The Paris Peace Accords and the Vietnam War were some of the most important events to have taken place in world history. This paper will present an attempt to break the Paris Peace Accords down into its constituent parts. This will be done by analysing its setting, the negotiation process, as well as its successes and failures.
Setting
The Paris Peace Accords of 1973 was an agreement that was aimed at bringing peace to Vietnam by putting an end to the Vietnam War. It put an end to undeviating US military warfare and briefly put an end to the conflict between North and South Vietnam (Zagare 1977: 665). “The governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, the United States as well as the interim Revolutionary government that symbolized the native South Vietnamese revolutionaries; all signed the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on January 27, 1973” (Zagare 1977: 665).
In 1969 the amount of U.S. troops present in Vietnam amounted to more than 475 000. Furthermore by this time more than 48 000 U.S. servicemen had lost their lives in the war. Each week an estimated amount of two hundred soldiers …show more content…
were dying and 800 wounded (Berman 2001:11). In America and cross the world there were growing numbers of people questioning the justification of the war as well as whether the war could be won (Berman 2001:11). By this time American citizens were seeking an ‘honourable peace’ out of Vietnam.
Subsequently, the concept of an “honourable peace” was first introduced by President Lyndon Johnson (Berman 2001:13). Johnson came into the war with a policy to ensure a stable, independent, and non-Communist South Vietnam. However as the war went on, Johnson no longer believed he could achieve his objective and thus the concept of an “honourable peace” was introduced to the American people (Berman 2001:13). By the time President Richard Nixon took office the concept of an “honourable peace” had been further developed and became the basis of policy towards Vietnam. The main objective of President Nixon was to remove American soldiers in an honourable manner that did not leave South Vietnam to a possible Communist takeover (Katz1997: 496). To achieve this objective, Nixon introduced the concept of the Vietnamization of South Vietnam, “this meant that the United States would train, equip and expand South Vietnamese forces so that they could take over more military responsibilities for their own defence against the North communists”, while at the same time, the United States would leisurely remove they fighting troops from South Vietnam (Lewy 1980: 162).
The negotiations that led to the accord started on May 10, 1968 in Paris, France after a number of long interruptions (Katz1997: 496). As a result of the accord, the International Control Commission was replaced by International Commission of Control and Supervision to fulfil the agreement. The main negotiators of the agreement were United States National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Vietnamese politburo member Le Duc Tho (Zagare 1977: 665).
Negotiation Process
Before the negotiations had begun the main objective for the North Vietnamese were the withdrawal of US troops and the national reunification of the two Vietnams. While the United States main objective was leave Vietnam honourably, protect the independence of South Vietnam and stop the spread of communism into the South (Llewellyn et al 2016).
When the Paris Peace talks began in 1968 arguments over procedure were the order of the day, one main argument was that the delegates from Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (NLF) would not recognise the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government. Other procedural arguments included the types of furniture to be used during the talks (Llewellyn et al 2016). The negotiation process was long and draining, mainly because the demands of both sides were so incompatible that it seemed impossible for an agreement or compromise to be met. Therefore “by the autumn of 1969 the Paris talks had fallen into a monotonous and unproductive routine, where all sides restated their position but refused to concede ground.” (Llewellyn et al 2016).
Due to the unproductive progress of the talks in Paris, President Nixon began to look for other avenues for peace.
Therefore National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was instructed by Nixon to start secret peace talks with the North Vietnamese that would not include or be made known of to the South Vietnamese nor the American military allies in Vietnam (Llewellyn et al 2016), something which later backfired for the Americans and almost caused the entire negotiation process to be unsuccessful. Although the talks were secret it was not unusual for a series of secret talks to be associated with public talks. The reasoning behind the secret nature of these peace talks was that some of the subject matter was so sensitive that if they were to be revealed to the public, all of the negotiations would be
compromised.
Subsequently, the above mentioned secret talks began in August 1969, between North Vietnamese representative, Le Duc Tho and his American counterpart Dr Henry Kissinger (Llewellyn et al 2016). However like the public talks, the secret talks were long and draining and after three years the secret negotiations had also failed to produce any significant agreement or compromise. The turning point came however in October 1972, after the failure of the Hanoi administration failed Easter Offensive (Isaacs 1998: 18). The North Vietnamese representative came back to the peace talks more accommodating, suggesting to Kissinger that North Vietnam would be willing to think through an agreement that recognized the legitimacy of the South Vietnam government, as long as processes for political reform and free elections would occur (Hammond 2014). Along these guidelines Kissinger and Tho began drafting a treaty, which was completed in late October 1972 and was received around the world with much enthusiasm (Hammond 2014).
After a long five years of halted talks, by October 1972 it seemed as if a feasible peace for Vietnam was on the horizon. However one Nguyen Van Thieu, the South Vietnamese president, found out about the secret talks and the draft treaty, Thieu was outraged and refused to sign the treaty, believing it placed his country at the mercy of the Viet Cong (Llewellyn et al 2016). The refusal of Thieu to accept the treaty nearly caused North Vietnam to withdraw from the peace agreement. In fact it was only due another massive US aerial bombardment of North Vietnam, ordered by Nixon, that North Vietnam remained at the negotiating table. However because North Vietnam were not willing to agree to any new terms ordered by Thieu, the US promised to back South Vietnam in the event that the North broke the terms of the agreement, because of this promise Thieu eventually agreed to the terms of the treaty. Therefore in mid-January 1973 Nixon suspended US bombings of North Vietnam, while final negotiations commenced (Llewellyn et al 2016). The Paris Peace Accords were formally signed 12 days later on the 27th January 1973 by representatives of the United States, North and South Vietnam as well as the NLF (Hammond 2014).