Plato's Republic

Be kind, for everyone you meet is fighting a harder battle. –Plato

Justice and the challenge of the Sophists

The premise of Plato’s Republic is indeed a question of morality, as Zeitlin contends (Zeitlan 1997, 3), and a direct challenge to the philosophical ideas proposed by the Sophists who assert that subjective truths, individualism and self-interest is the basis of human nature, and therefore what is moral is relative to ones’ own perception, and justice is what serves the individual’s desires. They considered Plato’s definition of justice one that would often go against one’s self-interest and could therefore be considered a form of injustice (Zeitlan 1997, 6). In Bloom’s translation and analysis (Bloom 1991, 335) we see this argument over the merits of justice expertly expressed by Socrates with Thrasymachus struggling to maintain his claim’s about the benefits of injustice. For his stance is so extreme that he dismisses justice as indifferent and proposes that as it applies to “caring for others, obeying laws, or being dedicated to the common good,” it is simply bad and that even the unjust power of a tyrant was preferable. This of course is an extreme example of the “might makes right” argument, which Thrasymachus is most strongly associated with. Not only does Plato attempt to confront this extreme individualistic stance, but he takes on these arguments and their basic premise as a foundation for his ambitious claim that morality and justice are not only human imperatives of necessary virtue, but is the basis for any semblance of human happiness. While the argument may take on the character of circular reasoning common of the sophists, it is hard to claim that Plato fails completely in pointing out the flaws in the arguments of self-interest and strength as being the measures of justice.

The Human Soul-Mind and Utopian Political State In the Republic, Plato develops a sort of tripartite “psychology,” (the components of the human soul-mind) according to Waterfield in his introduction to Oxford’s translation (Republic 1993, pp 41). The psychology is first of the individual and their respective strengths and roles in society. Plato then ambitiously tries to unify these within a framework that is essentially an analogy for his ideal political state and utopian political system. His proposed system is based on the concept of morality and dependent on individuals participating in the divisions of labor that Plato’s political system necessitates. The division’s are believed to be derived from the specific nature or “psychology” of the individual as it relates to their unique disposition to one of the three characteristics of the human mind-soul: appetitive (epithymia), reason (logos), and spirit (thymos). In the political realm these divisions of the human mind-soul form the basis of labor divisions with analogous propensities, e.g., the rulers, influenced mainly by logos, the warriors or helpers by thymos and the producers/labourers by epithymia. Thus, in this way Zeitlin is correct that in this sense the state is a product of the human mind and each component of the state is a product of an element of the soul-mind (Zeitlin 1997, 10).
The Principle of Specialization

Justice for Plato is the adherence to the state by one’s participation based on specialization or rather the Principle of Specialization (hereby referred to as PS) (Republic 1993, 290, 370a-c). “Complying with PS is the foundation of individual happiness and fulfillment (406c-407a, 241c), the foundation of the unity of the community (423d) and is social morality (433aff.) because it involves co-operating with others and contributing to the welfare of the whole. And this has a psychological counterpart: if each part of one 's mind conforms to the internal equivalent of PS, then one is unified and moral” (Republic 1993, 298). PS is thus morality, allowing the interdependence that an ideal society needs to function. Ergo, Plato believes that individuals who adhere to their PS can obtain happiness by virtue of their morality; as opposed to any external advantages that may be gained by the Sophists’ idea that it is self-interest and greed or plexonexia- defined by Zeitlin as selfishness (Zeitlan 1997, 5), and more specifically by Plato as representing an immoral behavior that denotes getting more than one’s fair share (Republic 1966, 342a).
Criticisms of Political Systems

Obviously, Plato’s Republic represented strong criticisms and an attempt at moderation of the forms of government present in Greece at the time, including the oligarchies typical in Sparta, and Athenian democracy, which Plato feared may result in a form of anarchy. While the dangers of oligarchies and their tendency to corrupt and create greed and power mongering was evident, Plato also was somewhat prescient about the dangers of democracy, where ill-informed statesmen and citizens make decisions and create laws while lacking sufficient knowledge of the interdependence of society and the need to be cognizant of this. Furthermore uninformed citizens may be apt to engage in kind of a mob rule, making laws that weaken the rights of the minority. In this way it may be stated that Plato envisioned democratic systems like those in the United States where citizens vote in their own interest and dismiss the benefits of the whole society, such as same sex marriage.
Plato’s proposal

Zeitlin has serious concerns about the framework of Plato’s proposed ideal government, and contends that the divisions he advocates institute a type of caste system and create a greater divide between the producing and working classes. Plato saw that all humans possessed specific natures that fit differently into society, each possessing a particular function, but each equally necessary to operate society as a whole (Kemerling 2002). This need for individual roles is illustrated in The Republic when Plato states: “When each of these classes performs its own role appropriately and does not try to take over the function of any other class, the entire city as a whole will operate smoothly, exhibiting the harmony that is genuine justice” (Republic, 433). Plato is in no way proposing a caste system, but rather a simple way of organizing society where people fill the role they are best suited for. Yet, Zeitlin then agrees that Plato allows for movement between one’s pre-determined labor division if one can demonstrate capacities either outside their previously specialized division, or intellect superior to the constraints their labor division binds them to. Plato actually asserts that society has the duty to make certain that each individual is suited to their PS. Since the ruling and warrior classes are the only classes exempt from raising any children individually, they would not be able to pass along via heredity their caste, as is common in such a system. To guard against the corruption of the caste system typical of oligarchies, Plato proposes to prohibit this possibility among the ruling class in the Republic. Zeitlin also argues against Plato’s proposal that the Philosopher Kings should be deprived of having a family or owning property “both of which are essential to a full human personality”(Zeitlin 1997, 12). However, there appears no factual basis for this statement, and would in fact seemingly strike Plato as contrary to his likely belief as a philosopher that the pure pursuit of knowledge was the highest objective of mankind and likely therefore essential to the development of a full personality; whereas, property ownership and parentage, were doubtless lesser objectives, falling more likely in the realm of the appetitive rather than logos aspects of the human mind-soul. In fact, one need not be a philosopher to disagree with the statement that a full human personality is not necessarily related to childbearing and property ownership. While a certain critique is merited given that Plato proposes that his own kind (philosophers) become the new rulers of society, his contention is that their extensive knowledge will allow them to be wise and benevolent rulers.
Conclusion

While Plato’s philosophical tripartite analogy may appear an overworked attempt to link his “psychological” concepts to a social and political structure, and therefore may fall short, his greatest emphasis is on the merits of morality and justice as virtuous, which he believes more likely leads to happiness than would greed and personal power, both within one’s sense of self and within one’s relation to others and to society. Many scholars agree that for all practical purposes his proposed political system is likely unworkable and that the creation of the Republic reflected an analogy of the human psyche and an ideal similar blueprint for a just political system. Trevor Saunders (Laws 1970, 27-28) summed it thus: “to suppose that Plato ever thought the Republic was attainable would be to suppose him capable not merely of optimism or idealism, but of sheer political naïveté.” In conclusion, while the Republic can be seen as a political polemic, its more profound philosophical ascertains suggest a philosophical investigation of the state of mankind and the imperative of morality and justice as both virtuous and necessary as the basis for happiness, which benefits both the individual and society.

Works Cited Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato Second Edition: Translated with notes and Interpretative Essay by Allan Bloom. New York, London. Basic Books: A Division of Harper Collins, 1991.

Kemerling, Garth. “Plato: The State of the Soul”. Last modified October 27, 2001. http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html

Plato. The Republic. Jowett, Benjamin, trans. London: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Plato. The Laws. Saunders, Trevor J., trans. Plato: The Laws. London, New York, Toronto: Penguin Books, 1970.

Plato. Plato: Republic-Oxford World 's Classic. Waterfield, Robin, trans. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1993.

Zeitlan, Irving M. Rulers and Ruled: An Introduction to Classical Political Theory from Plato to the Federalists. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1997.

Cited: Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato Second Edition: Translated with notes and Interpretative Essay by Allan Bloom. New York, London. Basic Books: A Division of Harper Collins, 1991. Kemerling, Garth. “Plato: The State of the Soul”. Last modified October 27, 2001. http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html Plato. The Republic. Jowett, Benjamin, trans. London: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Plato. The Laws. Saunders, Trevor J., trans. Plato: The Laws. London, New York, Toronto: Penguin Books, 1970. Plato. Plato: Republic-Oxford World 's Classic. Waterfield, Robin, trans. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1993. Zeitlan, Irving M. Rulers and Ruled: An Introduction to Classical Political Theory from Plato to the Federalists. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1997.