Shifting responsibilities 6 2.3.4 Decreased likelihood of policy adoption 6 2.3.3 Control variables 6
3. Methods and data 7 3.1 Data 7 3.2. Operationalization of dependent variable 7 3.3 Operationalization of independent and control variables 8 3.4 Method 8
4. Analysis and results 9 4.1 Description of dependent variable 9 4.2 Results 10
5. Conclusion – Implications for assessing delegation 12
6. References 14
7. Appendix – Stata syntax 15
1. Introduction – Normative assessment of delegation
“Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils — no, nor the human race, as I believe — and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day. “ (Plato 1960: 332)
Plato’s ideal state is that of a noocracy, a state lead by a group of experts (the term philosopher had a much broader meaning in these times). Such a type of regime is solely justified by output legitimacy, that is by the results it generates (Cities have rest from their evil). In other word: This is a government for the people but not necessarily by the people.
In recent years this type of legitimacy has been used to justify a transfer of power from elected politicians to non-elected institutions such as Non Majoritarian Institution, supranational organizations or private organizations. The normative discussions of these delegation processes are very much focused on the question whether
1. Introduction – Normative assessment of delegation 1
2. Theory ………………………………………………………………………………2 2.1 The Principal-Agent-Theory 2 2.2 Application of Principal-Agent logics to Bureaucracies 3 2.3 Hypotheses 4 2.3.1 Efficiency 4 2.3.2 Depoliticization 5 2.3.3 Shifting responsibilities 6 2.3.4 Decreased likelihood of policy adoption 6 2.3.3 Control variables 6
3. Methods and data 7 3.1 Data 7 3.2. Operationalization of dependent variable 7 3.3 Operationalization of independent and control variables 8 3.4 Method 8
4. Analysis and results 9 4.1 Description of dependent variable 9 4.2 Results 10
5. Conclusion – Implications for assessing delegation 12
6. References 14
7. Appendix – Stata syntax 15
1. Introduction – Normative assessment of delegation
“Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils — no, nor the human race, as I believe — and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day. “ (Plato 1960: 332)
Plato’s ideal state is that of a noocracy, a state lead by a group of experts (the term philosopher had a much broader meaning in these times). Such a type of regime is solely justified by output legitimacy, that is by the results it generates (Cities have rest from their evil). In other word: This is a government for the people but not necessarily by the people.
In recent years this type of legitimacy has been used to justify a transfer of power from elected politicians to non-elected institutions such as Non Majoritarian Institution, supranational organizations or private organizations. The normative discussions of these delegation processes are very much focused on the question whether
References: Huber, J. D. and Shipan, C. R (2000) The Costs of Control. Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25 (1): 25–52. Plato (1960) The Republic, Plain Label Books, London Schoenbrod, David (1983) Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, UCLA Law Review 30:740-70.