Two hundred years ago, to question the absolute worth of human life was an unforgivable offense. Individuals, who attempted to suicide, were often punished in courts, and even sent to work camps. Those who were successful were often buried with stakes in their hearts, and the state confiscated their property rather than dispersing it to their relatives. If taking one’s own life were so serious, asking a doctor to help one commit suicide would have been unthinkable. Although our society is certainly more liberal today, physician assisted suicide remains a perplexing question, both legally and morally. In this paper, I will argue for the moral permissibility of euthanasia. First, I will deal with the moral permissibility of assisted suicide as a principle, and then I shall explore the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Finally, I will conclude with a short discussion of the legality of assisted suicide. In the interests of brevity, I shall consider voluntary euthanasia only for individuals who are terminally ill and suffering from unmanageable pain. All arguments will be evaluated from a utilitarian and deontological perspective.
The first argument for euthanasia is a utilitarian one. “Actions,” according to the utilitarian John Stuart Mill, “are right as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce pain or the reverse of happiness.” If we were to apply a hedonistic calculus to the case of a terminally ill patient suffering from severe, untreatable pain, we would see that the happiness is maximized and pain minimized by euthanasia. The sort of pain caused by an advanced, terminal illness would clearly score a negative value, perhaps a negative seven. The level of pain and the progression of the disease would also render the person unable to enjoy the activities that made his life pleasurable, so there could be no higher intellectual or emotional pleasures to balance the physical pain. At best, the person