Peter Singer Famine Analysis
In his article on famine, affluence, and morality, morally Peter Singer states that people who live in rich countries are morally obligated to ease the burden of famine and overpopulation for poorer countries. Singer states that rich countries can alleviate unnecessary suffering and death in poor countries by giving famine relief, and at the cost of a “morally insignificant” lessening of standard of living for the rich country. Singer also notes that this giving of famine relief should not only occur during dire emergency situations, but on a long-term basis, as well. Singer presents his justification for his reasoning in the form of an anecdote: if you were to walk by a pond where a small toddler was drowning it would be morally wrong to not
save the child’s life, if the only negate effect on yourself would be getting your shoes and clothes wet and muddy. By this same reasoning, it would be morally reprehensible to spend one’s disposable income non-necessary items rather than foreign aid which could save lives. Singer also raises a very important distinction with his argument; the giving of foreign aid cannot be classified as charity by Singer’s reasoning, as this would result in the action becoming supererogatory (above and beyond the call of duty).
While Singer may present these moral sacrifices as an easy and clear choice, upon closer examination, several difficulties can be spotted. In my previous essay I mentioned in passing the “proximity objection”, and the “how much is enough objection”. The proximity objection states since many poor countries are far away, they may be outside of our “sphere of moral responsibility”. However, Singer responds to this stating that with today’s modern technology the world is extremely connected, forming a sort of “global village”, and while proximity may dictate the probability of for whom we will give aid, it does not dictate to whom we give aid. The “how much is enough objection” states that by Singer’s reasoning there is never a stopping point to how much aid to give. In response to this, Singer states that on should only stop giving aid once the sacrifice becomes of comparable moral worth to what people receiving aid need.
save the child’s life, if the only negate effect on yourself would be getting your shoes and clothes wet and muddy. By this same reasoning, it would be morally reprehensible to spend one’s disposable income non-necessary items rather than foreign aid which could save lives. Singer also raises a very important distinction with his argument; the giving of foreign aid cannot be classified as charity by Singer’s reasoning, as this would result in the action becoming supererogatory (above and beyond the call of duty).
While Singer may present these moral sacrifices as an easy and clear choice, upon closer examination, several difficulties can be spotted. In my previous essay I mentioned in passing the “proximity objection”, and the “how much is enough objection”. The proximity objection states since many poor countries are far away, they may be outside of our “sphere of moral responsibility”. However, Singer responds to this stating that with today’s modern technology the world is extremely connected, forming a sort of “global village”, and while proximity may dictate the probability of for whom we will give aid, it does not dictate to whom we give aid. The “how much is enough objection” states that by Singer’s reasoning there is never a stopping point to how much aid to give. In response to this, Singer states that on should only stop giving aid once the sacrifice becomes of comparable moral worth to what people receiving aid need.