Robert Mcnamara's Memoir 'In Retrospect'

In Robert McNamara’s memoir, In Retrospect, McNamara provides intimate details on the events surrounding both the Kennedy, and Johnson administration. Moreover, he reflects on the some of the most controversial issues surrounding the cold war era, specifically, the “the Tonkin Golf Incident”, and the resolution it gave way to. McNamara examines what he believes to be the key questions surrounding these events that have sparked debate for decades. Did attacks occur on two US naval warships in the Gulf of Tonkin? Were these attacks provoked by the Johnson administration, in order to justify a declaration of war? Was the subsequent U.S. retaliation justified? McNamara attempts to answers these questions, based on his recollection of the events leading up to and after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed.
However, upon close examination of the facts and cross-referencing from other sources, it appears much of McNamara’s account proves largely inaccurate, and lacks important detail. Essentially, McNamara’s memoir can be seen as an attempt to admonish himself of the controversy. He removes himself from many of the important events, and gives the illusion that he was a mere
observer of the unfortunate incidents that would lead to a declaration of war by President Johnson. Primarily his account is lacking in it’s accuracy of the intelligence gathered after the two Naval war ships Turner Joy and Maddox were attacked on August 2nd and 4th of 1964. Moreover, he fails to present an accurate picture of the case for the Tonkin Resolution that took place two days after the attack on August 6th. McNamara does recognize the importance of the alleged attacks surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin, as they would be the main motivation behind President Johnson resolution. The subsequent resolution would increase US military personnel in Vietnam, from 16,000 to 550,000 men. Thus, he appears to present in depth detail as to the probability these attacks actually occurred. He states In Retrospect, “The evidence of the first attack is indisputable. The second attack seems probable but not certain.”1 While this may not seem like a statement that a man attempting to clear his name would make, the evidence he uses to justify his thoughts would prove inaccurate. Many historians today do acknowledge that the August 2nd attack did occur, with McNamara obtaining an enemy shell fragment from the ship as proof. However, numerous studies and research as recent as 2005, have proven that the second attack on August 4th did not take place. In the events leading up to the second alleged attack, McNamara discusses CIA covert guerilla operations that took place in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces, know as the 34A operations. In addition, the US navy was conducting “a system of global electronic reconnaissance”, that collected radio and radar signals, “emanating from the shore-based stations on the periphery of Communist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and, North Vietnam.”2 These operations were known as DESOTO missions. McNamara states that “Although some individuals knew of both 34A operations and DESOTO patrols, few senior officials planned or followed in detail the operational schedules of both.”3 This statement concerning the overall cooperation between the two operations does prove accurate in other accounts. However, McNamara’s statement that “Desoto patrols differed substantially in purpose and procedure from 34A operations”4 can actually be seen as incorrect. A top secret document declassified in 2005, in one instance gave orders to a DESOTO patrol to "Locate and identify all coastal radar transmitters, note all navigation aids along the DVR 's [Democratic Republic of Vietnam 's] coastline, and monitor the Vietnamese junk fleet for a possible connection to DRV/Viet Cong maritime supply and infiltration routes."5 This mission was essentially planned to gather information that would be useful to 34A raid operations in the vicinity of DESOTO patrols. In addition, McNamara writes that while some believed 34A operations had played a part in the initiating North Vietnamese actions against the Maddox and Turner Joy, and others(including McNamara), “pointing to 34A’s ineffectiveness found the explanation hard to accept”.6 At the congressional hearing that took place on August 6th 1964, McNamara again downplays the role of the 34A missions, saying they were a “worthless pinprick” to the North Vietnamese.7 Yet, McNamara ignores that tension had in fact been increasing between the DRV and the South Vietnamese 34A operations. In one example on July 28th, after a 34A attack on the Island of Hon Grio, DRV patrol boats chased the South Vietnamese operatives over 45 nautical miles before giving up the chase.8
Nonetheless, declassified audiotapes from the Johnson library in 2005 contain a very intriguing statement made by McNamara. In the morning after the August 2nd attack, McNamara admits to the president that attack and the 34A operation were in fact connected. He states, “We probably shot up a radar station and a few other miscellaneous buildings. And following 24 hours after that with this destroyer in the same area undoubtedly led them to connect the two events…."9 Not only does McNamara use misleading information regarding the 34A and DESOTO operations, but he also leaves out crucial detail from the intelligence that was gathered that day. McNamara does show that there was a great sense of doubt as to whether the August 4th attack occurred, using testimony from the officers on board the two ships that day, as well as from pilots that flew over the ships. McNamara describes how unusual weather conditions, and “overeager” sonar men, may have played a significant role in the accuracy of the alleged attacks. Yet, he doesn’t disclose that there was in fact, faulty equipment on both ships.
In an article written by an NSA analyst entitled “Skunks, Bogues, and Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery”, Captain John J. Herrick of the Maddox, had reported that the Maddox’s long range, air search radar was inoperative, and fire control radar belonging to the U.S.S. Turner Joy was out of malfunctioning as well.10 Even in Herrick’s initial account of the August 4th attack, he reported “two skunks”(surface contacts) and “three bogies”(air contacts). Moments later, he would disregard these findings as “terrain returns”, proving further the faulty equipment both ship had.11
Moreover, McNamara leaves out the clear difference in the sonar reports from the August 2nd and August 4th attacks. As reports show, the radar from both the Maddox and Turner Joy on August 4th were not continuous trackings, but mostly unexpected flash returns that appeared for a few seconds on radar and disappeared12. On the August 2nd attack Vietnamese PT boats would take several hits but remain afloat and visible on the radar while on the night of August 4th, “A target would apparently be hit and then disappear, as if it had completely and instantaneously incinerated in an explosion.”13
The reader may ask, Out of all the faulty evidence why did Robert McNamara still confirm that the August 4th attack? In Retrospect, McNamara famously stated in response to a report of the August 4th attack, “We obviously don’t want to do it (launch the retaliatory strike) until we are damn sure what happened.”14Basically, McNamara tries to persuade the reader that he had actually looked at all the intelligence gathered from that day and found substantial evidence that would make it appear the August 4th attack occurred. McNamara provides what he believes to be the five main factors that had persuaded him. Out of all these factors the most important was his claim that the U.S. had intercepted and translated a North Vietnamese message indicating two of it’s boats had been sunk.
This piece of alleged evidence was so important that at the congressional hearing that took place on August 6th McNamara stated that he had “unimpeachable proof” of four North Vietnamese radio messages that showed clear intention to attack U.S. destroyers on the night of August 4th. 15. Surprisingly, McNamara leaves this statement out of Retrospect, and only states that the messages would later prove to be from the August 2nd attacks. Alarming evidence released by NSA historians would prove that not only was Robert McNamara wrong in his previous statement he knew he was, and covered up crucial information in order to protect himself.
Out of all the intercepted messages from the North Vietnamese only 15 of the 122 were used. It is believed that over 90% of these messages were kept out of reports because of the conflicting accounts of the August 4th events they told.16 Additionally, most of messages that were sent contained “severe analytic errors, unexplained translation changes, and the conjunction of two messages in one.”17 In one example analytic error, an intercepted message contained the Vietnamese phrase “Hanh Quan” which can mean military operation. The phrase has an alternative meaning however of “forced or long march or movement”. In a nautical context, this could simply refer to a long voyage. This second context would make more sense when it was learned in another message, that the North Vietnamese had actually been preoccupied with a salvage mission, in which they were searching for the two sunken boats from August 2nd’s battle. 18
The congressional hearing that would follow on August 6th 1964, would create even more confusion. McNamara emphasizes that at the time of the hearing, he truly believed all of his statements were accurate. But the information just presented holds a strong case for the lack of merit in his writing. It’s as if McNamara held no control over the events that took place and is an innocent observer. In the non-fiction book Why the Senate Slept, author Ezra Siff presents a different picture of the events.
The hearing that took place on August 6th, was a joint executive session of Senate Foreign Relations and Armed services forces committees to testify to on both the events that took place on August 2nd and August 2nd and 4 and in support of the resolution presented before both houses. Siff makes the point that it was completely irresponsible to hold a hearing of only three hours on a complex series of events that took place over two days; “Most of the senators weren’t even remotely familiar with what was going on at the time”19 McNamara asserts that the key issue was “the ambiguous language of the Constitution, which established the president as commander in chief but gave Congress the power to declare war.”20
Senator Fulbright who presided over the hearing and oversaw the resolution on the Senate floor, would later absolve McNamara of the charge of intentionally misleading Congress.21 As a result, I believe that because of Senator Fulbright’s “gracious actions” towards McNamara, he doesn’t mention the contradicting responses Fulbright gives to those senators that asked questions about the power of the resolution. In one instance Senator Daniel Brewster (D-Md) asked “is there anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam? Fulbright gives a contradictory response in which he states “There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. However, the language of the resolution doesn’t prevent it.22 In another instance, Senator Jack Miller (R-Iw) attempted to understand the phrase in the resolution that stated “Congress approves and supports the determination of the President to prevent further aggression.” He then inquired as to who they would be preventing aggression from; Aggression against the U.S.? Or Aggression against the South Vietnamese. Senator Fulbright simply replied with “I believe that both are included in that phrase."23 It is evident from these responses that all Fulbright really did was cloud issue with his response to the senators’ questions.
Even though the many in Congress were apprehensive of the resolution, it still passed almost unanimously, with only two senators voting against the resolution.
The question still remains however, why did it pass? McNamara in some sense does give an accurate answer when referring to the ambiguous language of both the constitution and the resolution itself. But, he still doesn’t analyze some of the other key factors such as the role of Senator Fulbright in the hearings. It was his assurance that “This resolution doesn’t mean a thing. Lyndon wants this to show he can be decisive and firm with the communists, too”, that would help persuade congress. Congress understood the breadth of the resolutions power but they didn’t for see that it would be an authorization for the escalation of
war.24
Likewise, McNamara doesn’t take into account the reaction the general public would have if the committee voted the no on the resolution. McNamara doesn’t include in his memoir President Johnson’s radio and television appearance shortly after the second attack, in which he informed the public of “two unprovoked” attacks on US naval vessels in the Tonkin Gulf. It’s obvious that any member of congress that wanted to continue their career in politics could not vote no to a resolution in response to two unprovoked attacks. They would be viewed as completely unpatriotic during a time of national crisis. To put it plainly, congress didn’t really have a choice in the matter.
Unfortunately, the Tonkin resolution would commit over half a million US military forces to Vietnam with a death toll that would reach over 58,000 Americans. Subsequently, many Americans immediately put the blame on Robert McNamara and the Johnson Administration. Whether they are deserving of it, the question still remains. Robert McNamara attempts to bring clarity to the events surrounding the Golf of Tonkin in his memoir In Retrospect, but it unfortunately is an inadvertent attempt to clear his name. Because of this attempt to admonish himself, McNamara leaves out important detail specifically involving intelligence gathered after the second attack that took place on August 4th, as well as important dialogue that occurred during the congressional hearings on August 6th. In Retrospect, is a primary account, but unfortunately it uses evidence that present a very lopsided picture of a man who tries to excuse the events as “policy that spun out of control.”25

Bibliography

Hanyok, Robert J. “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964,” Cryptologic Quarterly, (2005): 10
-Presented key facts about intelligence and encrypted messages from August 2nd and 4th

McNamara, Robert S. In Retrospect, New York: Times Books, (1995), 128
-My primary source account, as told by Robert McNamara

Nathan, James A. “Robert McNamara 's Vietnam deception." USA Today Magazine 124, no. 2604 (September 1995): 32. MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 8, 2013).
-Provided me with key dialogue from McNamara that was not in the book, specifically information pertaining to the 34A missions

Paterson, Pat."The Truth About Tonkin." Naval History 22, no. 1 (February 2008): 52. MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 8, 2013).
-Similar to “McNamara’s deception, provides key info about the actual attacks of August 2nd and 4th

Karen, Schwindt. “The Obligation for Patriotism: Why Congress Passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution." (n.d.): OAIster, EBSCOhost (accessed April 8, 2013).
-Looked closely at events surrounding the congressional hearing, gave important dialogue on senator Fulbright
-The Foreword, was written by the most decorated officer from Vietnam, who severely criticized McNamara

Siff Y. Ezra. Why the senate slept : the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and the beginning of America 's Vietnam war / Ezra Y. Siff ; foreword by Lt. Col. Anthony B. Herbert. n.p.: Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1999., 1999. ShaRC -- MIC Consortium Shared Catalog, EBSCOhost (accessed April 8, 2013). 20.
-Also looked at events leading up to and after the August 6th congressional hearing
-Looked at different theories of why congress passed the resolution