Schneckloth V. Fallsbauer's Ambiguity?
One does not expect to leave their house and have a stranger barge into their home and rummage through their belongings. This is the situation that Petitioner David Fallsbauer found himself in with not a stranger, but a highly esteemed officer of the law, whom unreasonably dissected his possessions. Under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, citizens are protected against the unbridled and unreasonable searches and seizures. One exception is through consent to the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (9th Cir. 1973). Petitioner David Fallsbauer can demonstrate through established case law that the consent his mother gave was ambiguous. Because his mother’s consent was ambiguous, the consent was not
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Fallsbauer’s consent regarding searching in the shoe box where the police officers found the tablets later discovered to be Taz. Mrs. Fallsbauer said in her official statement that the shoebox was from her pair of shoes. R. at 5. The ambiguous statement Mrs. Fallsbauer gave to the officers is that she “left the shoebox empty on the dresser a while back, and that her son put some of his clothes in the dresser.” R. at 5. The case of U.S. v. Whitfield is analogous to and precedential for the issue we are faced with here. 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Whitfield, the Court said that ownership of the house does not imply common authority. “A landlord-tenant type of arrangement between a parent and an older child might indicate that the child has been given greater autonomy in the house, that his room is his private enclave, a place no one else may enter without his permission.” Id. at 1075. Because David Fallsbauer is 30 years old, a reasonable person could assume that he is autonomous and that his possessions are private. R. at 6. Therefore, his explicit consent would be necessary to access his private belongings in his bedroom. There is legitimacy for allowing police officers to search whatever they deem necessary based from consent of a third party alone, however obtaining consent to search is hardly asking for the shirt off the officers’ backs. Police officers should be reasonable people who are required to use their common sense in searching objects that are owned by an older child living with his
Fallsbauer’s consent regarding searching in the shoe box where the police officers found the tablets later discovered to be Taz. Mrs. Fallsbauer said in her official statement that the shoebox was from her pair of shoes. R. at 5. The ambiguous statement Mrs. Fallsbauer gave to the officers is that she “left the shoebox empty on the dresser a while back, and that her son put some of his clothes in the dresser.” R. at 5. The case of U.S. v. Whitfield is analogous to and precedential for the issue we are faced with here. 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Whitfield, the Court said that ownership of the house does not imply common authority. “A landlord-tenant type of arrangement between a parent and an older child might indicate that the child has been given greater autonomy in the house, that his room is his private enclave, a place no one else may enter without his permission.” Id. at 1075. Because David Fallsbauer is 30 years old, a reasonable person could assume that he is autonomous and that his possessions are private. R. at 6. Therefore, his explicit consent would be necessary to access his private belongings in his bedroom. There is legitimacy for allowing police officers to search whatever they deem necessary based from consent of a third party alone, however obtaining consent to search is hardly asking for the shirt off the officers’ backs. Police officers should be reasonable people who are required to use their common sense in searching objects that are owned by an older child living with his