In his essay "Why Abortion is Immoral," Don Marquis argues against the morality of abortion on the premise that the value of a fetus' future is so great that it is immoral to take that potential future away from it. Essentially, he contends, abortion is tantamount to murder: killing an individual is prima facie wrong because the loss of the goods of one's future is the worst loss a human can suffer. He calls this potential future a "future-like-ours," which is the basis for his contentions. In the next few pages I will delineate the general progression of his argument, and later, will evaluate the plausibility of said argument. Though Marquis makes both logical and compelling claims, there are several concerns and weaknesses that arise from his argument that must be considered. Marquis establishes his argument with the exploration of why killing humans is wrong, in any case. The clear answer, he says, is that killing is wrong because of its "effect on the victim" (Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 558). Taking one's life deprives the victim of "all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future," and this is the greatest loss that any human can suffer (558). This theory of wrongness can account for why it is also wrong to kill infants and young children, whereas other theories that make narrower claims (e.g. "It is prima facie wrong to kill only rational agents) do not stand in such cases. There are obvious implications concerning the ethics of abortion with this theory in place. Marquis contends that "The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings..." (559). It follows then, that because it is wrong to kill humans, it is also wrong to kill potential humans, and so abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. Fetuses have a viable, valuable future, which
In his essay "Why Abortion is Immoral," Don Marquis argues against the morality of abortion on the premise that the value of a fetus' future is so great that it is immoral to take that potential future away from it. Essentially, he contends, abortion is tantamount to murder: killing an individual is prima facie wrong because the loss of the goods of one's future is the worst loss a human can suffer. He calls this potential future a "future-like-ours," which is the basis for his contentions. In the next few pages I will delineate the general progression of his argument, and later, will evaluate the plausibility of said argument. Though Marquis makes both logical and compelling claims, there are several concerns and weaknesses that arise from his argument that must be considered. Marquis establishes his argument with the exploration of why killing humans is wrong, in any case. The clear answer, he says, is that killing is wrong because of its "effect on the victim" (Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 558). Taking one's life deprives the victim of "all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future," and this is the greatest loss that any human can suffer (558). This theory of wrongness can account for why it is also wrong to kill infants and young children, whereas other theories that make narrower claims (e.g. "It is prima facie wrong to kill only rational agents) do not stand in such cases. There are obvious implications concerning the ethics of abortion with this theory in place. Marquis contends that "The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings..." (559). It follows then, that because it is wrong to kill humans, it is also wrong to kill potential humans, and so abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. Fetuses have a viable, valuable future, which