Operation Market Garden: An Analytical Assessment
Staff Sergeant David T. Provost
Military Intelligence Senior Leader Course Class 16-002
OPERATION MARKET GARDEN 2
Operation Market Garden: An Analytical Assessment
This single but massive failure may well have delayed the inevitable end to the Second World War in Europe past the hopes it would end prior to Christmas Day, 25 December 1944. Due to senior commanders’ inability to determine credible intelligence and an accelerated planning phase, along with misaligned logistical assets, the largest airborne operation of its kind in history was the first major loss by Allied forces during the European campaign. Through sequencing of historical events, analyzing …show more content…
There would be gaps between each group, a 13-mile gap between the 101st and 82nd area of responsibility (AOR) and a 5-mile gap between the 82nd and 1st.
Garden
XXX Corps would break through the German front lines with tanks and other heavy tactical vehicles and encounter minimal resistance once the German front broke. The entire route from Meuse - Escaut Canal where the XXX Corps was staged to Arnhem was 64 miles and was anticipated to only take 48 hours. XXX Corps prior to this operation was advancing at an estimated rate of 50 miles per day. Each time XXX Corps reached an objective the airborne forces would then maintain a sustainment posture.
The German Defensive
Immediately following the defeats in Normandy, Belgium and France, Adolf Hitler initiated a plan to consolidate German forces along the northern front. He called General Field Marshall Ger von Rundstedt out of retirement to take control of the newly formed Wehrmacht West. Immediately upon his arrival, Rundstedt developed a strategy to prevent further advance by the allies. The 25 Infantry Divisions and 6 Armored Divisions were called up to fortify the already disintegrating German lines. The reforming Army Group B, lead by General Field Marshal Walter Model, would gather whatever remaining forces within the …show more content…
The greater the length of time the operation, the more susceptible it is to be affected by changing weather. The first and second day of the operation the weather forecasts were of ideal conditions for an airborne operation, however the assumption of the operation only lasting 72 hours greatly hindered future reinforcements and resupply as weather reports on 16 September stated that there would be clear weather from 17 to 21 September. Those reports would be proved false as heavy fog would prevent aircraft from taking off, bad weather would eventually arrive in Arnhem and Nijmegen, which delayed much needed supplies and