Priori Truths

In the book "Naming and Necessity", Saul Kripke attempts to refute the customary idea that a priori knowledge consist solely of necessary truths, and a posteriori knowledge consist of only contingent truths. This is done with the aim of pushing against the widely accepted theories of language brought about by Frege and Russell, in addition to confronting the traditional analytic/synthetic distinctions accepted by many philosophers. Kripke claims that necessary truths can be known through both a posteriori, as well as, a priori. However, in my view, I find Kripke's theory of rigid designation to be inaccurate. Moreover, the examples given regarding contingent a priori truths and necessary a posteriori truths seem to be faulty.
Kripke begins
In one sense, the sentence takes on the meaning that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are rigid designators, which ultimately designate to the same object. This implies that the sentence is a contingent a posteriori truth. In the other sense, the sentence "Hesperus is Phosphorus" comes out to be tautologous, necessary, and a priori. An example can be used to help elucidate this distinction. In response to this example, let's say that there is an individual who has been told that the Spanish word for "Green" is "Verde". In this instance this individual has learned something which stems from a posteriori knowledge. However, this is not a necessary truth, for the word "Verde" could have easily referred to something else, therefore it must be contingent. When the individual makes the statement that "Verde is Green" this is not known via necessary a posteriori knowledge, but a priori. This is because that individual knows that the word "Verde" and "Green" have the same meaning. Therefore, the two words are
One might argue that the point of the "Hesperus is Phosphorus" example is to demonstrate that one can know the meaning of both names, still unknowingly understand they are identical. An individual can know that Hesperus is a star which is present in the evening and can know that Phosphorus is a star which is present in the morning, however that same individual still might not know that both the evening and morning stars are the planet Venus. The above example dealing with "Verde" does a more proficient job of describing the problem with the considered objection. One might take the word "Green" to be a rigid designator for a color on the color spectrum. Likewise, that same individual might take the word "Verde" to be a rigid designator for a certain color on the color spectrum. However, this does not guarantee that one cannot know that "Verde is Green" a priori, because one could be mistaken about what "Verde" and "Green" designate. Referring to the "Hesperus is Phosphorus" example, one could know what each term designates—Venus—but just be