Prichard's Dilemma Analysis

In this essay, I will examine whether T. M. Scanlon dodges Prichard’s dilemma. To analyse, first, I will show the structure of Prichard’s dilemma. Second, I will present how Scanlon solve the dilemma that is defined by Scanlon as Prichard’s dilemma. With Scanlon’s definition of the dilemma, Scanlon’s account seems to solve the dilemma. Third, I will compare the structure of the dilemma that Prichard discusses with that of Prichard’s dilemma as understood by Scanlon. By comparing the two dilemmas, I will argue that Scanlon misunderstands the structure of the dilemma that Prichard discusses. Finally, I will conclude that Scanlon’s account falls into the dilemma that Prichard discusses, and will argue that Scanlon fails to dodge Prichard’s dilemma.
A. Prichard examines the reason to be moral. Prichard concludes that there is no reason that appropriately answers the question ‘why be moral?’. To support his argument, Prichard refers to two arguments that we face when we think about the reason to be moral. The first argument is dilemma that is, today, called ‘Prichard’s dilemma’. The second argument appeals to the analogy of the ‘Theory of Knowledge’. Although the second argument is important in explaining why Prichard considers that there is no reason to be moral, in this essay, for our purpose, I will only deal with Prichard’s first argument, i.e., ‘Prichard’s dilemma’.
According to Prichard, moral philosophy has provided two separate answers that are based on nonmoral and moral reasons to answer the question ‘why be moral?’. Prichard writes:
So far as I can see, the answers [for the reason to be moral] all fall from necessities of the case, into one of two species. Either they state that we ought to do so and so, because, as we see when we fully apprehend the facts, doing so will be for our good, i.e. really, as I would rather say, for our advantage, or better still, for our happiness; or they state that we ought to do so and so, because something realised either in or by the action is good. (1912:
Scanlon’s definition of Prichard’s dilemma is in some ways similar to, but in other ways different from, the dilemma that Prichard actually discusses. The similar point is that both Prichard and Scanlon believe that nonmoral and moral reasons fail to explain the reason to be moral. However, there are two different points. Firstly, although Scanlon argues that nonmoral reason that appeals to agents’ self-interest fails to explain the reason to be moral because it would not be the kind of reason that motivates a moral person, Prichard (1912: 23) argues that the explanation fails because such reason only makes us want to be moral. Prichard does not think that nonmoral reason necessarily relates to the reason that does not motive a moral person. Secondly, Prichard criticises the moral reason not to take action not because, unlike Scanlon, action is wrong, but because both accounts that rely on Utilitarianism and the intrinsic goodness involved in action fail to answer the question ‘why be moral?’ I think that Scanlon misunderstands the structure of the dilemma that Prichard discusses. Indeed, when defining Prichard’s dilemma, Scanlon (1998: 389n. 1) refers to a different dilemma that occurs by relying on moral reason to explain the reason to be