Operation Approach Case Study

Two key operational approach elements that link the operation to national interests include objectives and COG. JP 5-0 states, “the operational approach reflects an understanding of the OE and the problem…and identification of objectives, COG(s) and decisive points are useful in developing the basis for an operational approach.” However, if the analysis and understanding of these fundamental aspects are wrong, the operational approach will fail. Sadly, an imprudent objective and the wrong COG hampered OIF’s initial operational and strategic success.
JP 1-02, defines objective as “the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed.” Initially, OIF’s primary objective focused on removing Hussein from
The United States felt the locus of power and COG for Saddam’s regime was Baghdad. While one could make a argument for Baghdad as an operational COG tied to an objective of removing Hussein from power, it was not the strategic COG for OIF. As Elkus states, “to often military planners can fixate on finding the COG, at the expense of losing the larger strategic picture.” The strategic COG tied to the Presidents end state was the Iraqi people’s national will to act. Not in the irregular warfare sense that focuses on legitimacy and influence over the population. Instead, where the people have the national will facilitated by a secure and stable environment to create an inclusive government that can protect its sovereignty. As Colonel Sepp stated, “the COG … is the country’s people and their belief in and support of their government.” Fortunately, through iterative reassessment and reframing Gates and Petraeus were able to establish conditions that facilitated reaching national
Doctrinally, reframing is a critical part of the planning and execution of operations as unforeseen opportunities or challenges may cause revision of the operational approach. Through reframing from outside the command, an initially failed operational approach became a successful operation that supported national interest.
The reframing that occurred with the transition from Rumsfeld and Franks to Gates and Petraeus provides a strong case study for analysis. Rumsfeld and Frank’s operational approach centered on a small predetermined force size utilizing accelerated planning and execution timelines through a top down civilian to military interface. Their plan was to remove Hussein from power, then have the Iraqi’s quickly take responsibility for their own security and governance. In short, civilian leadership would direct and control the war down to the operational level with a focus on Phase