Miss

Democracy II – Forms of Democracy
1. Introduction
2. Intrinsic justifications of democracy
3. Direct democracy
4. Indirect democracy (representative)
5. Constitutional democracy vs. majoritarianism
6. Rousseau and Self-rule – if there’s time

1. Democracy and freedom
‘The people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short moments of liberty it enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose them.’
J. J. Rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. II, Ch. 15. (1762)

2. Direct and Indirect Democracy
Direct
All citizens are actively involved in running the state
Voting will be on every issue, not just on laws, but also on, say, going to war, privatising national assets, or adjusting the winter allowance for pensioners
Indirect: Representative
All citizens vote for representatives
But on most issues, only these representatives get to vote
Only occasionally might there be direct voting, when there is a referendum

3. Review: instrumental justifications of democracy
Chiefly, a form of democracy is justified instrumentally when it is a good decision-procedure – when it brings about the right end result
This could be rule for
_The aggregate good
_The common good
_Justice
This includes a concern with ensuring that those governing/ruling are both
a) good at the job
b) not corrupt, and are genuinely ruling for the benefit of the people

4. Intrinsic value
Extrinsic – valued for something other than itself; instrumental value is a clear version of this
– e.g. we value medicine because it makes us well
Intrinsic – valuable in itself because of its qualities
G.E. Moore: imagine a world with nothing in it but doughnuts, would they still be valuable? If no, then they are not intrinsically valuable. (Principia Ethica (1903)) But the happiness that doughnuts give us might be intrinsically valuable
But, we might say instead, that intrinsic value can be found in context.
a. Doughnuts, we might say, are tasty for creatures like us because of their intrinsic properties (sweetness, texture, etc.), and that is what makes them valuable (to us); and so they are intrinsically valuable.
b. If we don’t eat doughnuts to achieve some further end (such as the perfect figure…), and if we don’t think the value can be reduced to the value of something else such as happiness (there are other ways of getting happy), then we can say that they are intrinsically valuable
5. Intrinsic Justifications
Deciding things democratically may be good/right independently of getting the ‘right’ answers about how to run the state, or what ends we want the state to achieve.
Autonomy – It is good for adults to make their own decisions over their own lives, and voting is an extension of this into the political arena.
Solidarity/equality – we care more for each other’s interests when we feel like we are running the state together, rather than where some rule and others are ruled. (This also falls under the instrumental heading, where solidarity helps maintain order and stability.)
Legitimacy – we might think that we only have reason to obey as subjects because we are also on the ‘team’ of rulers as citizens. Otherwise we simply have some people forcing others to obey – why should we comply?
6. Direct Democracy
A key ideal is that democracy is rule by the people
This suggests a presumption in favour of direct democracy: If the people don’t get a say on all political decisions, how can we claim that it is the people who rule?
Watch the Watchmen: We can ensure that rulers don’t further their own interests at the expense of everyone else’s – because the rulers and the ruled are precisely the same group of people.
Reply to the anarchist: We can allay the worries of the anarchist while safeguarding our security. If we are ruling ourselves, how can our freedom and autonomy be limited? And yet we can still have a police force and punishment for crime, as well as an army.
Autonomy, Solidarity, Legitimacy all seem to be most obviously connected with direct democracy
7. Practicality issues
How can we all vote on every question? There are so many of us.
Answer: on the internet, via interactive TV, by telephone, etc.
How many of us would have the time to vote on running the country every day?
Answer: an hour or two a day on the internet.
In Ancient Athens, very few people were citizens, so the slaves, the poor, and women could be left to take care of day to day work – the rich male citizens would have time to vote.
But perhaps we could just slightly decrease the length of our working days to make time.
8. Setting the agenda
One of the most powerful jobs in any democracy is getting to set the agenda for voting.
E.g. if fox hunting had never been raised in a private member’s bill, hunting with hounds never would have been banned.
Setting the agenda is an enormously complex and time consuming task. Who would do it?
Would we take turns? Would we all be equally at good at this job?
9. Expertise
How can we all be sufficiently informed on all of the issues?
Perhaps we could have revolving membership of large expert groups; issues relating to that group’s expertise will only be voted on by its current members.
Problem: But wouldn’t we then lose some of the intrinsic value of everyone being involved? (autonomy, solidarity, legitimacy)
Problem: What if an important issue came up that you felt strongly about (say, euthanasia) but you didn’t happen to be part of the relevant expert group at the time of the vote. Wouldn’t you have lost your say? (autonomy, legitimacy)
Perhaps we could stand for election to the groups we wanted to belong to. But then we’d have a (albeit unusual) form of representative democracy instead.
10. Indirect/Representative Democracy
If we elect representatives:
We don’t face the burden of ruling: of informing ourselves and making constant decisions
We can also elect, and vote out, those who set the agenda (the ‘government of the day’) – thus, we still watch the watchmen, thus:
Accountability: Our rulers will be accountable to us, so they will not be entirely free to favour themselves over us – ensuring some measure of rule for the people.
We also can vote for people who we think are especially skilled at the job of ruling – expertise
Also, if our representatives change periodically, we will avoid having a single ruling class, with its own distinct interests.
Admittedly, there are problems with this last part: the current professionalisation of politics, together with the preponderance of their number coming from similar social backgrounds
11. Representing the people
Mirror conception: the elected representatives should ‘look’ like the population – similar proportion of men/women/ethnicity/religion etc. This can be especially important if prejudice is an issue.
Problem: but how could this be achieved?
Representing the people’s views: on this view the representatives should put their own opinions aside when the majority of their constituency disagrees with them about the policy.
Representing people’s interests: subjective/objective.
Ruling on their behalf: representatives are elected for their judgement so (e.g. Edmund Burke (1729-97)) it is the job of the representative to vote with their own conscience, not the ‘conscience’ of some majority or vocal minority of their constituency.
12. Hybrids?
Switzerland has a hybrid system, with elected representative (parliament and executive) but also very frequent referendums which can be called for by petition
E.g. to change a recently passed law, anyone can trigger a referendum if they secure 50,000 signatures within 100 days
Perhaps a hybrid or half-direct democracy would deliver the best of both worlds?
13. The ‘tyranny of the majority’
_This phrase was coined by Alexis de Toqueville (Democracy in America, 1835)
_And it was developed into a distinctly liberal idea by, especially, John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 1859)
14. Constitutional democracy vs. Majoritarianism
Majoritarianism can severely disadvantage minorities. This applies to both direct and indirect democracy.
Consider regulation of a sport or other activity that matters a great deal to a few people, but which is mildly disapproved of by many. (E.g. fox hunting, boxing) The majority could ban it, even while they don’t know or care much about it. The minority’s lives would be greatly affected.
Imagine if instead of a sport it was a religion, or a matter of consensual sexual choices, or of who you choose to marry.
Persistent minorities: importantly, some people can find themselves in a minority on a large number of issues. If football fans tend to vote one way on most issues, and ballet fans another, you’d better hope you belong in the larger group (this often applies to ethnic and religious groups)
15. Divisiveness
Imagine that the issue in which the minority is consistently outvoted is very important to its self-respect and self-understanding
E.g. religious freedoms – including slaughter practices (halal and kosher), and dress codes (turban, hijab, yarmulke)
Sexual freedoms
Ethnic customs: marriage, divorce, education and even law (e.g. on the application of Sharia law)
This would threaten the solidarity of society as a whole, as well as the autonomy of the minority.
This problem can actually do more to threaten stability when the minority is large or highly motivated, yet still persistently a minority
16. Constitutional democracy vs. Majoritarianism Cont.
We can counteract this by having a constitution that protects minorities (outvoted groups)
Rights: individual rights to free religious practice, freedom of speech, etc. protect the minority’s ability to live how they wish to. See, for example, John Rawls A Theory of Justice, section 54 (1971)
Fragmented government with checks and balances – as with the system advocated in America by James Madison in 1787:
a. Separation of the powers: legislative, executive, judicial
b. Possibly also: a sharp distinction between church and state, with religious (and anti-religious) grounds deemed inappropriate for legislation
Constitutional changes must be possible if the people are really in charge of the system; but we might stipulate that you need a supermajority (such as 60%) in favour of constitutional changes.
We can also make it more difficult by requiring multiple votes over time on the same issue – so that people’s rights cannot be changed easily.
_E.g. multiple houses debating and voting on it (bicameralism- a legislative body having two branches, houses, or chambers.)
_Also, such issues might be good issues for a referendum, rather than leaving it to representatives. Majorities would still rule, but this process would take more time/money, etc., and add an extra chance for reversing the decision.

17. Rousseau and self-rule
In order for each one of us to remain free under a system of rule, we must each be one of the rulers.
But with representatives, elected in line with individual interest, this is only an illusion. Sure, we have accountability – we get to choose who does the ruling – but we don’t get to do the ruling ourselves.
Also, if I am ever outvoted by a majority (or supermajority), how can I think that I am still ruling myself on that issue?
Thus, ordinary democracies don’t actually deliver on: autonomy, solidarity and legitimacy
18. Rousseau and the general will
A harmony of interests: Rousseau’s answer was that we need to have the same interests as each other, not conflicting interests.
This, effectively presents an understanding of the common good: as common interest and what Rousseau called the general will
This way, if I am outvoted, yet the majority still chose what was in my favour, then I am still being ruled in accordance with my own interests.
We might say voting against my interests is less a form of freedom, than it is a miscalculation – so autonomy is preserved
In this way, Rousseau offers a synthesis of ‘rule by’ and ‘rule for’. Genuine political freedom depends not just on getting a vote, but also in having society ruled in a way that is good for you, personally.
But: could we really expect to achieve a situation like this in a diverse modern society? Does this mean that having a vote (even with direct democracy) simply isn’t enough for rule by the people?
That is, it fails in terms of autonomy, and thereby in terms of legitimacy. With competing interests, it also fails in terms of solidarity
19. Conclusion
What form of democracy is best?
Think especially of direct and indirect (representative); but also about simple majoritarianism versus constitutionalism; and about Rousseau’s concerns for self-rule
In what way is it best (for instrumental or intrinsic reasons)?
Does democracy have any very special moral superiority over other forms of government? Or is it merely better at some things (like avoiding corruption) and not that bad at others (like securing stability and order)?
And if it has some special value, which form of democracy delivers it best