Richard Hallion's Storm Over Iraq
On January 17 1991 combat aircraft from several coalition countries took off from land based or sea based runways with one common goal, drop their munitions on preselected targets deep inside Iraq. The Gulf War was about to begin. Downtown Baghdad was off-limits to conventional aircraft due to their sophisticated air defense network. The only thing permitted were cruise missiles and the most advanced fighter/bomber the world had seen, the F-117 stealth aircraft that was invisible to radar and could deploy their bombs with deadly accuracy. Storm over Iraq was written by Richard Hallion and provides a history lesson of sorts about the evolution of airpower from WWI to Grenada and ending with the Gulf War. He also has a chapter that deals with what went right, what went wrong and what can be improved. There are also appendixes that explain the information and capabilities better. The one message that is portrayed loud and clear throughout is the effectiveness of stealth technologies like the F-117 Nighthawk. The one example that stands out is where he writes that thirty-eight support aircraft were needed so that eight attack aircraft could attack am airfield whereas twenty-one F-117s could carry out thirty seven missions by themselves. It also is a testament to
…show more content…
their effectiveness in that not one aircraft was lost to enemy activity. (page 248) Richard Hallion is a world-renowned historian in the aviation community.
To say he is a subject matter expert is an understatement. He is a former professor at the Army War College and has written many books about aerial warfare. In the preface he states what this book is not which would be a definitive account of the Gulf War because the history was still being written. I believe Hallion should have waited for all the facts before writing this book. Ultimately, Storm Over Iraq is a good book for someone who wants a history lesson about the air campaign during the Gulf War but other than that it falls flat. The book should have contained more information about the strengths and weaknesses of
the
Although the overall treatment of the air campaign itself is instructive, one cannot help but notice there are several oversights, whether this is accidental or intentional Hallion does not acknowledge it. First, and foremost Hallion is a clear advocate for air supremacy but also a supporter of the US Air Force The book is about airpower in the Gulf war in the Gulf War, but skewed heavily towards the US Air Force involvement. He does mention the Navy and Marine Corps involvement but is critical of carrier operations due to the distances involved, few refueling aircraft and a shortage of smart bombs. He mentions the Navy might have been better suited for a conflict like Libya in 1986. He also says that if it were not for Air Force refueling aircraft two thirds of the Navy’s strike missions would never happened. He wants you to think the Marines wanted to do an amphibious assalt
He also mentions briefly the coalition involvement and
The first part of the book is devoted to a history of air power of sorts from World War I up to Grenada and and concluding with the buildup of the Gulf War. Hallion traces both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and smaller conflicts such as Desert One, Beirut, and Grenada among others. Depicting Vietnam as a turning point—a failure which caused the United States to reevaluate its military In many instances, Hallion appears defensive, repeatedly anticipating and countering critics of air power. Thus, he paints a picture that Vietnam was less than a failure of air power, but was a failure of leadership to implement it correctly. Ultimately Hallion determines the lessons learned in Vietnam led to new tactics and doctrines being implemented that were used in places like Grenada, Panama and lastly proved quite successful during the Gulf War. Hallion selects specific shortcomings which eventually highlight specific strengths that would emerge in the Gulf conflict. The two largest examples are weapon precision and stealth technology. Hallion notes that in World War Two, “’Precision’ proved a relative word… From September through December 1944… only 7 percent of all bombs dropped hit within 1,000 feet of their aiming point. In contrast, in the Gulf war, ‘precision’ meant hitting within 10 feet of a target.” Even with this more stringent definition of “precision,” he shows that pilots in the Gulf earned an astonishing record for accuracy, often in excess of ninety percent. Additionally, stealth technology became extremely important, as Vietnam highlighted the lethal environment of what an enhanced air defense artillery is capable of doing Discussing the development of the F-117A stealth fighter, he explains, “Encountering integrated air defense networks over Vietnam and the Middle East compelled the West to invest in technology, training and tactics that would result in integrated air assaults to crack such defenses. The success of that effort…would be obvious in the skies over Baghdad.”
Richard Hallion states “while Iraq might be a Third World nation economically, it was a First World nation militarily and certainly no ‘paper tiger.’” He then states what attributes the Iraqi military have in the form of lists and maps showing the locations of Iraqi airbases.
The rest of the book consists largely of a thorough explanation of the air campaign itself. Hallion reveals a complicated, interlocking plan where various instruments of air power achieved various objectives. F-117 stealth fighters were able to penetrate defenses undetected and destroy many anti-air capabilities as well as communications, which then allowed less stealthy aircraft to attack unprotected targets. Hallion often describes the extraordinary level of cooperation among various forces using musical terminology. “The war opened with the full orchestration of Allied land-and-sea-based air power.” This unique and complex undertaking proved remarkably successful, crippling Iraq’s communications and reducing their defenses useless in a matter of hours. Hallion suggests the campaign was so effective that it should have spurred instantaneous surrender. In a flurry of overstatement, Hallion cites Hussein’s refusal to surrender as a sign of his brutality: “By the time dawn broke the morning of January 17, Iraq was well on the way to losing the war, thanks to the coalition’s strategic air campaign
Along with stealth, the changes in precision allowed the Gulf war to proceed quite differently from previous conflicts. In this conflict, many of the weapons used were so accurate that their success was not determined by whether or not they could hit a specific building, but by whether they hit a specific part of the building, such as a door or window. In addition to rendering air power far more effective overall, these improvements had other perhaps unforeseen consequences. Hallion discusses how weapons were often so accurate that they led to intelligence failures, since intelligence officers could not determine if targets had been hit. Bombs which maneuvered into bunkers or penetrated through tank armor often left the exterior of their target somewhat intact, instead destroying them from the inside, which led to a severe underestimation of hits. Far more notably, the increased accuracy of these weapons prevented excess collateral damage and many civilian casualties. Iraq’s “civilian population was virtually untouched directly by the war. Humane values had, in fact, prevailed.” Hallion does address the various instances of friendly fire, noting some of the solutions put in place to prevent these tragedies as the war unfolded. Some of these were more successful than others, although Hallion calls attention for a need for further development in this area. Hallion often punctuates the book with sections entitled “What Went Right,” and “What Went Wrong,” in various conflicts, often indicating that there is a clear, objectively correct way to wage air war, and a clear incorrect way. This simplistic analysis naturally demonstrates that the Gulf war was the correct way. However, he does not consider that other conflicts (real or potential) could present differing requirements or opposition which would necessitate different tactical approaches.
The narrative, despite the perhaps overstated description, is notable for its heavy reliance on statistics, helpful charts and figures, and useful maps. Hallion includes a large amount of sheer data, from details of sorties flown by various aircraft to technical specifications for various planes and defensive networks. Also included are several useful appendixes which focus on technical details of new weapons and aircraft technology. These are a wealth of information for readers who are interested in detailed specifications. He also does a splendid job of livening the accounts with relevant anecdotes which paint a clear picture and put a human face on the information. However, much of this data is reliant on secondary sources. He primarily uses newspapers and articles from air power journals. Although he appears to have consulted government documents where possible, little archival research was done, if any. No non-English sources are cited at all. Considering the book was released in 1992, shortly after the war was conducted, this is hardly surprising. It does raise questions regarding the veracity of the information presented, particularly in the details, and it remains to be seen if future research validates many of Hallion’s claims as more sources become available.
The most striking element of the book by far is the collection of hyperbolized claims and predictions which litter the book. Hallion predicts the death of the tank, as others have done previously, by noting that “air attack rendered all categories of armored fighting vehicles superfluous—they were no protection to their occupants whatsoever, no matter how thick their armor.” He goes on to imply that forces outside of air power are essentially useless, as the Gulf war “has revolutionized war,” ushering in a new era of warfare based on air power. “In the air power era, neither armies nor navies can be considered the primary instrument of securing victory in war.” Essentially, Hallion is making similar claims to that of Douhet and Mitchell before him, heralding that technological advances have finally rendered these once-outrageous claims to finally come to fruition: “Today, air power is the dominant form of military power… Air power has clearly proven its ability not merely to be decisive in was… but to be the determinant of victory in war.” While air power clearly played a decisive role in the Gulf war, to extend its decisiveness to war in general is a large leap.
A stout prejudice and fondness for overstatement undermine the work, despite its value as a narrative and a data source. The entire book has a rushed feel to it and might be attributed to the public opinion of the Gulf War and maybe wanting to be one of the first books The book might be more useful as a history of Air Force tactics than as a history of the Gulf War. That’s a problem I have with this book
their effectiveness in that not one aircraft was lost to enemy activity. (page 248) Richard Hallion is a world-renowned historian in the aviation community.
To say he is a subject matter expert is an understatement. He is a former professor at the Army War College and has written many books about aerial warfare. In the preface he states what this book is not which would be a definitive account of the Gulf War because the history was still being written. I believe Hallion should have waited for all the facts before writing this book. Ultimately, Storm Over Iraq is a good book for someone who wants a history lesson about the air campaign during the Gulf War but other than that it falls flat. The book should have contained more information about the strengths and weaknesses of
the
Although the overall treatment of the air campaign itself is instructive, one cannot help but notice there are several oversights, whether this is accidental or intentional Hallion does not acknowledge it. First, and foremost Hallion is a clear advocate for air supremacy but also a supporter of the US Air Force The book is about airpower in the Gulf war in the Gulf War, but skewed heavily towards the US Air Force involvement. He does mention the Navy and Marine Corps involvement but is critical of carrier operations due to the distances involved, few refueling aircraft and a shortage of smart bombs. He mentions the Navy might have been better suited for a conflict like Libya in 1986. He also says that if it were not for Air Force refueling aircraft two thirds of the Navy’s strike missions would never happened. He wants you to think the Marines wanted to do an amphibious assalt
He also mentions briefly the coalition involvement and
The first part of the book is devoted to a history of air power of sorts from World War I up to Grenada and and concluding with the buildup of the Gulf War. Hallion traces both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and smaller conflicts such as Desert One, Beirut, and Grenada among others. Depicting Vietnam as a turning point—a failure which caused the United States to reevaluate its military In many instances, Hallion appears defensive, repeatedly anticipating and countering critics of air power. Thus, he paints a picture that Vietnam was less than a failure of air power, but was a failure of leadership to implement it correctly. Ultimately Hallion determines the lessons learned in Vietnam led to new tactics and doctrines being implemented that were used in places like Grenada, Panama and lastly proved quite successful during the Gulf War. Hallion selects specific shortcomings which eventually highlight specific strengths that would emerge in the Gulf conflict. The two largest examples are weapon precision and stealth technology. Hallion notes that in World War Two, “’Precision’ proved a relative word… From September through December 1944… only 7 percent of all bombs dropped hit within 1,000 feet of their aiming point. In contrast, in the Gulf war, ‘precision’ meant hitting within 10 feet of a target.” Even with this more stringent definition of “precision,” he shows that pilots in the Gulf earned an astonishing record for accuracy, often in excess of ninety percent. Additionally, stealth technology became extremely important, as Vietnam highlighted the lethal environment of what an enhanced air defense artillery is capable of doing Discussing the development of the F-117A stealth fighter, he explains, “Encountering integrated air defense networks over Vietnam and the Middle East compelled the West to invest in technology, training and tactics that would result in integrated air assaults to crack such defenses. The success of that effort…would be obvious in the skies over Baghdad.”
Richard Hallion states “while Iraq might be a Third World nation economically, it was a First World nation militarily and certainly no ‘paper tiger.’” He then states what attributes the Iraqi military have in the form of lists and maps showing the locations of Iraqi airbases.
The rest of the book consists largely of a thorough explanation of the air campaign itself. Hallion reveals a complicated, interlocking plan where various instruments of air power achieved various objectives. F-117 stealth fighters were able to penetrate defenses undetected and destroy many anti-air capabilities as well as communications, which then allowed less stealthy aircraft to attack unprotected targets. Hallion often describes the extraordinary level of cooperation among various forces using musical terminology. “The war opened with the full orchestration of Allied land-and-sea-based air power.” This unique and complex undertaking proved remarkably successful, crippling Iraq’s communications and reducing their defenses useless in a matter of hours. Hallion suggests the campaign was so effective that it should have spurred instantaneous surrender. In a flurry of overstatement, Hallion cites Hussein’s refusal to surrender as a sign of his brutality: “By the time dawn broke the morning of January 17, Iraq was well on the way to losing the war, thanks to the coalition’s strategic air campaign
Along with stealth, the changes in precision allowed the Gulf war to proceed quite differently from previous conflicts. In this conflict, many of the weapons used were so accurate that their success was not determined by whether or not they could hit a specific building, but by whether they hit a specific part of the building, such as a door or window. In addition to rendering air power far more effective overall, these improvements had other perhaps unforeseen consequences. Hallion discusses how weapons were often so accurate that they led to intelligence failures, since intelligence officers could not determine if targets had been hit. Bombs which maneuvered into bunkers or penetrated through tank armor often left the exterior of their target somewhat intact, instead destroying them from the inside, which led to a severe underestimation of hits. Far more notably, the increased accuracy of these weapons prevented excess collateral damage and many civilian casualties. Iraq’s “civilian population was virtually untouched directly by the war. Humane values had, in fact, prevailed.” Hallion does address the various instances of friendly fire, noting some of the solutions put in place to prevent these tragedies as the war unfolded. Some of these were more successful than others, although Hallion calls attention for a need for further development in this area. Hallion often punctuates the book with sections entitled “What Went Right,” and “What Went Wrong,” in various conflicts, often indicating that there is a clear, objectively correct way to wage air war, and a clear incorrect way. This simplistic analysis naturally demonstrates that the Gulf war was the correct way. However, he does not consider that other conflicts (real or potential) could present differing requirements or opposition which would necessitate different tactical approaches.
The narrative, despite the perhaps overstated description, is notable for its heavy reliance on statistics, helpful charts and figures, and useful maps. Hallion includes a large amount of sheer data, from details of sorties flown by various aircraft to technical specifications for various planes and defensive networks. Also included are several useful appendixes which focus on technical details of new weapons and aircraft technology. These are a wealth of information for readers who are interested in detailed specifications. He also does a splendid job of livening the accounts with relevant anecdotes which paint a clear picture and put a human face on the information. However, much of this data is reliant on secondary sources. He primarily uses newspapers and articles from air power journals. Although he appears to have consulted government documents where possible, little archival research was done, if any. No non-English sources are cited at all. Considering the book was released in 1992, shortly after the war was conducted, this is hardly surprising. It does raise questions regarding the veracity of the information presented, particularly in the details, and it remains to be seen if future research validates many of Hallion’s claims as more sources become available.
The most striking element of the book by far is the collection of hyperbolized claims and predictions which litter the book. Hallion predicts the death of the tank, as others have done previously, by noting that “air attack rendered all categories of armored fighting vehicles superfluous—they were no protection to their occupants whatsoever, no matter how thick their armor.” He goes on to imply that forces outside of air power are essentially useless, as the Gulf war “has revolutionized war,” ushering in a new era of warfare based on air power. “In the air power era, neither armies nor navies can be considered the primary instrument of securing victory in war.” Essentially, Hallion is making similar claims to that of Douhet and Mitchell before him, heralding that technological advances have finally rendered these once-outrageous claims to finally come to fruition: “Today, air power is the dominant form of military power… Air power has clearly proven its ability not merely to be decisive in was… but to be the determinant of victory in war.” While air power clearly played a decisive role in the Gulf war, to extend its decisiveness to war in general is a large leap.
A stout prejudice and fondness for overstatement undermine the work, despite its value as a narrative and a data source. The entire book has a rushed feel to it and might be attributed to the public opinion of the Gulf War and maybe wanting to be one of the first books The book might be more useful as a history of Air Force tactics than as a history of the Gulf War. That’s a problem I have with this book