Pros And Cons Of Narco-Oligarchy

Narco-Oligarchy: Not All Wealth Is Equal In analyzing the actions of oligarchs across many nations with robust property defense laws and enforcement, a trend between source of wealth and methods of wealth defense becomes clear. Oligarchs whose primary sources of wealth are investments, real estate holdings, and corporate ownership rely on significant defensive institutions to secure these holdings. When the state both has the capacity and provides this property defense via legal protection and publicly funded law enforcement oligarchs will disarm themselves, resorting to financial rather than violently coercive means of influencing the political process. The key notion here is the exchange of government assurance of protection of wealth for
the disarmament of oligarchs. While this social contract is applicable to the majority of oligarchs in any given country, there are sources of wealth which can yield oligarchic levels of wealth concentration that are not protected by the state, as they are illegal. Perhaps the most lucrative and most universal of these is illicit narcotic trade. By acquiring their wealth outside of legal means, the narco-oligarch must remain armed to protect his holdings, and enforce property claims against theft, both by the state and private individuals. At the same time, the narcotics trade still often requires government provided infrastructure and corrupt officials, necessitating participation in the political process to defend their wealth and trade. Thus, the narco-oligarch has a much greater incentive to use coercive force in the political process, so long as the illicit nature of narcotics persists.
In order to compare the actions of oligarchs with various sources of wealth and power, a clear definition of both oligarchs and oligarchy must be employed. For the purpose of this essay, the definitions proposed by Jeffrey Winters in Oligarchy will be used. “Oligarchs,” Winters states, “are actors who command and control massive concentrations of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position.” The deployment of this greatly concentrated wealth to defend or buttress personal wealth is of greatest concern to those with large fortunes, as Winters argues “oligarchs face particular political problems and challenges that are directly linked to the material power resources they own and use in stratified societies… The possession of fortunes raises property concerns to the highest priority for the rich.” Oligarchy is thus defined as “the politics of wealth defense by materially involved actors.” The distinctions between outcomes of oligarchy arise from variation in the application of concentrated wealth as a power resource by the oligarch. Winters employs a useful typology, by which oligarchs are delineated by their role in defending property, and the degree of fragmentation between oligarchs. The peculiarities of the narco-oligarchs, which stem from the unique relationship between the source of their wealth and the state, are most apparent in their roles in defending property. The drug trade on the islands of Trinidad and Tobago clearly depicts the various roles played by narco-oligarchs based on their source of wealth, with a multi-faceted drug trade impacting the island nation. Fewer than 15 miles from the coast of Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago saw a large spike in drug usage in the 1970’s.
Domestic usage, while of great concern to the country , was only one piece of the drug trade involving the islands. According to the Scott Report, there are two main aspects of the narcotics trade: Cocaine imported for domestic use, cocaine imported to be repackaged and shipped by international drug lords. These unique yet highly interconnected markets both create actors with massive relative wealth concentration. Two strata of narco-oligarchs emerged in Trinidad and Tobago as a result of the drug trade: the domestic kingpin, and the international trafficker. The domestic kingpin being a byproduct of the international drug trade passing through the country, their role cannot be understood without comprehension of the international drug trade, and its relation to these Islands. The Cali and Medellin cartels, Colombian cocaine producers had two primary routes for exporting their product to the United States and Europe, by land and by sea. The land route entailed travel through central America, entering the United States via the border with Mexico. To reach Europe and the Atlantic coastline, cartels would bring their product to Trinidad or Tobago, either via airdrop or clandestine boat landings leaving from the shores of Venezuela. With no restrictions on trade and movement between the two islands, shipments to either could be transported to Port-of-Spain for
re-packaging and shipment. Once the drugs reach the islands, however, they move into the hands of domestic actors. As outlined in the “Scott” Report, cartel traffickers would sell the cocaine to local gangs which may either insert the drugs into the local market, or export them to either the United States or Europe. While the domestic drug market is lucrative, the great wealth is to be made in the shipment of narcotics. Evading detection and prosecution being necessary for the perpetuation of an international illicit market, a vast network of real estate properties, import/export companies, ships, property defense, and political capital with a unified goal across many island nations must be present for the Caribbean cocaine trade to exist. Those who possess these shipping businesses, warehouses, vast properties, and political influences have emerged as the primary and most formidable form of oligarch in Trinidad and Tobago, and the Caribbean as a whole: the International Trafficker. As the entry costs for the international drug trade are quite high, it is natural that the traditional holders of wealth and land in the Caribbean dominate the market for trafficking services.
Due to systematic racial exclusion from the economy during and immediately after the colonial period in Trinidad and Tobago, the majority of business owners at the formation of the Colombian drug cartels belonged to one of the following ethnicities: Syrian/Lebanese or East Indian. With international business connections and arrangements typically falling along racial, and sometimes familial lines, the primary cartels (Cali and Medellin) employed ethnically homogenous networks of traffickers to transport their product from Colombia to the United States. The Medellin cartel utilized a network of descendents of Syrian and Lebanese immigrants who came to the Caribbean at the start of the 20th century, some of whom Figueria alleges in Cocaine and Heroin trafficking in the Caribbean came to Trinidad to expand their heroin trafficking empire. The Cali cartel employed a similar network of Indians, whose ancestors came to the islands during British rule, and enjoyed a privileged position over the Afro-Trinidadian and Tobagonian slaves they replaced as indentured servants. While the bulk of the profits from the cocaine trade ultimately found their way back to Colombia, the networks of Syrian/Lebanese and Indian traffickers grew to great relative wealth for their participation in the market.
While both the narcotics and the profits that ensue are illegal in Trinidad, the international trafficker’s wealth is largely protected by the state, as it is often indistinguishable from legal holdings. Taking advantage of the diversity of banking regulation and opacity of banking records in many of the Caribbean islands, as well as money-laundering through these international business networks, these narco-oligarchs can amass grand fortunes in the form of real estate holdings, capital investments, and other holdings which the state has pledged to protect. By converting profits from outlawed narcotics into property with a state-enforced right of possession behind it, the international trafficker parallels the oligarch whose wealth is completely legal in their capacity to produce political outcomes via their wealth. Recognizing their property rights as legal and legitimate, the state deepens their social contract with the narco-oligarch and pressures disarmament on the part of the trafficker. As a result, the individual international traffickers who bridge the gap between Colombian cartels and are able to operate with functional legal impunity, and without being directly implicated. Rather, cabals of oligarchic actors are identified by their ethnicity, and recognized as homogenous in their political activity. The parties which have dominated the politics of Trinidad and Tobago each serve one of the two ethnicities associated with narco-oligarchic cabals, with the United National Congress representing the Indian population, and the People’s national movement representing the black population, but largely financed by the Syrian/Lebanese business community. Although candidates need not disclose their funding sources, the parties are required to report all funding, foreign and domestic. The initiative to digitize and publicize campaign finance data is in infancy in Trinidad and Tobago, and as a result, there is little direct financial evidence available in the foreign public record to support or refute the claims of such inextricable links between the political parties and their financial supporters. Albeit, the narrative of oligarchic cabals of a single ethnicity, and thus homogenous economic and political interests funding and controlling political parties is asserted regularly in the academic and political discourse in Trinidad and Tobago.