Morality And Ethics Behind The Bombing Of Hiroshima And Nagasaki
Research Paper
Samuel Overton
40827123
25 March, 2013
History 111
Dr. Julien Vernet
On August 6th, 1945, the atomic bomb “Fat Man” was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, Japan. Only three days later, a second atomic bomb, “Little Boy”, was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, Japan. These two bombs marked the end of World War II and the conflict with Japan, remaining as the only use of nuclear weapons to date. In their destructive path they left up to 210,000 people dead1, and many of those who escaped the initial dangers of flame burns and falling debris eventually succumbed to the lethal effects of radiation sickness. Consequently, the morality and ethics behind the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are …show more content…
significant factors for a controversial topic, and many arguments can be made supporting or criticizing the use of the bombs. The ultimate decision regarding the use of the bombs rested in the hands of Harry S. Truman, a man who was prepared to accept that “the final decision of where and when to use the bomb, was up to [himself], let there be no mistake about it”2. For Truman, this decision was incredibly difficult. On one hand there was the rationale was to save the lives of American troops and end the war completely, and on the other was morality and the guilt of killing thousands of innocent Japanese civilians. It was both these factors that placed president Truman in a difficult position when deciding whether to use the atomic bomb.
The war on the Pacific was escalating rapidly leading up to the use of the bombs, and because the “very idea of surrender was alien to the Japanese samurai tradition”3; for the Japanese accepting unconditional surrender was not an option. For Truman, this meant that seeking their unconditional surrender by conducting an invasion later that year “would mean facing an army consisting of an entire population of Japan”4. Otherwise, he would have to accept the attempts Japan was making to “negotiate some type of peace settlement that would not require either surrender or occupation of the home islands or any fundamental changes to the Japanese Imperial system”5. However, by continuing to pursue unconditional surrender, Truman did nothing but further motivate Suzuki Kantaro, Japan’s prime minister, who believed that “for the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force them also to end the war… if we hold firm, then they will yield before we do”6. With this bold attitude, “Japanese troops levels in Kyushu dedicated to repelling any invasion had grown by six divisions”7. This led General Charles Willoughby to state to Truman that Japanese forces “could grow to the point where we attack on a one to one ratio”8. If they were to attack, the US would expect a force of over four thousand kamikaze planes, whose “combined attacks might knock out fifteen to twenty percent of the invasion force while still at sea”9.
Truman, aware of “the suicidal resistance not only of the Japanese army but also of civilians”10, began to realize the inevitable fate for American troops if sent to invade Japan. If sent, these American soldiers would face a Japanese army ready for “an all-out, death to last man, woman and child fight”11, and could be expected to suffer “over a million casualties”12. Secretary of war Henry L. Stimson, who expected a cost of “over a million casualties for American forces alone”13 with an assault on Japanese islands, recommended to Truman “that the bomb be used against Japan in order to end the war as soon as possible”14. Both General George C Marshall and Secretary of State James F Byrnes, despite approaching the issue from difference perspectives, reached the same conclusion. With this information, Truman reasoned that a “quarter of a million of the flower of [American] young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities”15.
Byrnes further argued that by shortening the war, it would not only save American lives, but also “save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers and millions more of the Japanese people”16. Moreover, others proposed to Truman that the use of the atomic bombs would also end the “death and suffering of innocent third parties among peoples throughout Asia […] at the hands of the Japanese”17. Estimates state that during their rampage from Manchuria to New Guinea “seventeen to twenty-four million deaths [were] attributed to the Japanese”18, and that following the attack on Pearl Harbor, “between 200,000 and 300,000 persons died each month either directly or indirectly at Japanese hands”19. For Truman, by using the atomic bomb and ending the war as early as possible, not only would American lives be saved, but so would those of the Japanese, Chinese, Koreansm, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and even Javanese. In hindsight, it is difficult to disagree with this statement, and of the “210,000 people estimated to have died as a result of the two explosions”20, this number alone amounts to “53,000 fewer than the number of people killed at Okinawa”21.
However, for all those that encouraged Truman to use the bomb, there were also those who tried to prevent its use, warning Truman of the unthinkable consequences that would come out of its use. These same individuals did not agree that Truman faced a dichotomous choice “between the bomb and an invasion that would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives”22. Those who believed Truman’s dilemma to be a “prevailing myth”23 state “there were other options available for ending the war within a reasonably short time without the bomb and without an invasion”24. Many individuals believed that “even in the worst case, if an invasion proved necessary […] military planners in the summer of 1945 projected the number of American lives lost at far fewer than the hundreds of thousands that Truman and his advisers claimed”25, and that when regarding Truman’s estimates “there is no reliable pre-Hiroshima evidence that Truman ever received from any trusted subordinate an estimate of a half a million U.S dead for the land operation”26. Furthermore, many stated at the time that “Japan was so weak that the war could end before [an] invasion”27 would have to occur, and that the dilemma between invasion or the bomb was far from inevitable.
Several argue that in the process of deciding to use the bomb, Truman “relied heavily on his predecessor’s advisors to provide information and guidance on what Roosevelt’s policies and intentions had been”28. With a “fundamental military strategy […] to achieve complete victory at the lowest cost of American lives”29, Roosevelt had adopted an incredibly nationalist and aggressive policy, and Truman saw it as his job to continue it. Additionally, “Truman also sought to curtail American casualties as much as possible because of his own combat experience”30. In contemplating how to keep American casualties at a minimum, Truman “not only sympathized with Roosevelt’s strategy of winning the war […] he empathized with it on a personal level”31. The pinnacle of Truman’s efforts to save American lives came with the development of the atomic bomb, which is regarded as “the most dramatic example of how the Truman administration devoted their scientific, engineering, and industrial assets to a project that they hoped would help win the war at the earliest possible time and reduce combat losses”32. When contemplating the use of the bomb, it was this “cosmic and national focus [that] helped [Truman] to exclude from his consciousness more frightening images of large-scale death and killing in relation to the weapon”33. Ultimately, with Truman’s nationalist focus and responsibility to continue Roosevelt’s policies, his main objective was “to win the war in Japan – to win it completely and to win it as quickly as possible”34, no matter how unethical the method.
In the process of deciding whether or not to use the bomb, Truman also sought out the advice of the Interim Committee. Formed by Stimson, who acted as chairman of the committee, the group included George L. Harrison, William L. Clayton, Ralph A. Bard, Karly T. Compton, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, and James F. Byrnes. When discussing the use of the bomb with Truman, the group “did not deliberate over the issue of whether Japan should be attacked with the new weapon; they assumed that once the bomb was ready it would be used”35. Instead of discussing the issues of morality and ethics with the use of the bomb, when conversing with Truman, the group instead debated the “most advantageous way to demonstrate its power and help force a Japanese surrender”36. When deciding the target area, the committee concluded that the best way to display the “terrifying visual effects of [the] atomic explosion”37 was to target “not only factory workers but also their families who lived in nearby houses”38. The Committee also reached an agreement that “the bomb should be employed without any advance warning”39, which in turn would increase the impact and shock value of the bomb. That said, the “Interim Committee was only advisory”40 in their discussions of the bomb, with the ultimate responsibility “for recommending the use of the bomb to Truman [lying] with Stimson”41. Stimson, who was the first to brief Truman about the existence of the bomb42, saw the bomb as giving the US “an important addition to its arsenal for achieving both diplomatic and military objectives”43. Stimson viewed the bomb as something that could not only bring about instant victory, but also something that could “control the future, and offer those who used it a deity’s dominion and immortality”44. Truman, who primarily perceived the bomb as the “most terrible thing ever discovered”45, became convinced of its benefit by Stimson and ultimately decided to use the bomb “because, like so many others, he was drawn to its ultimate power and because he feared not using it”46.
The wartime alliance between the US and Soviet Union had “always been an awkward and uneasy coalition that was held together principally by their struggle against a common enemy, Nazi Germany”47. Therefore, when the war in Europe came to an end in the spring of 1945, “tensions between the allies increased”48. However, Truman “did not want to rupture U.S-Soviet relations”49, since for both Truman and the Interim Committee “relations between the U.S and the Soviet Union [were seen as] the key to post war peace”50. Consequently, it was in the context of achieving post war peace with the Soviet Union that “the Interim Committee considered the impact of the atomic bomb on U.S-Soviet relations”51. The Interim Committee decided on two options: one was to “offer general information to Stalin about the American effort to build the bomb”52 in hopes that it would create co-operation between the two powers, while the other was to “maintain a lead over the Soviets and other nations, in hopes that the bomb would give the United States greater leverage in achieving diplomatic objectives”53. After strong debating between the Committee and Truman, Byrnes decided “the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in production and research to make certain that we stay ahead”54. For Byrnes, “the use of the atomic bomb would impress the Soviets with American power and make them more manageable”55, and that the bomb was “the high card of a royal flush towards relations with Russia”56. Byrnes suggested that the best course of action would be “to drop the new weapon upon Japan directly, in order to deprive Stalin of any military justification for deploying his armies in Manchuria”57, which would in turn “prevent the USSR from participating in the occupation of Japan, and […] demonstrate American ruthlessness to the Russian’s”58. However, until successful testing of the bomb Truman felt unconfident, and “anticipated with dread his meeting at Potsdam with Stalin and Churchill”59. Truman, being primarily “content simply to secure from the Soviet leader a promise to join in the invasion of Japan”60, was approached by his advisers, who “urged him to find a way to prevent a joint Soviet occupation of Japan and the Russian expedition through Manchuria that would entail”61. Consequently, Truman delayed the Potsdam conference, “[scheduling] it to coincide with the July 15th date of the testing of the new weapon at Trinity”62. Following the successful testing at Trinity, “Truman gained more confidence” regarding negotiations with Stalin and Churchill, and drew “both political and psychological strength from [the] weapon”63. With the success of Trinity, “Soviet entry into the war was no longer necessary to defeat Japan”, and armed with this justification, “Truman and Byrnes moved quickly to renege the agreement Truman had made with Stalin about Soviet Participation in the war”. However, due to the discussions of the bomb and involvement with the Soviets, many criticized Truman, and claimed that the bomb was being used “primarily as a diplomatic weapon to intimidate the Soviet Union, not to end a war they all knew was over”64.
In conclusion, the decision regarding the use of the atomic bombs was one of great controversy. For Truman, the bomb was seen as a remedy for the resilience of the Japanese, and that its use could save the lives of not only Americans, but all parties involved. The bomb was also seen by Truman as a solution towards the tense relations between the US and the Soviets, and could be used in the future as a diplomatic negotiator. Truman also gained encouragement to use the bomb from his predecessors and the Interim Committee, who sought out to find the best deal they could for America. However, many greatly opposed the use of the bomb, and saw Truman and the Interim Committee as power hungry and unethical. They argued that there were more options available to end the war in Japan, and that the untrue dilemma between an invasion and the bomb stated by Truman was in the means to justify a demonstration of power, to intimidate the rest of the world and increase US control of diplomatic relationships and agreements. Therefore, on one hand, the bomb was an incredibly effective tool, and could bring forward with it many benefits for the U.S, and on the other was great opposition towards its use, and the morality of killing thousands of innocent Japanese civilians. It was both of these factors that placed president Truman in an extremely problematic position when contemplating the use of the bomb.
Bibliography
Bernstein, Barton J. “Reconsidering Truman’s Claim of ‘Half a Million American Lives’ Saved by the Atomic Bomb: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no.1 (1999): 45-95. http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/01402399908437744 (accessed January 23, 2013)
Burnham, Alexander. “Okinawa, Harry Truman, and the Atomic Bomb,” Virginia Quarterly Review 71, no. 3 (1995): 377-393. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=911b1cb0-326a-482f-9d0f-744cec648c70%40sessionmgr13&vid=1&hid=26&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=9507234314 (accessed January 23, 2013)
Craig, Campbell, and Sergey Radchenko.
The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
Donovan, Robert J. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948. Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press, 1996.
Lifton, Robert J, and Greg Mitchell. Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years in Denial. New York, NY: G.P Putnam 's Sons, 1995.
Maddox, Robert J. Weapons for victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press, 1995.
Miscamble, Wilson D. The most controversial decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Snowman, Daniel. “President Truman’s Decision to Drop the First Atomic Bomb,” Political Studies 14, no. 3 (October 1966): 365. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1966.tb00417.x/abstract;jsessionid=92EC3D3370F3C1DD3EAD32A0B1BB8D8A.d04t04 (accessed January 23, 2013)
Walker, Samuel J. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
2004.
Samuel Overton
40827123
25 March, 2013
History 111
Dr. Julien Vernet
On August 6th, 1945, the atomic bomb “Fat Man” was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, Japan. Only three days later, a second atomic bomb, “Little Boy”, was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, Japan. These two bombs marked the end of World War II and the conflict with Japan, remaining as the only use of nuclear weapons to date. In their destructive path they left up to 210,000 people dead1, and many of those who escaped the initial dangers of flame burns and falling debris eventually succumbed to the lethal effects of radiation sickness. Consequently, the morality and ethics behind the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are …show more content…
significant factors for a controversial topic, and many arguments can be made supporting or criticizing the use of the bombs. The ultimate decision regarding the use of the bombs rested in the hands of Harry S. Truman, a man who was prepared to accept that “the final decision of where and when to use the bomb, was up to [himself], let there be no mistake about it”2. For Truman, this decision was incredibly difficult. On one hand there was the rationale was to save the lives of American troops and end the war completely, and on the other was morality and the guilt of killing thousands of innocent Japanese civilians. It was both these factors that placed president Truman in a difficult position when deciding whether to use the atomic bomb.
The war on the Pacific was escalating rapidly leading up to the use of the bombs, and because the “very idea of surrender was alien to the Japanese samurai tradition”3; for the Japanese accepting unconditional surrender was not an option. For Truman, this meant that seeking their unconditional surrender by conducting an invasion later that year “would mean facing an army consisting of an entire population of Japan”4. Otherwise, he would have to accept the attempts Japan was making to “negotiate some type of peace settlement that would not require either surrender or occupation of the home islands or any fundamental changes to the Japanese Imperial system”5. However, by continuing to pursue unconditional surrender, Truman did nothing but further motivate Suzuki Kantaro, Japan’s prime minister, who believed that “for the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force them also to end the war… if we hold firm, then they will yield before we do”6. With this bold attitude, “Japanese troops levels in Kyushu dedicated to repelling any invasion had grown by six divisions”7. This led General Charles Willoughby to state to Truman that Japanese forces “could grow to the point where we attack on a one to one ratio”8. If they were to attack, the US would expect a force of over four thousand kamikaze planes, whose “combined attacks might knock out fifteen to twenty percent of the invasion force while still at sea”9.
Truman, aware of “the suicidal resistance not only of the Japanese army but also of civilians”10, began to realize the inevitable fate for American troops if sent to invade Japan. If sent, these American soldiers would face a Japanese army ready for “an all-out, death to last man, woman and child fight”11, and could be expected to suffer “over a million casualties”12. Secretary of war Henry L. Stimson, who expected a cost of “over a million casualties for American forces alone”13 with an assault on Japanese islands, recommended to Truman “that the bomb be used against Japan in order to end the war as soon as possible”14. Both General George C Marshall and Secretary of State James F Byrnes, despite approaching the issue from difference perspectives, reached the same conclusion. With this information, Truman reasoned that a “quarter of a million of the flower of [American] young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities”15.
Byrnes further argued that by shortening the war, it would not only save American lives, but also “save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers and millions more of the Japanese people”16. Moreover, others proposed to Truman that the use of the atomic bombs would also end the “death and suffering of innocent third parties among peoples throughout Asia […] at the hands of the Japanese”17. Estimates state that during their rampage from Manchuria to New Guinea “seventeen to twenty-four million deaths [were] attributed to the Japanese”18, and that following the attack on Pearl Harbor, “between 200,000 and 300,000 persons died each month either directly or indirectly at Japanese hands”19. For Truman, by using the atomic bomb and ending the war as early as possible, not only would American lives be saved, but so would those of the Japanese, Chinese, Koreansm, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and even Javanese. In hindsight, it is difficult to disagree with this statement, and of the “210,000 people estimated to have died as a result of the two explosions”20, this number alone amounts to “53,000 fewer than the number of people killed at Okinawa”21.
However, for all those that encouraged Truman to use the bomb, there were also those who tried to prevent its use, warning Truman of the unthinkable consequences that would come out of its use. These same individuals did not agree that Truman faced a dichotomous choice “between the bomb and an invasion that would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives”22. Those who believed Truman’s dilemma to be a “prevailing myth”23 state “there were other options available for ending the war within a reasonably short time without the bomb and without an invasion”24. Many individuals believed that “even in the worst case, if an invasion proved necessary […] military planners in the summer of 1945 projected the number of American lives lost at far fewer than the hundreds of thousands that Truman and his advisers claimed”25, and that when regarding Truman’s estimates “there is no reliable pre-Hiroshima evidence that Truman ever received from any trusted subordinate an estimate of a half a million U.S dead for the land operation”26. Furthermore, many stated at the time that “Japan was so weak that the war could end before [an] invasion”27 would have to occur, and that the dilemma between invasion or the bomb was far from inevitable.
Several argue that in the process of deciding to use the bomb, Truman “relied heavily on his predecessor’s advisors to provide information and guidance on what Roosevelt’s policies and intentions had been”28. With a “fundamental military strategy […] to achieve complete victory at the lowest cost of American lives”29, Roosevelt had adopted an incredibly nationalist and aggressive policy, and Truman saw it as his job to continue it. Additionally, “Truman also sought to curtail American casualties as much as possible because of his own combat experience”30. In contemplating how to keep American casualties at a minimum, Truman “not only sympathized with Roosevelt’s strategy of winning the war […] he empathized with it on a personal level”31. The pinnacle of Truman’s efforts to save American lives came with the development of the atomic bomb, which is regarded as “the most dramatic example of how the Truman administration devoted their scientific, engineering, and industrial assets to a project that they hoped would help win the war at the earliest possible time and reduce combat losses”32. When contemplating the use of the bomb, it was this “cosmic and national focus [that] helped [Truman] to exclude from his consciousness more frightening images of large-scale death and killing in relation to the weapon”33. Ultimately, with Truman’s nationalist focus and responsibility to continue Roosevelt’s policies, his main objective was “to win the war in Japan – to win it completely and to win it as quickly as possible”34, no matter how unethical the method.
In the process of deciding whether or not to use the bomb, Truman also sought out the advice of the Interim Committee. Formed by Stimson, who acted as chairman of the committee, the group included George L. Harrison, William L. Clayton, Ralph A. Bard, Karly T. Compton, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, and James F. Byrnes. When discussing the use of the bomb with Truman, the group “did not deliberate over the issue of whether Japan should be attacked with the new weapon; they assumed that once the bomb was ready it would be used”35. Instead of discussing the issues of morality and ethics with the use of the bomb, when conversing with Truman, the group instead debated the “most advantageous way to demonstrate its power and help force a Japanese surrender”36. When deciding the target area, the committee concluded that the best way to display the “terrifying visual effects of [the] atomic explosion”37 was to target “not only factory workers but also their families who lived in nearby houses”38. The Committee also reached an agreement that “the bomb should be employed without any advance warning”39, which in turn would increase the impact and shock value of the bomb. That said, the “Interim Committee was only advisory”40 in their discussions of the bomb, with the ultimate responsibility “for recommending the use of the bomb to Truman [lying] with Stimson”41. Stimson, who was the first to brief Truman about the existence of the bomb42, saw the bomb as giving the US “an important addition to its arsenal for achieving both diplomatic and military objectives”43. Stimson viewed the bomb as something that could not only bring about instant victory, but also something that could “control the future, and offer those who used it a deity’s dominion and immortality”44. Truman, who primarily perceived the bomb as the “most terrible thing ever discovered”45, became convinced of its benefit by Stimson and ultimately decided to use the bomb “because, like so many others, he was drawn to its ultimate power and because he feared not using it”46.
The wartime alliance between the US and Soviet Union had “always been an awkward and uneasy coalition that was held together principally by their struggle against a common enemy, Nazi Germany”47. Therefore, when the war in Europe came to an end in the spring of 1945, “tensions between the allies increased”48. However, Truman “did not want to rupture U.S-Soviet relations”49, since for both Truman and the Interim Committee “relations between the U.S and the Soviet Union [were seen as] the key to post war peace”50. Consequently, it was in the context of achieving post war peace with the Soviet Union that “the Interim Committee considered the impact of the atomic bomb on U.S-Soviet relations”51. The Interim Committee decided on two options: one was to “offer general information to Stalin about the American effort to build the bomb”52 in hopes that it would create co-operation between the two powers, while the other was to “maintain a lead over the Soviets and other nations, in hopes that the bomb would give the United States greater leverage in achieving diplomatic objectives”53. After strong debating between the Committee and Truman, Byrnes decided “the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in production and research to make certain that we stay ahead”54. For Byrnes, “the use of the atomic bomb would impress the Soviets with American power and make them more manageable”55, and that the bomb was “the high card of a royal flush towards relations with Russia”56. Byrnes suggested that the best course of action would be “to drop the new weapon upon Japan directly, in order to deprive Stalin of any military justification for deploying his armies in Manchuria”57, which would in turn “prevent the USSR from participating in the occupation of Japan, and […] demonstrate American ruthlessness to the Russian’s”58. However, until successful testing of the bomb Truman felt unconfident, and “anticipated with dread his meeting at Potsdam with Stalin and Churchill”59. Truman, being primarily “content simply to secure from the Soviet leader a promise to join in the invasion of Japan”60, was approached by his advisers, who “urged him to find a way to prevent a joint Soviet occupation of Japan and the Russian expedition through Manchuria that would entail”61. Consequently, Truman delayed the Potsdam conference, “[scheduling] it to coincide with the July 15th date of the testing of the new weapon at Trinity”62. Following the successful testing at Trinity, “Truman gained more confidence” regarding negotiations with Stalin and Churchill, and drew “both political and psychological strength from [the] weapon”63. With the success of Trinity, “Soviet entry into the war was no longer necessary to defeat Japan”, and armed with this justification, “Truman and Byrnes moved quickly to renege the agreement Truman had made with Stalin about Soviet Participation in the war”. However, due to the discussions of the bomb and involvement with the Soviets, many criticized Truman, and claimed that the bomb was being used “primarily as a diplomatic weapon to intimidate the Soviet Union, not to end a war they all knew was over”64.
In conclusion, the decision regarding the use of the atomic bombs was one of great controversy. For Truman, the bomb was seen as a remedy for the resilience of the Japanese, and that its use could save the lives of not only Americans, but all parties involved. The bomb was also seen by Truman as a solution towards the tense relations between the US and the Soviets, and could be used in the future as a diplomatic negotiator. Truman also gained encouragement to use the bomb from his predecessors and the Interim Committee, who sought out to find the best deal they could for America. However, many greatly opposed the use of the bomb, and saw Truman and the Interim Committee as power hungry and unethical. They argued that there were more options available to end the war in Japan, and that the untrue dilemma between an invasion and the bomb stated by Truman was in the means to justify a demonstration of power, to intimidate the rest of the world and increase US control of diplomatic relationships and agreements. Therefore, on one hand, the bomb was an incredibly effective tool, and could bring forward with it many benefits for the U.S, and on the other was great opposition towards its use, and the morality of killing thousands of innocent Japanese civilians. It was both of these factors that placed president Truman in an extremely problematic position when contemplating the use of the bomb.
Bibliography
Bernstein, Barton J. “Reconsidering Truman’s Claim of ‘Half a Million American Lives’ Saved by the Atomic Bomb: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no.1 (1999): 45-95. http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/01402399908437744 (accessed January 23, 2013)
Burnham, Alexander. “Okinawa, Harry Truman, and the Atomic Bomb,” Virginia Quarterly Review 71, no. 3 (1995): 377-393. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=911b1cb0-326a-482f-9d0f-744cec648c70%40sessionmgr13&vid=1&hid=26&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=9507234314 (accessed January 23, 2013)
Craig, Campbell, and Sergey Radchenko.
The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
Donovan, Robert J. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948. Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press, 1996.
Lifton, Robert J, and Greg Mitchell. Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years in Denial. New York, NY: G.P Putnam 's Sons, 1995.
Maddox, Robert J. Weapons for victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press, 1995.
Miscamble, Wilson D. The most controversial decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Snowman, Daniel. “President Truman’s Decision to Drop the First Atomic Bomb,” Political Studies 14, no. 3 (October 1966): 365. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1966.tb00417.x/abstract;jsessionid=92EC3D3370F3C1DD3EAD32A0B1BB8D8A.d04t04 (accessed January 23, 2013)
Walker, Samuel J. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
2004.