the problem of evil, and see what premises the responses target and how they negate them. Some examples of these are the punishment theodicy, the soul-building theodicy, and the free will theodicy. The latter will be addressed in depth, as it provides a particularly formidable explanation as to why God may allow evil to exist. To explain the problem of evil, one must begin with the definition of evil. Evil, as defined by Merriam-Webster, is “morally reprehensible; sinful, wicked.” Evil surely exists in the world, and is obvious in cases like the Holocaust, when millions of innocent civilians died because of a totalitarian leader’s propaganda. Its existence is even obvious in less extreme cases, like the death of one child due to starvation because of a family’s negligence and selfishness. Next, the prevalent idea of God’s attributes must also be identified, which are namely omnipotence and omnibenevolence. Each trait comes with heavy implications. With omnipotence, or basically power over everything, comes the capability to eliminate all evil. With omnibenevolence, or infinite goodness, comes the desire to eliminate evil. Within these two characteristics lies a contradiction, however, because it is apparent that evil exists, yet God is either unwilling or unable to stop it. To summarize the premises of this argument in a clear format: “1. If God exists, he is omnipotent and omnibenevolent. 2. If evil exists, God will stop it because of His omnipotence and omnibenevolence. 3. Evil continues to exist.” These premises thus lead to the conclusion that: “4. God does not exist.” Not only does this argument potentially “undermine the compatibility of two of God’s alleged properties,” it also may “undermine the point of religious belief altogether” (Timmons and Shoemaker, 257). This is due to the conclusion that a God who does not have those capabilities truly does not seem to be worthy of worship anyway. Furthermore, if God must exist with both of these attributes, but evil is still around, then the very existence of God may be considered a paradox. God could not exist if all of these points hold true. In response to that logical argument, theodicies have developed that attempt to explain how a God could still exist despite evil in the world.
For example, the punishment theodicy proposes the idea that evil is just a form of punishment for sin, although there are many instances that “punishments” seem far too severe for any sin possibly committed. The soul-building theodicy claims that evil is necessary for human development, as “sin and suffering is valuable… because improvement of character.” One of the main responses is with the free will theodicy, though, and focuses on God choosing upon creation of beings to make them free. Though this choice posed the risk of agents freely choosing to do evil, the benefits ultimately outweighed the risk because of the inherent value placed on libertarian free will. Because of free will, people have “moral responsibility for their actions” and can be considered “creators in their own right,” so God is justified in giving people free will, but not responsible for their reprehensible choices (Timmons and Shoemaker, 308). As always, there are objections to this argument, one of the principal ones being that there are many natural evils that occur without a freely willed decision leading to it. For example, hurricanes and disease causing suffering and death. However, where there is reason for believing in a supernatural God, there can be reason for believing in entities such as demons as well. These natural evils could result from the free choices of said demons, thus classifying them as moral evils in the end as well. Another objection to the free will targets the true “benefits” of beings having free will. With free will comes desires to do wrong, but if the wrong is combatted by the desire to do right, and morality wins, satisfaction follows. However, in some extreme cases, is the desire to murder people really worth the “good feeling” after choosing not to? It appears that these immoral inclinations may not seem to be truly
beneficial if all that results are moments of pride in oneself for fighting them. However, again, this objection is relatively uncommon because for normal individuals, no such extremely bad desires exist. The problem of evil has historically been a very troubling issue for many theists who believe in a God that is omnipotent and omnibenevolent. It is a deductively valid argument when each premise is accepted in whole. However, through theodicies, there are many explanations that address premise two and explain God’s potential reasoning as to why He would not stop the evil, regardless of His omnipotence or omnibenevolence. Therefore, it is valid, but simply not sound. If people have free will, and live in this universe free from interference by God, then evil is bound to exist and continue existing until people collectively stop doing wrong. Although the problem of evil does provide a compelling reason as to why some individuals may question the existence of God, there are too many holes and possible explanations to the problem for it to be considered an argument that absolutely disproves the existence of God.