Moral Disagreements
Critical Summary
Regan argues that there is a difference between moral disagreements and personal preference disagreements. He believes that disagreements in preferences do exist between people. Someone likes or prefers something and another person may not like it or may be preferring something else. Judging morality as in what is morally right and wrong is different from when judging personal preferences. A person does not need justification to what his/her personal preferences are, because there is nothing wrong or right in preferring something while others not preferring that same thing. However, when it comes to judging morality and the different perspectives of morality in peoples’ minds, a person has to justify and give reasons to why he/she believes that this should be moral or immoral. Regan’s conclusion is that there is a difference between personal preference disagreements and moral judgement disagreements. (Regan, 2011, P.25).
The main two reasons to justify and support his argument are that different persons’ preferences cannot deny each other, but different persons’ moral judgements can deny each other. An example to the first reason for his conclusion is: If person (A) prefers the color pink and another person (B) prefers the color purple. Both (A) and (B) are not denying or disagreeing with each others preferences and both preferences are considered and justified to be true. Which means that both Persons (A) and (B) preferences are justified to be true. On the other hand when two persons disagree with a moral judgment; an example would be: If person (A) says that stealing is moral and person (B) says that stealing is immoral, then both parties are denying and disagreeing with one another in the judgement of morality. Which means if person (A)’s judgement is true then person (B)’s judgement is false. Both moral judgements could not be justified to be true at the same time. One has to be true, which makes the other false. (Regan, 2011, P.26)
The
Regan argues that there is a difference between moral disagreements and personal preference disagreements. He believes that disagreements in preferences do exist between people. Someone likes or prefers something and another person may not like it or may be preferring something else. Judging morality as in what is morally right and wrong is different from when judging personal preferences. A person does not need justification to what his/her personal preferences are, because there is nothing wrong or right in preferring something while others not preferring that same thing. However, when it comes to judging morality and the different perspectives of morality in peoples’ minds, a person has to justify and give reasons to why he/she believes that this should be moral or immoral. Regan’s conclusion is that there is a difference between personal preference disagreements and moral judgement disagreements. (Regan, 2011, P.25).
The main two reasons to justify and support his argument are that different persons’ preferences cannot deny each other, but different persons’ moral judgements can deny each other. An example to the first reason for his conclusion is: If person (A) prefers the color pink and another person (B) prefers the color purple. Both (A) and (B) are not denying or disagreeing with each others preferences and both preferences are considered and justified to be true. Which means that both Persons (A) and (B) preferences are justified to be true. On the other hand when two persons disagree with a moral judgment; an example would be: If person (A) says that stealing is moral and person (B) says that stealing is immoral, then both parties are denying and disagreeing with one another in the judgement of morality. Which means if person (A)’s judgement is true then person (B)’s judgement is false. Both moral judgements could not be justified to be true at the same time. One has to be true, which makes the other false. (Regan, 2011, P.26)
The
References: Regan, T. 2011. “How Not to Answer Moral Questions” in Exploring Ethics: An Introductory Anthology, ed. Cahn, S.M. New York: Oxford University Press.