You now have hypothetical knowledge, but that is not good enough, because you are still skeptical of the results. So you test your hypotheses, and when corroborated, you now possess reliable knowledge, which is as close as humans can get to the truth in a natural world, but it is close enough. Later in this paper, I will demonstrate that naturalism is a methodological necessity in the practice of science by scientists, and an ontological necessity for understanding and justifying science by scientists. But I can discuss the general justification for the essentiality of naturalism in science now. The alternative to naturalism is supernaturalism, and unless naturalism is true and supernaturalism false, empiricism--comprehending reality solely by sensory experience--is not sufficient to comprehend reality; rationalism--the use of logic in reasoning--is not sufficient to understand reality; and skepticism--the questioning and evaluation of one's knowledge system and beliefs--is not sufficient to arrive at reliable knowledge of reality. Simply put, empiricism, rationalism, and skepticism--the foundations of science--will not be epistemologically reliable unless naturalism is either true or assumed to be true, since by not doing so, part of reality …show more content…
Some may suggest that my defense of science is an example of scientism. Scientism has been defined as "the belief that science, especially natural science, is much the most valuable part of human learning--much the most valuable part because it is much the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial" (Sorell, 1991, p. 1). I would say that this definition is an overstatement, especially since it is exactly what I believe, and I am not scientistic. Scientism is, rather, the belief that science is the only valuable part of human learning, that knowledge comes only through the methods of investigation available to science, that science by itself gives us reliable answers to questions about morality and epistemology, that science enables us to solve all serious human problems, and that science will give us a comprehensive and unified understanding of the meaning of the universe. I believe none of these. Science may illuminate serious ethical, epistemological, aesthetic, and metaphysical problems and suggest solutions, but, in the end, many human problems must find solutions in human philosophies, even if the answers are unsatisfactory for a variety of