Introduction
Geroge W. Merck stated once stated, “We try never to forget that medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits follow. Initially, Vioxx was the blockbuster drug that Merck needed due to the upcoming Zocor patent cliff in 2006. With an estimated 27,785 heart attacks and sudden cardiac deaths that could have been avoided if Celebrex had been used instead of Vioxx, Merck faces the possibility of not only having to pay enormous civil and criminal penalties, but also losing the trust of patients. Many parties are partially culpable, but Merck faces the severe uphill battle of regaining a reputation that once served as a market differentiator; in the 1980’s, Merck was voted the “Most Admired Company in American Business” for seven consecutive years. A critical issue in this case is to analyze the events listed in the case and propose an alternate course of action that may help prevent future deaths from other pharmaceutical drugs while not prohibitively restricting innovative research that could potentially save lives if tested properly.
Critical Points and Issues Merck was relying on the success of Vioxx due to Zocor’s expiring patent and the direct competition Vioxx was engaged in with Celebrex, which had a first mover advantage. While Celebrex was also a Cox-2 inhibitor, Vioxx was the only Cox-2 inhibitor proven to be beneficial for ulcers and gastrointestinal bleeding. Once studies came out suggesting that Vioxx contributed to a greater number of cardiovascular problems than naproxen, Merck seemed to opportunistically interpret these results. Furthermore, Merck did not institute any studies that might have found negative cardiovascular results, and management failed to perform a study that focused specifically on the cardiovascular risks of Vioxx. Instead, Merck spent a record amount on advertising the gastrointestinal benefit of the drug in a period of uncertainty. The
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