Quining Qualia Dennett Summary

The philosophy of mind is no stranger to rather abstract philosophical terms and concepts. Usually, these terms are defined to better understand a philosophical theory, or to describe a flaw in one of those theories. Qualia is a product of the latter category. However, the existence of qualia has been called into question by Daniel Dennett in his article Quining Qualia. This paper will be exploring the claims Dennett made about the existence of qualia in three parts. First, by defining the five qualities that Dennett observes as being attributed to the term qualia. Then, summarizing Dennett’s four primary arguments by highlighting an example of each that shows his conclusion. Finally, I will provide my personal thoughts on his arguments, and
why I believe Dennett is correct in saying that qualia do not exist.
What Dennett is trying to argue against is an inherently abstract idea. Qualia is part of the conscious experience of a person’s mind. All qualia possess these five characteristics: ineffability, private, intrinsic, infallible, and immediate apprehension in thought. Ineffability is the characteristic of being unexplainable in words. The second characteristic privacy is that qualia must be unique to the person having that experience. The third characteristic critical to qualia is indivisibility. To be intrinsic, qualia must be an integral part of the experience and cannot be in any way analyzed without the context of the experience. Fourth, is that qualia cannot be wrong or incorrectly interpreted. The final characteristic of qualia is the idea that qualia are directly accessible to the person who had the experience to which the qualia belong, and that access of the qualia is infallible.
Now that qualia have been accurately defined, Dennett’s article argues that qualia do not exist. His first argument against qualia is built on an unethical neurosurgeon example. The example is, a person goes to sleep and then a neurosurgeon operates on this person without their knowledge. When the person awakens, they find the entire world’s colors have been changed. All the colors have been switched with the color opposite it on the color wheel. Now, two equally likely possibilities exist to explain this situation. One, the neurosurgeon tampered with the person’s vision and thus the colors have all been switched around. Two, the neurosurgeon has inverted some of the person’s memory-access links, and the colors in the person’s memories are inverted. Now, the person is incapable of determining which surgery they have undergone without outside help. Importantly, only one of these surgeries changes the person’s experience qualia. Therefore, qualia lack the characteristic of direct accessibility as the pathways from the eye can be tampered with just as easily as the pathways to a person’s memory links.
Dennett’s second counter to qualia focuses on the propriety of infallibility. Suppose a person name Gene has been surgically altered to have inverted taste buds. What should taste sweet instead tastes sour and vice versa. Yet, over time Gene has compensated for this and now everything tastes like it did before the surgery. So, either Gene’s memories have changed to fit this new reality, or those old memories have overwritten the newly inverted qualia. Either way, Gene’s personal observations cannot discern which has happened. Which clearly undermines the propriety of infallibility according to Dennett.
Next, Dennett argues against the intrinsic nature of qualia. In this section, Dennett observes that beer is one of a group of drinks and foods that are an acquired taste. This means the enjoyment of the taste changes as the drinker gains experience. This means qualia has a dependent relationship with the attitudes of the person experiencing the qualia, and therefore they are not intrinsic.
Finally, Dennett addresses ineffability: the inability to be expressed in words.
Dennett says “Why does it seem that our conscious experiences have ineffable properties? Because they do have practically ineffable properties” (Dennett pg.241) which he then supports with an example. Here, Dennett supposes that he has never heard the call of an osprey, but he is an avid reader of books about birds including the osprey. Even so, without hearing the bird firsthand, he lacks qualia of the sound, regardless of how in depth those books describe the osprey’s call. So, Dennett tracks down one of these birds and listens to its call. Now he has firsthand experience with the sound, and at first it appears to be ineffable, as the books written by experts in the field of avian biology failed to fully capture the experience. However, Dennett claims this first-hand experience is in fact a property-detector, which allows him to now better identify the call of an osprey. Which means, Dennett can properly identify all the properties of an osprey call, given enough experiences hearing ospreys. Then, he would be able to properly quantify the sound in words. No doubt that full definition would be extremely lengthy, but it would be a perfectly accurate description of a conscious experience. Which clearly contradicts the idea that such experiences have ineffable
qualia.
Now that all of Dennett’s key arguments have been covered, I will provide my thoughts about the term qualia and Dennett’s article. To put it simply, I think Dennett has the correct conclusion, that qualia do not exist. His arguments show that qualia has too many characteristics that were added to the definition because philosophers intuitively agreed with the decision, and then used the term as it aided their arguments at the time. Now, philosophers continually defend qualia, because it makes their work easier if qualia exist. From my perspective, the defense of qualia, mainly by dualism philosophers, is very reminiscent of the arguments offered by defenders of religious ideologies. They are clearly trying to fit a stagnant idea into an evolving modern debate. They are inherently limited by their adherence to a theory that is vague by definition and cannot compromise on its characteristics. Otherwise, the entire theory falls in on itself. However, Dennett is not without his flaws. Dennettt could be more accurate when conveying his conclusion. Qualia is a term, as such its existence is a fact, but where anything exists that is properly represented by the term is another matter. As Dennett shows, nothing fulfills all the characteristics that define qualia. Therefore, nothing is qualia, but the word qualia does not then vanish. Undoubtedly, it will remain until everyone finally recognizes that the term properly defines nothing. If that day does come to pass, it will become a logistical artefact, and a footnote in the history of the philosophy of mind.
However, even if Dennett or some other philosopher does finally prove that nothing fits the definition of qualia, the argument may not end there. Dennett himself mentions this is not the first time this philosophical concept has appeared. He notes that “… no sooner does it retreat in the face of one argument than “it” reappears, apparently innocent of all charges, in a new guise” (Dennett, pg. 227). So, to lay this idea to rest for good is going to be a lengthy process, but I think Dennett has helped to put the nail in the final coffin of this philosophical concept.
To review, this paper has summarized the article Quining Qualia by Daniel Dennett. His identification of the philosophical term qualia, assertion that nothing fits this definition, and his core arguments as to why this is. Then, I offered my own assertions about the topic, and why I believe Dennett is correct in his conclusion. Regardless of his habit of reaching his conclusions via the most peculiar examples available.