Rochin Vs. California Year: 1952

How To Brief a Case

Facts: what happened?

Procedure: what occurred in the lower courts? Decisions made in the lower courts (before the Supreme Court).

Issue(s): question of law presented to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Holding: the ruling in the case. The decision/answer.

Rationale: reasons why the court ruled in a particular way.

Rochin v. California
Year: 1952

Facts
3 deputy sheriffs of the county of Los Angeles go into Rochin’s home after obtaining potential information that he was selling narcotics
They found him on the second floor, where he then swallows two capsules.
The deputies kicked him several times in the stomach attempting to force the capsules out of his body.
He was taken to a hospital to pump his stomach. He vomited the two capsules
containing morphine, which were used to accuse him.
Procedure
In the California Superior Court, he was convicted and sentenced to 60 days for violating the California Health and Safety Code (1947), 11,500.
District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction although the officers were found guilty of (1) unlawful break-in, (2) assaulting and battering the defendant, and (3) battering, assaulting, torturing, and falsely imprisoning the defendant at the hospital.
Supreme Court of California denied petition for a hearing.
Issue
Violation of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause
Violation of 5th Amendment Self-incrimination clause

Holding
“This is conduct that shocks the conscious.” (one of the judges’ response to the violation of Rochin’s rights and the offenses committed against him in order to extract the capsules from his stomach)
Judgment Reversed. Conviction Removed

Rationale
Evidence was obtained in an unnatural manner
Convicting/condemning evidence was obtained against his will
The evidence was extracted against his will. Thus, it is a violation of his 5th Amendment for self-incrimination without intent.

Griswold v. Connecticut

Year 1965

Facts
Griswold and Buxton were consultants for contraceptive use (information, instruction, and medical advice to preventing conception).
Griswold: Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League in Connecticut
Buxton: licensed physician and professor at the Yale Medical School who served as medical director for the League at its center in Haven

Procedure
Defendants were convicted of violating the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.): “Any person who uses any drug, medical article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception, shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or both fined and imprisoned.” “Any person who assists. Abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”
They were fined $100
Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed that the statue violated the Fourteenth Amendment
Supreme Court of Errors: affirmed

Issue
Does the state law violate the doctors’ constitutional rights?
Violation of the 1st Amendment (pg. 33): the penumbra (the doctors had the right to say whatever they wanted to say)
Privacy is protected from governmental concerns
Pg. 34 last paragraph

Holding
Decision Reversed

Rationale
- The Connecticut Statue violated the U.S. Constitution provision stated in the 1st Amendment (right of privacy)

Duncan v. Louisiana

Year
1968

Facts
Gary Duncan was accused and convicted of simple battery in the 25th Judicial District Court of Louisiana
By Louisiana Law: simple battery is a misdemeanor, with punishment of a maximum of 2 years of imprisonment and a $300 fine.
No jury because of state law
Convicted to 60 days and a $150
Slapped a white boy with whom two his cousins were having a racial encounter

Procedure
Judicial District Court of Louisiana: accused and convicted of simple battery.
Supreme Court of Louisiana found no error of law and denied the appellant a writ of certiorari
He had claimed that the Louisiana Constitution of granting a trial by jury only to cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed, violated his Constitutional right to a trial by jury (6th and 14th Amendment)
Issue
Violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments that guarantee a speedy and fair trial by jury.
Does it apply to state prosecutions during sentences as long as two years being imposed?

Holding
Reversed and remandated.
The 6th and 14th Amendments were violated.
Rationale
Pg. 41
The 14th Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in all criminal cases that would come within the 6th Amendment’s guarantee. State proceedings must abide these Amendments as well.
Trial by jury is mandated/applicable to the states.
Case that makes the 6th Amendment applicable to the states.

Draper v. U.S.

Year
1959

Facts
Draper was being accused and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting narcotic drugs in Denver, Colorado.
The evidence used was such taken from him in two envelopes with 865 grains of heroin and a hypodermic syringe after his arrest by his arresting officer.
Hereford, an informer, informed Marsh and described Draper with exactitude

Procedure
District court found that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant, resulting, lawfully, in a search and seizure that overruled the motion to suppress.
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Draper was being convicted under the Narcotic Control Act of 1956: “The Bureau of Narcotics may make arrests without warrant for violations of any law of the U.S. relating to narcotic drugs…where the violation is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest or where the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such violation.

Issue
Was there probable cause for a search and seizure or was it a violation his 4th Amendment rights?

Holding
Conviction Affirmed

Rationale
There was enough evidence/information for probable cause, making the search and seizure lawful.
The seized heroin was competent evidence lawfully received at the trial.
Pg. 58 top (probable cause)

U.S. v. Watson

Year
1976

Facts
Informant telephoned postal inspector informing that Watson was in possession of a stolen credit card
After informing of more stolen cards, Watson was taken out of the restaurant and read his Miranda rights.
He had no credit cards in his possession.
After being asked if it were ok to check his car, to which he mentioned yes, the officer found two stolen credit cards
Accounted for the two counts of a four-count indictment charging him with possessing stolen mail in violation of 18 USC SS 1708
Watson claimed the arrest was unlawful because of probable cause and arrest warrant and his consent to search the car was involuntary and ineffective because he was not advised of being withheld responsible

Procedure
Motion to suppress evidence was denied
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed because:
There was no arrest warrant
Search had been coerced

Issue
The officers didn’t have enough probable cause, so were they still allowed to search?
Did they violate the Fourth Amendment?

Holding
Decision reversed
Watson convicted

Rationale
The arrest did not violate his Constitutional rights because Postal Service officers, according to Title 18 USC ss 3061 (a)(3) are allowed to: “make arrests without warrant for felonies cognizable under the laws of the U.S. if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony”.

Virginia v. Moore

Year
2008

Facts
On February 20, 2003, two police officers stopped a car driven by David Lee Moore.
They’d heard over the radio that a person known as “Chubs” was driving with a suspended license, which one of the officers recognized as Moore’s nickname.
The officers determined that Moore’s license was in fact suspended, and arrested him for the misdemeanor for driving with a suspended license.
The officers then searched Moore’s car and found 16 grams of crack cocaine and $516 in cash.
Moore was charged with possession and intent to distribute, was found guilty, and sentenced to a 5-year sentence.

Procedure
Trial court found him guilty and convicted him to 5 years in prison, with 1 year and 6 months of the sentence suspended
A panel of Virginia’s intermediate court reversed the conviction
It was reinstated by the intermediate court sitting en banc
Reversed by the Virginia’s Supreme Court

Issue
Moore argued, however, that under state law the officers should have issued Moore a summons instead of an arrest because driving with a suspended license is not an arrestable offence, and that the evidence (crack and money) should have been suppressed under the 4th Amendment.

Holding
The conviction was upheld and the Supreme Court found that searching Moore’s car after his arrest and subsequent search of his person, although in violation of state law, did not violate his 4th Amendment rights.

Rationale
The Supreme Court found that although arresting Moore instead of issuing a summons violated state law, officers may perform searches in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence, and that an arrest based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 4th Amendment (the intrusion being a lawful search incident to the arrest that requires no additional justification).

Whren v. U.S.

Year
1996

Facts
On June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers were patrolling a high drug area of the city in an unmarked car when they spotted a Pathfinder with youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign.
The truck seemed to stay at the intersection for a very long time and the driver was spotted looking down into the lap of the passenger.
The police car then headed back toward the truck when, suddenly, it turned to its right without signaling, and sped off at an “unreasonable speed”.
When the officers pulled up alongside the truck, they immediately saw large bags of crack cocaine in petitioner’s Whren’s hands. Petitioners were then arrested, and several types of illegal drugs were found in the vehicle, and the petitioners were later charged with violating several drug laws.

Procedure
District Court denied the suppression motion, because there was nothing to demonstrate that it was a regular traffic stop
Convicted of the counts
Court of appeals: affirmed
Certiorari granted

Issue
The petitioners charge that the officers had not been justified by probable cause to believe, or even reasonably suspect that the petitioners were engaged in any drug-dealing activity, and the officer’s asserted ground for approaching the vehicle (to give the driver a warning concerning traffic violations) was pretextual.
It may be that the officers might decide which motorists to stop based on impermissible factors (such as race).
To avoid this, an automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be unreasonable under the same circumstances (i.e. the officer would’ve stopped the motorist under any circumstances due to a traffic violation).

Holding
Arrest and conviction stands

Rationale
The court found that the since the officers had probable cause to believe the petitioners had violated the traffic code, they didn’t stop the car based on an impermissible charge (one that violates the Equal Protection Clause). That rendered the stop reasonable under the 4th Amendment, and the evidence (crack) thereby discovered admissible (plain-view doctrine).

Ornelas v U.S.
Year:
1996
Facts:
In December 1992, Dt. Michael Pautz, a 20-year veteran, spotted a 1981 two-door Oldsmobile with California license plates in a motel parking lot.
The car attracted the officer’s attention because he knew from experience that those types of cars were popular with drug traffickers because it’s easy to hide things in them, as well as the fact that California is considered a source state for drugs.
Dt. Pautz radioed his dispatcher to inquire about the car’s registration, whose names the detective later asked the DEA to run.
The DEA personnel informed the detective that the names were on a database for known and suspected drug traffickers.
After bringing a police dog, detectives searched the car and found two kilos of cocaine. Procedure:
Magistrate judge: officers had reasonable suspicion but not probable cause
There was no rust on the screws, thus, Luedke had insufficient basis to conclude that drugs would be found within the panel
Nonetheless, he though that the sniffing dogs will eventually find the drugs.
District court: profile and NADDIS report gave probable cause/suspicion of drug trafficking. Evidence to not be suppressed.
Court of Appeals: would only reverse under “clear error”
Certiorari granted

Issue(s):
Petitioners argue that officers violated their 4th Amendment rights when they detained them in the parking lot and then searched the door panel (where the drugs were found) without a warrant.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reached the decision that Dt. Pautz was within his authority to detain and search the car, although the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to review de novo their determinations that the officer had reasonable suspicion and probable cause.

Rationale:
The court ruled that the detective was working and deducing based on extensive experience as an officer and that with the suspicious circumstances of a car with California plates was in a motel in Wisconsin in the winter with the vehicle being registered under the name of a person on the DEA’s database of suspected drug traffickers, as well as the inclusion of drug-sniffing dog, Dt. Pautz did not violate the petitioner’s 4th Amendment rights.

California v. Hodari D
Year:
1991

Facts:
In April 1988, two officers were on patrol in a high-crime area of Oakland California when they spotted a group of kids standing around a red car.
When the youths saw the officers’ car, they apparently panicked and ran.
One officer left the car, ran and tackled one of the fleeing suspects, who, just before being tackled, tossed what appeared to be a small rock (which turned out to be crack).
After being denied a motion to suppress, the California Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the seizure was unreasonable and a violation of the 4th Amendment, thus making the evidence inadmissible.

Procedure:
The case first underwent a Juvenile proceeding, which Hodari moved to suppress the evidence relating to the crack cocaine.
The court denied the motion to suppress without opinion.
The California court of appeals reversed, claiming that hodari had been seized when he saw officer Pertoso running in his direction.
The seizure was unreasonable under the 4th amendment, and the evidence of cocaine had to be suppressed as the fruit of the illegal seizure that had taken place.
The supreme court of California denied the state's application for review.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Issue(s):
In the juvenile proceeding brought against him, Hodari (the apprehended), moved to suppress the evidence, stating that he had been “seized” when he saw the officer running towards him, and that this seizure was unreasonable under the 4th Amendment, and that the evidence had to be suppressed, as the “fruit of that illegal seizure”.

Holding:
The court reversed the decision of the California Court of Appeals that Hodari was “seized” when he saw the officer running towards him, and ruled that this seizure was reasonable under the 4th Amendment.

Rationale:
If an officer shouts an order to stop (show of authority), at which point the suspect then flees with the officer in pursuit on foot, when the officer apprehends the suspect for fleeing it is in the act of arresting and not considered a seizure and a violation of 4th Amendment rights.

Payton v. New York
Year:
1980

Facts:
On January 14, 1970, after 2 days of investigations, police had assembled evidence that Theodore Payton had murdered the owner of a gas station.
Without a warrant, six officers went to Payton’s apartment to arrest him.
There was a no response to their knocking, and 30 minutes later, used crowbars to break in, and though no one was there, officers spotted a shell casing, which was later admitted as evidence during Payton’s trial.
Payton was then convicted, and the decision was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.

Procedure:
The trial judge held that the warrantless and forcible entry was authorized by the New York Code of Criminal procedure, and that the evidence in plain view was properly seized.
The appellate division, first department, summarily affirmed.
Obie Riddick's case came up.
Riddick was indicted on narcotics charges.
Just like in Payton's case, at his suppression hearing, the trial judge held that the revised New York Statute home authorized the warrantless entry into Riddicks, and that the search of the immediate area was reasonable under Chimel V. California.
The Appellate division, second department, affirmed the denial of the suppression motion.
The New York Court of appeals, in a single opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Payton and Riddick.

Issue(s):
The issue is whether or not the officers had the authority to enter Payton’s house even though they failed to obtain a warrant.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals.

Rationale:
The court stated that “the freedom of one man’s house” was one of the most vital tenets of liberty and barring exigent circumstances; the protection by the Constitution of a person’s home from search and seizure without a warrant violates the sanctity of the home.
Since no arrest warrants were issued in the case, the court ruled that the officers had no right to forcibly enter Payton’s home.

Illinois v. Gates
Year:
1983

Facts:
Respondents Lance & Susan Gates were indicted for violation of state drug laws when officers executing a search warrant found marijuana and other contraband in their car and home. Prior to trial, the Gates moved to suppress the seized evidence, on the basis that the warrant was obtained based on the letter from an anonymous informant, which led to the Chief of Police to pursue the tip. Dt. Mader then found a more recent address for the Gates & a plane ticket headed to West Palm Beach.
Gates then contacted a DEA agent, who watched Gates board the flight, as well as federal agents who saw Gates arrive, stop at a Holiday Inn, and leave the hotel with an unidentified woman towards a interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area, in a vehicle registered to him.
After being arrested, the Illinois Circuit Court ordered suppression of the marijuana, weapons, and contraband, a decision affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and by a divided vote by the Illinois State Supreme Court.

Procedure:
After being indicted for violation of State drug laws, prior to the trial, the gateses moved to suppress evidence seized during the search.
The Illinois supreme court affirmed the decisions of lower state courts granting the motion.
Certiorari was granted.
Issue(s):
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the affidavit for the search warrant was inadequate under the Court’s decisions in Aguilar v. Texas (1964) & Spinelli v. U.S. (1969), which requires that a letter meet two independent requirements (the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli Test) before it could be relied on.
According to the Illinois Circuit Court, the letter failed the necessary determination of probable cause to obtain a warrant.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, and ruled that the warrant based on the anonymous tip was sufficient enough to incite probable cause and thus legitimize the search.

Rationale:
The Supreme Court ruled that even though it was in agreement with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all relevant, they are not necessarily requirements that must always be met when obtaining a warrant.
The Supreme Court also stated that probable cause “as the name implies, deals with probabilities…are not technical; they are factual considerations on which reasonable and prudent men (i.e. law enforcement) act.” “An officer may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon direct observation, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.” (Totality of the Circumstances)

Chimel v. California
Year:
1965

Facts:
On September 13, 1965, 3 police officers arrived at the home of the petitioner with an arrest warrant for him for the burglary of a coin shop.
The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to his wife, and asked to come inside.
They waited for the petitioner to get home, handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to look around.
The petitioner refused, but the officers said that on the basis of lawful arrest, they conducted one anyway.
No search warrant had been issued.
The officers searched the home and later seized some coins and other items.
Over the petitioner’s objection, the seized items were admitted as evidence against him and he was convicted.

Procedure:
After the petitioner’s state trial on two charges of burglary, the items taken from the house were admitted into evidence, over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized.
He was convicted.
The California court of appeal and the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction.
Both courts accepted the petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid.
The appellate courts went on to hold that the search of the petitioners home had been justified.
Certiorari was granted
Issue(s):
Although an arrest warrant was procured against the petitioner, he claims that the evidence seized from his home was done so without a search warrant, violating his 4th Amendment rights.
The previous Courts argue that since the officers had an arrest warrant for the petitioner, it justified their searching of the home.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the petitioner’s conviction could not
stand.

Rationale:
Although there was an arrest warrant against the petitioner, probable cause permits officers to search an arrestee’s person and the areas “under his control”, in the case of finding a weapon or tool that can potentially be used for escape, or evidence that may be destroyed (wingspan, or the area under his immediate control, access to a weapon or destruction of evidence).
However, the area searched was far beyond the petitioner’s person and his ability to get a weapon or something that could be used against him as evidence, therefore making the search “unreasonable” under the 4th & 14th Amendments.

Maryland v. Buie
Year:
1990

Facts:

On February 3, 1986; two men committed an armed robbery at a pizza restaurant in Maryland.
County police obtained arrests warrants for respondent Jerome Edward Buie and his suspected accomplice Lloyd Allen.
On February 5, the police executed the arrest warrant for Buie.
Once inside the Officers fanned out through the first and second floor.
Buie was arrested, searched, and handcuffed.
A red running suit was lying in plain view on a stack of clothing and seized.
A Jury convicted Buie of robbery with a deadly weapon and using a handgun in the commission of a felony.
Procedure:
The trial court denied Buie’s motion to suppress the running suit.
The State introduced the running suit into evidence at Buie’s trial.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial Court’s denial of the suppression motion.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed by a 4 to 3 vote.

Issue(s):
Violation of Fourth Amendment.

Holding:
The Court Stated that when the sanctity is involved, the exceptions to the warrant requirement are few to justify a protective sweep of a home, the Government must show that there is probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality of danger exists.
The court went on to find that the State had not satisfied that probable-cause requirement
Rationale:
We conclude that by requiring a protective sweep to be justified by probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentially for danger existed, the court of Appeals of Maryland applied an unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard.
The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer posses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be wept harbors an individual posing a danger to those in the arrest scene.

Chambers v. Maroney
Year:
1970

Facts:
During the night of May 20, 1963, two men sobered a gulf service station in Pennsylvania.
Each of whom carried and displayed a gun; the robbers took the currency from the cash register.(placing the coins in his right hand glove).
Two teen-agers saw a blue compact station wagon circling the block, then saw the station wagon speed away.( four men were in the station wagon and one was wearing a green sweater).
Within an hour, a light blue compact station wagon answering the description and carrying four men was stopped by the police about two miles from the scene.
The men were arrested and the car was subject to search, in which the police found two 38-caliber revolvers, a right-hand glove containing small change, and cards bearing the name of “ Raymond Havicon” the attendant at a Boron service station who had been robbed at gunpoint on May13 1963.
In the course of a warrant-authorized search of petitioner’s home the day after petitioner’s arrest police found 38 caliber ammunition including some dumdum bullets similar to those found in one of the guns taken from the station wagon.
Petitioner was sentenced to a term of four to eight years of imprisonment for the May 13 robbery, and to a term of two to seven years of imprisonment for the May 20 robbery.
Procedure:
His first trial ended in a mistrial but he was convicted of both robberies at the second.
In 1965 petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the State Court, which denied the writ.
The denial of the writ was affirmed on appeal in the Pennsylvania appellate courts.
Issue(s):
The principal question in this case concerns the admissibility of evidence seized from an automobile, in which petitioner was riding at the time of his arrest, after the automobile was taken to a police station and was there thoroughly searched without a warrant.
Holding:
Affirmed

Rationale:
Officers had probable cause to make the arrest and to search the car due to thedescription of four men one wearing a green sweater and another wearing a trench coat, who had guns and the fruits of the crime, had fled the scene in a light blue compact station wagon.
Guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been implemented since the beginning of our government. However, recognizing a difference between a search of a house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant may be obtained to that of a wagon for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
If an effective search is to be made at any time, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search.

South Dakota v. Opperman
Year:
1976

Facts:
Local ordinances prohibit parking in certain areas of downtown Vermillion, SD, between the hours of 2:00 am and 6:00 am. During the early morning hours of December 10, 1973 a Vermillion police officer observed respondent’s unoccupied vehicle illegally parked in the restricted zone.
At approximately 10 o’clock on the same morning, another officer issued a second ticket for an overtime violation. (These circumstances were routinely reported to police headquarters).
After the vehicle was inspected, the car was towed to the city impound lot.
After the officer’s direction, the car door was then unlocked and, using a standard inventory form pursuant to police procedures, the officer inventoried the contents of the car, including the contents of the glove compartment.
The officer found fond marihuana contained in a plastic bag.
Late December 10, respondent appeared at the police department to claim his property.
Respondent was subsequently arrested on charges of possession of marihuana.
Procedure:
Respondent was convicted after a jury trial and sentence to a fine of $100 and 14 days’ incarceration in the county jail.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reverse the conviction, because the court concluded that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the 14 amendment (which prohibits against unreasonable searches and seizures).
Issue(s):
Here we review the judgment of the supreme court of South Dakota, holding that local police violated the 4 amendment to the federal Constitution, as applicable to the States under the 14 amendment, when they conducted a routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal parking ordinances.
Holding:
On this record we conclude that in the following standards police procedures, prevailing through the county and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of the police was not ”unreasonable” under the 4th Amendment.
Applying the 4th Amendment standard of “reasonableness” the state courts have overwhelmingly concluded that even if an inventory is characterized as a “search”, the intrusion is constitutionally permissible.
Rationale:
The court’s opinion appears to suggest that its result may in any event be justified because the inventory search procedure is a “reasonable” response to three distinct needs:
The protection of the owner’s property while in remains in police custody.
The protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property.
The protection of the police from potential danger.
The Court holds that the 4 Amendment permits a routine police inventory search of the closed glove compartment of a locked automobile impounded for ordinary traffic violations. Under the Court’s holding, such a search may be made without attempting to secure the consent of the owner and without any particular reason to believe the impounded automobile contains contraband, evidence, or valuables or presents any danger to its custodians or the public.

Knowles v. Iowa
Year:
1998

Facts:
Knowles was stopped in Iowa, after having been clocked driving 43 miles per hour on a road where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour.
The police officer issued a citation to Knowles, although under Iowa law he might have arrested him.
The officer then conducted a full search of the car, and under the driver’s seat he found a bag of marijuana and a pot pipe.
Knowles was then arrested and charged with violation of State laws dealing with controlled substances.
Procedure:
Before trial Knowles moved to suppress the evidence so obtained, arguing that the research could not be sustained under the “search incident to arrest”, because he was not place under arrest.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and found Knowles guilty.
Issue(s):
The question presented in whether such a procedure authorized the officer, consistently with the fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of the car.
Holding:
The Iowa Supreme Court, affirmed by a divide vote (granted certiorari and reverse).
Rationale:
Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger.
The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as providing authority to officers to conduct a full-blown search of an automobile and driver in those cases where police elect not to make a custodial arrest and instead issue a citation that is a search incident to citation.

U.S. v. Chadwick
Year:
1973

Facts:
On May 8, 1973, Amtrak railroad officials in San Diego observed respondents Gregory Machado and Bridget Leary load a brown footlocker onto a Boston-bound train.
The officials noticed the locker was leaking talcum powder, which has been used to mask the smell of marijuana or hashish and alerted officials in Boston.
Two days later, when the train arrived, federal narcotics agents, without obtaining an arrest or search warrant, surveyed Machado and Leary as they claimed their suitcases and the footlocker, and then released a drug-sniffing dog near the footlocker.
The dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance inside the footlocker, and as respondent Chadwick joined Machado and Leary, they engaged an attendant to move the footlocker outside onto Chadwick’s car.
Before they left, officers arrested all three and the keys to the footlocker were apparently taken from Machado.
As the three respondents were taken to the Federal Building in Boston, the footlocker and luggage were placed in the Federal Building, where the agents opened the footlocker and the luggage (without securing a search warrant*) and found large amounts of marijuana.
The respondents were then indicted for possession with intent to distribute, where they moved to suppress the marijuana as evidence.
The government sought to justify its search by citing it as a search incident to the arrest. However, the District Court and later the Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of the seized marijuana.

Procedure:
At a pretrial hearing, they petitioned for the evidence to be suppressed.
Although the Government sought include the “automobile exception” to justify their failure in this case, the District Court accepted the suppression of the evidence.
A Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the District Court and affirmed the suppression of the marihuana.
Certiorari was granted.

Issue(s):
The respondents claim that their 4th Amendment rights were violated on the grounds that the locker had been searched without a proper warrant, and that there was no evidence that allowed the officers to do so since there were no exigent circumstances of the officers being hurt or the evidence being potentially destroyed.

Holding:
The Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the marijuana as evidence.

Rationale:
The Supreme Court stated that there were no exigent circumstances, which gave the officers authority to open the footlocker (considered the property of the respondents) without a search warrant.
The footlocker was in a safe place and therefore, free from tampering or posing a threat to an officer. (A person’s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile)

California v. Acevedo
Year:
1991

Facts:
On October 28, 1987, Officer Coleman of the Santa Ana Police received a phone call from a federal drug agent in Hawaii, who informed Coleman that he had seized a package containing marijuana, which was to be delivered to the Federal Express office in Santa Ana (addressed to J.R. Laza), and then arranged to send the package to Coleman instead. Coleman then received the package, with the intent to arrest the person who would arrive to pick it up.
On October 30, Jamie Laza arrived to claim the package, and he then took it to his apartment. At 11:45 officers observed Laza leave the apartment and drop the box and paper that contained the marijuana into a trash bin. Coleman left the scene to obtain a search warrant.
At 12:05 p.m., officers observed Richard St. George leave the apartment with a knapsack that appeared to be half-full, and then stopped him, and found one and a half pounds of marijuana. At 12:30, Charles Steven Acevedo entered the apartment, and 10 minutes later emerged with a brown paper bag; which he then placed in the trunk of his car.
Fearing the loss of evidence the officers stopped him, searched the trunk and the bag, and found marijuana. Respondent was then charged with possession with intent to sell, where he moved to suppress the marijuana found in the car, but the motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty but appealed the denial of the suppression notion.
The California Court of Appeals concluded that the marijuana should have been suppressed; the officers had probable cause to believe the bag-contained drugs, but lacked probable cause that Acevedo’s car itself contained contraband.
The court stated that although the officers could seize the bag, they couldn’t open it without a warrant, ruling that, if there is probable cause to search a car, the entire car and its contents may be searched, however, if the probable cause pertains only to a container within the car, the container may be seized but not opened without a warrant.

Procedure:
Charged in state court with possession of marijuana for sale, in violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. Ss 11359. App. 2
He was denied the suppression of the marijuana.
He pleaded guilty but appealed the denial of the suppression motion.
The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, concluded that the marijuana found in the paper bag in the car’s trunk should have been suppressed.
The Supreme Court of California denied the State’s petition for review.
Certiorari granted.

Issue(s):
The respondent claims that although there was probable cause to search his car, the officers did not have the authority to search the container within his car without a warrant.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeals decision, stating that the police did not need to have a warrant in order to search inside the container.

Rationale:
Since the police had probable cause and were specifically looking for the paper bag, they had the authority to do so. The cop may search containers if they believe the container holds what the cop is looking for.

Illinois v. Lafayette
Year:
1983

Facts:
On September 1, 1980, Officer Maurice Mietzner, responded to a call about a disturbance and found respondent involved in an altercation with the theater manager.
He arrested the respondent for disturbing the peace, handcuffed him, and took him to the police station.
In the booking room, Officer Mietzner ordered the respondent to empty his pockets, at which the respondent took a pack of cigarettes from his shoulder bag and placed the bag on the counter.
Mietzner then removed the contents of the bag and found ten amphetamine pills inside the plastic wrap of a cigarette package. The respondent was then charged with possession of controlled substances, at which the trial court ordered the suppression of the pills. Officer Mietzner testified that inventorying the belongings of an arrestee is standard procedure, although the bag was small enough to place in a bag container or locker for protective purposes. The Illinois Appellate Court argued that the state had waived the argument that the search was incidental to arrest because they had failed to raise that argument at the suppression hearing.

Procedure:
A pretrial suppression hearing was held at which the state argued that the search of the bag was valid inventory search under South Dakota V. Opperman.
After the hearing, but before a ruling, the state submitted a brief in which it argued for the first time that the search was valid as a delayed search incident to arrest.
The Trial court ordered the suppression of the amphetamine pills.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate court affirmed.
The Illinois Supreme court denied discretionary review.
Certiorari granted, and they reversed.

Issue(s):
Whether or not the pills produced in the inventory search were considered evidence and incident to arrest.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and stated that the pills found in the respondent’s bag were admissible.

Rationale:
The Supreme Court holds that the police have the authority to perform an inventory search of the person and the area within the person’s immediate control.
Furthermore, a police inventory search is a standard procedure and did not impede on the respondent’s 4th Amendment rights. (“At the station house, it is entirely permissible for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed.”)

Cupp v. Murphy
Year:
1973
Facts:
The respondent, Daniel Murphy’s wife was found murdered in her home, by strangulation, and police found abrasions and lacerations on her throat.
When the respondent voluntarily came in for questioning for the murder of his wife, police noticed a dark spot on his finger.
When the police asked Murphy if they could take a sample of scrapings under his fingernails, he refused. Under protest and without a warrant, police took the samples, which were found to contain traces of skin and blood cells, as well as fabric from the victim’s nightgown.
The evidence was admitted at trial and Murphy was found guilty of second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, claiming that although there was probable cause, in the absence of an arrest or other exigent circumstances the search was unconstitutional.
Procedure:
Respondent was convicted by a jury in an Oregon court of the second-degree murder of his wife.
The respondent appealed his conviction, claiming that the fingernail scrapings were the product of an unconstitutional search under the fourth and fifteenth amendments.
The Oregon court of appeals affirmed the conviction, and he was denied certiorari.
Murphy then commenced the present action for federal habeas corpus relief.
The district court denied the habeas petition, and the court of appeals for the ninth circuit reversed.
Certiorari was then granted to consider the constitutional question presented.
The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.
Issue(s):
The respondent claims that his 4th Amendment rights were violated and the search, which produced the fingernail scrapings, was unconstitutional, since the police didn’t obtain an arrest neither warrant nor formally arrest him.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that Murphy’s 4th Amendment rights were not violated.

Rationale:
Although Murphy was not formally under arrest, the police had probable cause to believe he had committed the murder, and Murphy was fully aware that the police suspected him, enough to motivate him to attempt to destroy what evidence he could without attracting attention (evanescent evidence).
Testimony states that, after refusing to give fingernail samples, he put his hands behind his back and appeared to rub them together.
Considering the readily destructibility of the evidence and the very limited intrusion in the presence of probable cause, the Court determined there was no 4th Amendment violation.

Warden v. Hayden
Year 1967

Facts
An armed robber entered Diamond Cab Company in Maryland.
Stole 363 dollars and fled.
Two cap drivers followed him, describe as a Negro about 5/8 tall wearing a cap and a jacket.
The police officer nock on the door, the robber entered. Mrs. Hayden allow them to search the home.
They found Hayden pretending to sleep.
They discover a shoot gun and a pistol in a flush tank, and a jacket and trousers similar to those described.
Ammunition was found around the house.
All of these items were evidence introduce against him at his trial.

Procedure
Maryland State Court: he was sitting with out a jury, convicted of harm robbery.
District Court of Maryland: denied federal habeas corpus relief.
Court of Appeals for the four districts: reverse.
Issue
Violation of his 4th amendment (the search without a warrant)
Violation of his 5th amendment (due process clause).

Holding
The supreme reverse the court of appeals decision. He was convicted.

Rationale
The search and seizure without a warrant was not invalid. It did not violate the 4th amendment because the situation they were placed in made that course imperative.
It was not a violation of the 4Weth amendment because they had probable cause to enter the home and search for a man as well as the evidence matching the description they were given.

KENTUCKY V. KING
Year: 2011

Facts:
In Lexington, Kentucky, police set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine outside an apartment complex. Undercover officer Gibbons saw the deal take place from an unmarked car, at which he radioed officers to move in the suspect. He urged the officers to get there, at which point other officers exited their vehicle and ran until they heard a door shut, and they detected the smell of marijuana. Although they didn’t know which apartment the suspect had entered, they approached the one on the left, since that’s where they detected the odor was coming from (even though Officer Gibbons announced that the suspect was entering the one on the right). After approaching the door and announcing themselves, police heard sounds of movement coming from within the apartment, which led them to believe that evidence was about to be destroyed. Officers then broke through the front door and found three people (including the respondent) in the front room, and various drugs and cash. Police eventually entered the apartment on the right and found the suspected drug dealer who was the initial target. After the respondent was charged and found guilty by the Fayette County Circuit Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the conviction, on the grounds that the police may not deliberately create the exigent circumstances (the evidence was about to be destroyed) with the intent of superseding the warrant, and they may not rely on exigent circumstances if it’s foreseeable that their actions would create the exigent act (police-created exigency doctrine).

PROCEDURE
In the Fayette county circuit court, a grand jury charged the respondent with trafficking in marijuana, first degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and second-degree persistent felony offender status.
Respondent filed a motion to suppress evidence, but the circuit court denied.
Respondent entered a conditional guilt plea, therefore reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.
The court sentenced the respondent to 11 years in prison.
The Kentucky court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court of Kentucky reversed
Certiorari granted

ISSUES:
Whether or not the police initiated the exigent circumstances, and if exigent circumstances created as the result of police action legitimize the police into performing warrantless searches.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reversal and ruled that the exigent circumstances rule applied, as the police didn’t gain entry by an actual or threatened violation of the 4th Amendment.

RATIONALE:
The Court ruled that since the police knocked on the door (albeit without a warrant) and announced themselves, the respondent had a choice whether or not to open the door and/or speak. When the occupants fail to respond, they “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security system cannot provide”. And even if the occupant opens the door and speaks with the officers, they don’t need to allow the officers in and may refuse to answer questions at any time. Thus, if the occupants choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead attempt to destroy evidence, they have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue. The police clearly had announced themselves before entering and they never threatened to break down the door, so they did not create the exigent circumstances themselves.

ILLINOIS V. McARTHUR
YEAR: 2001

FACTS:
On April 2, 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to the trailer she shared with her husband Charles, to keep the peace while she removed her belongings. After collecting her possessions, Tera told one of the officers Charles had drugs inside the trailer. After being asked for permission to search the trailer, which was denied by Charles, one of the officers left to get a search warrant while one officer stayed with Charles. Charles was told he could not re-enter the trailer unless accompanied by a police officer. After obtaining a warrant, officers searched the trailer and found drugs and other paraphernalia. Charles was then arrested and moved to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia on the grounds that they were obtained by an unlawful police seizure. The trial court granted the motion for suppression, which was then upheld by the Appellate Court.

PROCEDURE
Illinois subsequently charged Charles McArthur with unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia and marijuana.
McArthur moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that they were the fruit of unlawful police seizure(mainly the refusal to let him enter his trailer unsupervised)
The Trial court granted McArthur's suppression motion.
The Appellate court of Illinois affirmed.
The Illinois supreme court denied the states petition for leave to appeal.
Certiorari was granted

ISSUES:
The respondent claims that the police obtained the evidence as a result of an unconstitutional seizure by refusing him to re-enter the trailer, which would have permitted him to “destroy the marijuana”.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Court, ruling that the police did not violate the respondent’s 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
The Court reasoned that they had probable cause to believe on the testimony of Charles’ wife that there were drugs in the house. They also believed that if he tried to enter the house, he would try to destroy the evidence. As the police did not attempt to enter the house without a warrant, and prevented the respondent from entering the house (except without direct observation) in order to potentially destroy the evidence, they acted reasonably in order to secure law enforcement need while protecting privacy interests and the respondent’s 4th Amendment rights.

STONER V. CALIFORNIA (1964)
FACTS:
On October 25, 1960, a Budget Town Food Market in Monrovia, California was robbed by two men, one whom was described as wearing horn-rimmed glasses and a gray jacket. A checkbook belonging to the petitioner was found in an adjacent parking lot, and two stubs indicated that the checks had been drawn to the order of the Mayfair hotel in Pomona, California. When the police got to the hotel, they were informed that the suspect was not present at the time. The police explained that they were in search of a man who committed a robbery and was possibly armed, at which point the hotel clerk consented to a search and led officers to the hotel room, where they found a pair of horn-rimmed glasses, a gray jacket, a .45 caliber automatic pistol, and several cartridges. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and convicted of armed robbery.

PROCEDURE
A jury in the superior court of Los Angeles County convicted the petitioner of armed robbery.
At the trial, several articles that had been found by police in a search of the petitioner’s home in his absence were admitted into evidence over his objection.
A district court of appeal of California affirmed the conviction, and the supreme court of California denied further review
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
Since the officers did not have search warrant, the petitioner argues that the police violated his 4th Amendment rights and therefore the evidence found at the hotel room was inadmissible.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, and stated that the officers conducted an unconstitutional search.

RATIONALE:
The Court reasoned that since only the petitioner’s rights were at stake, only he could have given consent to search his hotel room, and not the hotel clerk, and the police had no basis to believe that the petitioner could have authorized the hotel clerk to give consent in his stead.

BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA
FACTS:
Four police officers went to the house of Mrs. Hattie Leath, and announced that they had a search warrant in relation to a rape case in which Mrs. Leath’s grandson was the suspect. Mrs. Leath told the officers to enter, at which point they found a rifle which was later introduced as evidence during the petitioner’s trial. The petitioner was then convicted. The prosecutor however, informed the court that he relied not on the warrant, but on upon the consent of Mrs. Leath, who was not aware that the police were looking for her grandson, to justify the search.

PROCEDURE
The petitioner was brought to trial in a North Carolina court upon a charge of rape.
The jury found the petitioner guilty, and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment.
The trial court imposed that sentence, and the supreme court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether a search can be justified on the basis of consent, when it has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he has a warrant.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and asserted that Mrs. Heath had not given her consent under the circumstances.

RATIONALE:
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has to prove the consent was freely and voluntarily given. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant is invalid. When an officer claims authority to search, he establishes that the occupant has no right to resist the search, which is a form of (colorable lawful) coercion. Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent.

UNITED STATES V. MATLOCK
YEAR: 1974

Facts:
Respondent Matlock was indicted for the robbery of a federally insured bank in Wisconsin.
A week later. He filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers from a home in the town of Pardeeville, Wisconsin, in which he had been living.
Respondent was arrested in the yard in front of the home.
Although the officers were aware at the time of the arrest that respondent lived in the house, they did not ask him which room he occupied or whether he would consent to a search.
Three of the arresting officers went to the door of the house and were admitted by Mrs. Graff.
Although denied by Mrs. Graff at the suppression hearing, it was found that she consent voluntarily to the search of the house, including the east bedroom on the second floor which she said was jointly occupied by Matlock and herself.
The east bathroom was searched and the evidence at issue here, $4,995 in cash, was found in a diaper bag in the only closet in the room.
Procedure:
The District Court concluded, however, that the Government had failed to satisfied the second requirement and had no satisfactory prove Mrs. Graff’s actual authority to consent to the search.
The district Court also rejected the Government’s claim that it was required to prove only that at the time of the search the officers could reasonably have conclude that Graff’s relationship to the east bedroom was sufficient to make her consent binding on respondent.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court in all respect. (we granted Certiorari), and now reverse the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Is whether the evidence presented by the United States with respect to the voluntary consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the respondent was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in evidence at the responder’s criminal trial.
Holding:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reverse and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rationale:
It has been assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant, permitting evidence discovered in the search to be used against him at a criminal trial.
Authority here clearly indicates that the consent of one who possess common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, no consenting person with whom that authority is shared. Florida V. Bostick
Facts:
Two officers with badges, insignia, and one of them holding a zipper pouch containing a pistol boarded a bus, bound from Miami to Atlanta.
The officers without articulable suspicion picked out the defendant passage and asked to inspect his ticket, and identification.
The officers persisted and explained their presence as narcotics agents.
The officers requested the defendants consent to search his luggage.
Bostick was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine.
Procedure:
The trial Court denied the motion to suppress the cocaine, but made no factual findings.
Bostick subsequently entered a plea of guilty, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
The Florida District of appeals affirmed, but considered the issue sufficiently important that it certified a question to the Florida supreme Court.
Issue:
The issue presented for our review is whether a police encounter on a bus of the type described in this case constitutes a “seizure”, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Holding:
We have held that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies, and other public places to ask them questions and to request consent to search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.
Rationale:
Accordingly, the “free to leave” analysis on which Bostick relies is inapplicable. In such a situation, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
An individual may decline an officer’s request without fearing prosecution. This reasoning borders on sophism and trivializes the values that underline the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, a person’s “voluntary” decision to place himself in a room with only one exit does not authorize the police to force an encounter upon him by placing themselves in front of the exit.

Illinois V. Rodriguez
Facts:
Respondent Edward Rodriguez was arrested in his apartment by law enforcement officers and charged with possession of illegal drugs.
The police gained entry to the apartment with the consent and assistance of Gail Fischer.
On July 26, 1985, police were summoned to the residence of Dorothy Jackson on South Wolcott in Chicago.
She told the officers that she had been assaulted by respondent Edward Rodriguez.
Fischer stated that Rodriguez was then asleep in the apartment, and she consented to travel there with the police in order to unlock the door with her key so that the officers could enter and arrest Rodriguez.
It is unclear whether she indicated that she currently lived at the apartment, or only that she used to live there.
They did not obtain an arrest warrant for Rodriguez, nor did they seek a search warrant for the apartment.
The officers arrested Rodriguez and seized the drugs and related paraphernalia.
Rodriguez was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
Procedure:
He moved to suppress all evidence seized at the time of his arrest, claiming that Fischer had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and had no authority to consent to the entry.
The County Circuit Court granted the motion, holding that at the time she consented to the entry, Fischer did not have common authority over the apartment.
The Circuit Court also rejected the State’s contention that, even if Fisher did not posses common authority over the premises, there was no Fourth Amendment violation if the police reasonably believe at the time of their entry that Fischer possessed the authority to consent.
The appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the Circuit Court in all respect. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the State’s Petition for Leave to Appeal and granted certiorari.
Issues:
Whether a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police at the time of the entry, reasonable believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not.
Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision.
Rationale:
In this case the authority claimed by the third party will be false, ( the reasonableness of police conduct must be measured in light of the possibility that the target has not consented).
Police officers, when faced with the choice of relying on consent by a third party or securing a warrant, should secure a warrant, and must therefore accept the risk of error id they decide to rely on consent.
Even if the officers reasonably believed that Fischer had authority to consent, she did not, and Rodriguez’s expectation of privacy was therefore undiminished. ( action that violates his right to Fourth Amendment).

SCHNECKLOTH V. BUSTAMONTE
Facts:
While on patrol, Officer James Rand stopped an automobile that had one headlight and its license plate light burned out.
Six men were in the vehicle, including Joe Alcala, the respondent Robert Bustamonte and the driver Joe Gonzalez all in the front seat.
None of the men, other than Joe Alcala, could produce a driver’s license. Alcala explained that the car was his brother’s and they were all asked to step out of the vehicle. Two additional policemen arrived.
After Alcala gave officer Rand consent to search his car, the police officers found three checks under the left rear seat that had previously been stolen from a car wash.
Procedure:
The respondent was brought to trial in a California court on a charge of possessing a check with the intent to defraud.
He moved to suppress the introduction of the checks as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through an unconstitutional search and seizure.
The trial judge denied the motion to suppress and the checks in question were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial.
He was convicted and the California court of appeal for the first appellate district affirmed the conviction.
The California Supreme Court denied review.
The respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court, it was denied on appeal.
The court of appeals for the 9th circuit set aside the district court’s order, and reasoned that consent is a waiver of a person’s 4th and 14th amendment rights and the state was under obligation to demonstrate not only that the consent had been uncoerced, but that it had been given with an understanding that it could be freely and effectively withheld.
The court held that consent would not be found solely from the absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent.
The court of appeals vacated the order denying the writ and remanded the case for further proceedings since the district court had not determined that Alcala had known that his consent could have been withheld.
Certiorari was granted.
Issue:
The constitutional question in this case concerns the definition of consent in the 4th and 14th amendment context.
The precise question in this case, then, is: what must the state prove to demonstrate that consent was “voluntarily” given.
Holding:
The U.S. Supreme Court held that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the state attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 4th and 14th amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
Rationale:
It is only by analyzing all of the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced.
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances, and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.
While the state of the accused’s mind and the failure of the police to advise the accused of his rights were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the voluntariness of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.

BUMPER V. NORTH CAROLINA

Facts:
Four white law enforcement officers: the county Sheriff, two of his deputies, and a State investigator. Went to the house of the petitioner and found Mrs. Leath.
One of them announced “I have a search warrant to search your house”.
In the kitchen the officers found the rifle that was later introduced in evidence at the petitioner’s trial, after a motion to suppress had been denied.

Procedure:
The petitioner was brought to trial in a North Carolina Court upon a charge of rape.
The Jury found the petitioner guilty, but recommended a sentence of life imprisonment.
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment and granted certiorari.

Issue:
Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Is whether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent, when that “consent” has been given only after the official conducting the search has assert that he poses a warrant.

Holding:
We hold that MRS. Leath did not consent to the search, and that it was constitutional error to admit the rifle in evidence against the petitioner, because the rifle was plainly damaging evidence against the petitioner.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Rationale:
When a person seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of providing that the consent was in fact, freely, and voluntary given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.
A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant or fails to show that there was in fact any warrant at all. GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH (2006)
FACTS:
Respondent Scott Randolph and his wife Janet separated in May 2001, at which she then moved with her son and some belongings to Canada to stay with her parents.
In July, she returned with her son, and on July 6, she complained to police that her husband had taken her son away, that he was a cocaine user and that it had caused financial troubles for them in the past.
Janet went with an officer to reclaim the child at Scott’s home, where she said there were “items of drug evidence” in the house.
The officer asked for permission to enter the house, which Scott refused, at which the officer then asked the same of Janet, which she readily gave.
She then led the officer to a room she said was Scott’s, where the officer noticed a straw with a powdery residue he believed to be cocaine. The officer then left the house to get an evidence bag and call the district attorney, who told him to stop the search and apply for a warrant.
When the officer returned to the house, Janet withdrew her consent but the police took the straw, and the Randolphs, to the police station. After getting a warrant, the police returned to the house, seized further evidence of drug use, and indicted Scott Randolph for possession of cocaine.

PROCEDURE:
When Scott Randolph moved to suppress the evidence, the court denied the motion, and ruled that Janet had authority to give consent.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, which the Georgia Supreme Court sustained the ruling.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
If consent to search a home is valid if the consent is given by one person but denied by another who is present at the scene.

HOLDING:
The Court ruled that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident can’t be justified as reasonable even if another resident has given the police consent.
RATIONALE:
A tenant cannot have any superior authority superior enough to prevail over another’s and unless there is probable cause or exigent circumstances, a tenant’s authority to give consent cannot overrule the refusal of another tenant’s if he/she is physically present.

ARIZONA V. HICKS (1987)
FACTS:
On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of the respondent’s apartment, striking and injuring a man in the apartment below. When the police entered the apartment to search for the shooter and other potential victims, they found various weapons, a stocking cap, and stereo equipment, which upon verification of its serial numbers, was confirmed to have been taken in an armed robbery.
The respondent was then indicted for armed robbery, at which point he then filed a motion to suppress the evidence.

PROCEDURE:
State trial court granted motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized.
Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed.
The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.
State filed petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
Since the officers were responding to a shooting and were supposedly there only to seize any weapons or potential victims, the issue is whether the seizure of the stereo equipment violated the 4th Amendment rights of the respondent.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and stated that the evidence should be suppressed on the grounds that it violates the respondent’s 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
Since the officers were at the apartment for an unrelated offense, and the officer had reasonable suspicion but not probable cause to check the stereo equipment, the Court ruled that this was not good enough to permit the officer to seize the evidence. Also, the officer had to turn over the stereo system in order to find the serial number which he used to verify that it was indeed stolen, which does not meet the “plain view” criteria, which states that the incriminating evidence must be in plain view of the officers, without having to disturbed.

HORTON v. CALIFORNIA (1990)
FACTS:
Erwin Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, was robbed by two masked men, one armed with a stun gun and one with a machine gun, as he entered his garage. During the robbery, enough conversation took place for him to identify the petitioner’s distinctive voice. A witness who saw the robbers leaving the scene, coupled with evidence that the petitioner had attended the coin show, corroborated his testimony. Sergeant LaRault investigated the crime and determined there was probable cause to search the petitioner’s home. A magistrate that only authorized a search for the proceeds, including three specifically described rings issued a warrant. When Sergeant LaRault searched petitioner’s residence he did not find the stolen property but did find various weapons, a San Jose Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing identified by the victim. LaRault testified that while he didn’t find the items listed in the search warrant, he was interested in finding other evidence connecting the petitioner to the robbery, thus the seized evidence that was not discovered inadvertently. The petitioner was then arrested and despite his attempts to suppress the evidence on the argument that Coolidge required suppression of evidence that had not been listed in the warrant.

PROCEDURE:
Trial court refused to suppress the evidence found in the home. Petitioner was sentenced to prison.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed.
The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s request for review.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
Since the evidence used in court was not listed in the warrant and although in plain view, and not acquired inadvertently since the officer was purposely was searching for things not listed in the warrant, the issue is whether or not the evidence is admissible in court.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling and held that the evidence seized during the investigation was lawfully seized.

RATIONALE:
The items seized from the petitioner’s home were discovered during a lawful warrant and when they were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. He had probable cause, not only to obtain a search warrant for the stolen property, but also to believe the weapons and handguns found in the home had been used in the crime he was investigating. The search was authorized by the warrant and the seizure by the “plain view” doctrine.

CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD (1988)
FACTS:
In early 1984, Investigator Jenny Stracner received information indicating that the respondent might be engaged in narcotics trafficking. Stracner learned that a criminal suspect had informed a federal drug enforcement agent in February 1984 that a truck filled with drugs was en route to Greenwood’s home. Neighbors had complained of heavy vehicular traffic at night and that they stayed only a few minutes. When Stracner conducted a surveillance of Greenwood’s home, she observed several vehicles make brief stops at late hours, and she followed a truck from his home to one that had been under investigation as drug house. On April 6, 1984, Stracner asked the neighborhood’s trash collector to pick up Greenwood’s trash bags and turn them over to her. When she searched through his trash, she found items indicative of narcotics use, which she used to obtain a warrant. Later that day, police while executing the warrant discovered cocaine and hashish in the house and arrested the respondents on felony narcotics charges, after which they made bail. The police continued to receive reports of late-night traffic at the Greenwood home, so on May 4, Investigator Robert Rahaeuser obtained Greenwood’s trash just as Investigator Stracner had and also found evidence of narcotics use. Again, after another warrant was obtained, police searched the home, found more narcotics and again arrested Greenwood. The Superior Court then dismissed the charges on the authority of People v. Krivda (1971), which held that warrantless trash searches violate the 4th Amendment as well as the California Constitution. The court stated that the police would have had probable cause without the evidence obtained from the trash searches.

PROCEDURE
Superior Court dismissed the charges against respondents on the authority of People v. Krivda, which held that warrantless trash searches violate the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
Whether the 4th Amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left outside the home.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Court of Appeals and ruled that the search and seizure of garbage left outside the home is not in violation of the 4th Amendment.

RATIONALE:
The court reasoned that the respondents placed their trash in an area where it was readily accessible to other parties, and in addition the trash was placed in an area with the express purpose of having strangers take it, therefore the respondents had no legitimate expectation of privacy in information (the trash bags) he voluntarily turns over to third parties.

OLIVER V. UNITED STATES (1984)
FACTS:
Acting on reports that marijuana was being grown on the petitioner’s farm, two narcotics agents went to the farm, where they arrived at a locked gate with a “No Trespassing” sign. The agents followed a footpath that led around one side of the gate and for several hundred yards after, passing a barn and a parked camper. Someone standing in front of the camper shouted, “No hunting’s allowed, comes back up here”, at which point the officers announced themselves and did not receive a reply. The officers resumed their investigation and soon found a field of marijuana over a mile from the petitioner’s home. The petitioner was arrested and indicted for manufacturing a controlled substance, at which the District Court suppressed the evidence, applying Katz v. U.S., finding that the petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the field would remain private as he had done all he could to assert his privacy in the area that had been searched, therefore it was not an open field that invited casual intrusion. The Court of Appeals then reversed the decision.
After receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent Thornton’s residence, two officers entered the woods by a path between his residence and a neighbor’s house. After following a footpath through the woods, they discovered two marijuana patches covered in chicken wire. Later, the officers determined that the patches were on his property and arrested and indicted the respondent. The trial court granted the respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence.

PROCEDURE:
Petitioner was arrested and indicted for “manufacturing a controlled substance"
After a pretrial hearing, the district court suppressed evidence of the discovery of the marihuana field.
In applying Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357(1967), the court found that petitioner had reasonable expectation that the fields would remain private because the petitioner “had done all that was expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of the farm that was searched,” including the “no trespassing” signs, and had locked the gate at the entrance of the farm. Also, it could not be seen from any point of public access.
The court concluded that this was not an open field that invited casual intrusion.
The court of appeals for the 6th circuit reversed the district court.
Certiorari was granted.

PROCEDURE 2:
Thorton: Respondent was arrested and indicted.
The trial court granted the respondent’s motion to suppress the fruits of the second search.
The court held that the open field’s doctrine did not apply because the warrant for this search was premised on information that the police had obtained during their previous warrantless search, that the court had found to be unreasonable. In addition, the “no trespassing” signs and the secluded location of the Marihuana patches evinced a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
Does the “open fields” doctrine apply in these cases, where the officers traveled a considerable distance, through closed off and largely invisible spaces, and numerous warning signs in order to find the evidence?

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both cases and ruled that there was no violation of either respondent’s 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
The court reasoned that the “open fields” doctrine is consistent with the language of the 4th Amendment and does not violate any of the rights it grants. The court also ruled that even though the officers did trespass into the respondent’s property, the trespass law has no relevance to the applicability of the 4th Amendment, since the law of trespass extends to instances where the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interests. The court did state that the areas outside of the home are not considered to fall under the category of curtilage (the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life) are subject to search and intrusion.

UNITED STATES V. LEON (1984)
FACTS:
In August 1981, an informer of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department that two men, known only as “Armando” and “Patsy” were selling drugs from their residence, as well as indicating that the two suspects normally kept small amounts at their residency and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank. The Burbank police then initiated an investigation of the residences of the suspects and of two other ones as well. Police observed an automobile belonging to respondent Richard Del Castillo, who had previously been arrested for possession of marijuana, arrive at the residence. The driver of the car was observed exiting the residence with a small paper sack and drive away. When officers checked Del Castillo’s record, they discovered respondent Alberto Leon was listed as Del Castillo’s employer. Leon was previously arrested in 1980 on drug charges and officers later learned that he was living in 716 South Sunset Canyon in Burbank. After observing more people arriving at the price Drive residence and leaving with small packages, and respondents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights to Miami (where small amounts of marijuana were found in their luggage), officers prepared warrants in order to search 620 Price Drive, 716 Sunset Canyon, 7902 Via Magdalena, and the respondent’s automobiles. The ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs as well as other evidence and the respondents were indicted and charged. The respondents then filed to suppress the evidence, which the District Court granted to suppress in part, concluding that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause, but did not suppress all the evidence because none of the respondents had standing to challenge all the searches. The court stated that the officer who produced the warrants had acted in good faith, but rejected that the exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant. The District Court denied the Government’s motion to reconsider and The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling.

PROCEDURE
Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the District Court for the Central District of California and charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a variety of substances counts.
The respondents then file motion to suppress the evidence sized pursuant to the warrant.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing, while recognizing that the case was a close one, granted the motion to suppress in part.
The District Court denied the Government’s motion for reconsideration, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Court of Appeals refused the Government’s invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. (We granted certiorari).

ISSUES:
The issue is whether the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as to not bar the use of evidence obtained by the officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by an unbiased magistrate but ultimately unsupported by probable cause.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and deemed the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause adequate and in no way in violation of the respondents’ 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
The court reasoned that the officer sought out a warrant after conducting an extensive investigation and provided enough evidence to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. As the officer was acting in good faith and on the basis of surveillance gathered over an extensive investigation, the contention that the magistrate issued a warrant without probable cause is irrelevant.

NIX V. WILLIAMS (1984)
FACTS:
On December 24, 1968, Pamela Powers disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa where she had accompanied her parents. Shortly after, Williams was spotted carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket; a 14-year-old boy who helped Williams open his car door said he had seen “two legs in it that were skinny and white.” Williams’ car was found the next day 160 miles away in Davenport, Iowa, with several items of clothing belonging to the child and Williams, and an army blanket like the one used to wrap the bundle that Williams carried out of the YMCA were found at a rest stop between Des Moines and Davenport. A warrant was then issued for Williams’ arrest. Police surmised that Williams had left the body somewhere between Des Moines and the rest stop so on December 26, the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation initiated a large-scale search, checking all roads, abandoned buildings, ditches, culverts and any place the body of a small child might be hidden. Meanwhile, Williams surrendered to local police in Davenport, where he was arraigned and where he contacted an attorney in Des Moines to meet him at the Davenport police station. Des Moines police then informed counsel they would pick up Williams and return him to Des Moines without questioning, at which point Des Moines detectives took Williams into their custody and proceeded to drive him back to Des Moines. During the return trip, one of the policemen, Det. Leaming, told Williams that several inches of snow were predicted to fall that night, which might make locating the body impossible. Leaming then said that since they were going to pass where the body was anyways, that he felt they could stop and then locate the body so that the parents could bury their child who was murdered on Christmas Eve. He then told Williams not to answer, but to simply think about it. Later, as the car approached Grinnell, Williams asked if the police had located her shoes, after which he directed police to a point near a service station where he had left the shoes, though they were not found. As they approached Mitchellville, Williams, without any further conversation, directed the police to the child’s body. The officers directing the search had called it off at 3 p.m., when they joined Det. Leaming, while one search team was about two and half miles from where Williams directed the officers to the body. The child’s body was found in a ditch beside a gravel road, essentially within the area to be searched. At his first trial, his counsel moved to suppress evidence of the body and all related evidence including autopsy photos which showed the condition of the body, on the basis that such evidence was “fruit” or the product of Williams’ statements prompted by Leaming’s statements. The motion was denied and Williams was found guilty of first-degree murder, which was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court. Williams then sought release in the U.S. District Court, which concluded that the evidence had been wrongly admitted, which the Court of Appeals later agreed. The Supreme Court noted however, that although Williams’ incriminating statements were viewed as interrogation in violation of his right to counsel, and therefore could not be introduced as evidence, evidence of the body could be used as the body would’ve been discovered in any event, even if Williams had not offered his incriminating statements. At Williams’ second trial, his statements nor the fact that Williams had directed police to the body were not used, however the child’s body, autopsy pictures, and clothing were used and the State had proved that even if Williams had not directed police to the body, it would’ve been found in any case within a short time. Williams was then found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. The Court of Appeals then reversed, although they did agree that there is a hypothetical “independent source” exception to the exclusionary rule (in which a source independent of the primary investigative sources provides evidence of guilt), on the grounds that the State had not met the requirements of proof that the police did not act in bad faith.

PROCEDURE
Before trial in the Iowa Court, his consul moved to suppress evidence of the body and all related evidence including. The motion to suppress was denied.
The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder; the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court.
Williams then sought release on habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit agreed.( granted certiorari).
The Court of Appeals for the eight Circuit, reversed. Granted the State’s petition for certiorari, (We reverse).
ISSUES:
The issue is whether or not an independent source which provides proof of guilt can be admitted when there is proof that the primary evidence was obtained in an unconstitutional manner, (by directing the officers to the body under an unconstitutional interrogation), the body could not be admitted, thereby tainting all subsequent evidence (fruit of the poison).

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that an inevitable discovery exception applies to the exclusionary rule, and that the body could be admitted as evidence.

RATIONALE:
The evidence can be admitted if the prosecution can establish that the information would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means and that exclusion of evidence that would invariably been discovered adds nothing to either taint the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial.

MINNESOTA V. OLSON (1990)
FACTS:
On July 18, 1987, a lone gunman robbed a gas station in Minneapolis and fatally shot the station manager. An officer heard the dispatcher’s report and suspected Joseph Ecker. The officer and his partner drove immediately to Ecker’s home, arriving at the same time as an Oldsmobile. The driver then took evasive action, and the car spun out of control and crashed, at which point the men inside fled on foot. Ecker, later identified as the gunman, was arrested in his home shortly after, while the second man escaped. In the car, police found the murder weapon and a sack of money, as well as a title certificate, a letter, and video store receipt all addressed to Rob Olson, who police later verified lived at 3151 Johnson Street. The next morning, Dianna Murphy called the police station and said that a man by the name of Rob drove the car in the case, and that same Rob was planning to leave town. Later on, she called again and said that a man named Rob had told three other women that he was the driver in the robbery. The police went to one of the homes, a duplex to check out two of the women, who confirmed that Rob had been staying there but was not home. However, one of the women promised to notify police when he returned, at which point a probable cause arrest bulletin was issued for Olson’s arrest and police were instructed to stay away from the duplex. Later on, the police were notified Rob had returned, at which point they surrounded the house and telephoned one of the women from headquarters and told her Rob should come out of the house. The detective heard a male voice tell her to tell them that he had left, which the woman then stated. The detective then ordered the police to enter the house, and with weapons drawn and without seeking permission the police entered and found the respondent hiding in a closet, and was promptly taken into custody where an hour later he gave an inculpatory statement at police headquarters.

PROCEDURE
The respondent was later convicted, which the Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed and remanded for a new trial, stating that the respondent had a sufficient interest in the home to challenge the legality of his warrantless arrest and the arrest was illegal because there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry, therefore tainting the admissibility of the statement he gave at the police station.

ISSUES:
Whether Robert Olson had sufficient authority in the home to be considered a resident there, and whether or not officers violated his 4th Amendment rights by arresting him inside the home without a warrant or proof of exigent circumstances.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court affirmed, and ruled that Olson had sufficient authority over the home to challenge the warrantless arrest, as well as making the fruits of that warrantless arrest (his statement made at the police station) inadmissible as evidence at his trial.

RATIONALE:
The court concluded that even as an overnight guest, Olson was entitled to an expectation of privacy in the home that society recognizes as reasonable.

WONG SUN V. UNITED STATES (1963)
FACTS:
On June 4, 1959, federal narcotics agents in San Francisco arrested Hom Way after having had him under surveillance for six weeks. Hom Way, being found with heroin in his possession, told the agents had had bought it from Blackie Toy, who operated a laundry on Leavenworth Street. Later, agents went to the laundry, which was operated by the petitioner James Wah Toy (though there is nothing in the record which indicated he and Blackie Toy are the same person). After agents rang the bell and were informed he wasn’t open yet, the agents identified themselves. Toy then fled and was subsequently arrested, at which point he then told agents he knew a man named Johnny who was selling narcotics, and directed agents to the house. When the agents located the home, they spoke to one Johnny Yee, who after some discussion handed over some drugs to the agents. Within the hour, as Yee and Toy were taken in, Yee stated that the drugs had been bought to him earlier by Toy and another Chinese known as Sea Dog. Sea Dog turned out to be one Wong Sun, and the agents were directed to a dwelling where Toy and Sun apparently lived. After knocking on the door, police were led inside by a woman claiming to be Wong’s wife, where the agents later found Wong sleeping, where he was handcuffed and the apartment searched, although no narcotics were found. Petitioners Toy, Wong Sun and Yee were arraigned on a complaint though the two were later released. The three were then interrogated by the Narcotics Bureau, who informed them of their rights to withhold information and that it might used against them, as well as being entitled to the advice of counsel, although there didn’t seem to be an attorney present when any of them were questioned. After the three were interrogated, they were asked to sign statements, which none did. At the trial, the evidence which the state intended to use was admitted over objections that they were inadmissible as “fruits” of unlawful arrests or of attendant searches. The Court of Appeals then held that the arrest of the petitioner’s were illegal because they were not based on probable cause nor reasonable grounds, however, the four items of proof were not the fruits of illegal arrests and therefore admissible as evidence.

PROCEDURE:
The petitioners were tried without a jury in the district court for the Northern District of California under a two-count indictment for violation of the federal Narcotics law.
They were acquitted under the first count, which charged a conspiracy, but convicted under the second count, which charged the substantive offense of fraudulent and knowing transportation and concealment of illegally imported heroin.
The court of appeals for the ninth circuit, one judge dissenting, affirmed the convictions.
The court set aside Wong Sun’s Conviction on other grounds.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether or not the evidence gathered (the statements by Toy in his bedroom pre-arrest, the heroin surrendered by Johnny Yee, Toy’s pretrial unsigned statement, Wong Sun’s similar statement), were not based on probable cause and therefore inadmissible.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court set aside Toy’s conviction and Wong Sun’s on other grounds.

RATIONALE:
In regards to Toy, the Court ruled that the narcotics were obtained by the exploitation of the illegality (police entered his place of business without a warrant and detained him) and may not be used against Toy, while in the case of Wong Sun, the narcotics seized from information provided by Toy were done in illegal fashion while those seized from Yee were not, which made the narcotics admissible in court in regards to Wong Sun.

TERRY V. OHIO (1968)
FACTS:
On October 3, 1963, Officer McFadden was patrolling downtown Cleveland when two men caught his attention. For reasons he couldn’t explain, the two men aroused his interest. Officer McFadden then took up a post at the entrance of a store about 300 to 400 feet away. He observed one man walk away from the other one and past a store, only to turn and pass the store again and later confer with the other man. Then the second man went through the same series of motions. The two men then repeated the same routine about five or six times before a third man showed up. After the third man walked away down Euclid Avenue, the two men continued the routine a couple more times before also walking off down Euclid Avenue. Officer McFadden at this point became increasingly suspicious, thinking the men were observing, and followed the two men and saw them stop and confer with the third man who was with them earlier. Officer McFadden then approached the two men, identified himself, and asked for their names. When of the men mumbled something, Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around and frisked him, at which point he felt a gun. Unable to remove the gun, Officer McFadden ordered the three men inside a store, removed a .38 caliber revolver from Terry’s pocket and ordered all three men to line up against the wall. He frisked the other two men, found another gun on one of them, and called a police wagon, where all three were taken into custody, and Chilton and Terry were charged with carrying concealed weapons.

PROCEDURE:
Petitioner Terry was convicted of caring a concealed weapon and sentenced to the statutorily prescribed term of one to three years in penitentiary.
On the motion to suppress the guns the prosecution took the position that they had been seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest.
The trial court rejected this theory, stating that it “would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension” to find that Officer McFadden had probable cause to arrest the men before he patted them down for weapons.
After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and Terry waived jury trial and pledged not guilty. The court adjudged them guilty, and the court of appeals for the eighth judicial district affirmed.
The supreme court of Ohio dismissed their appeal on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was violated.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
The issue concerns the admission of the revolvers in court and whether it violates the petitioner’s 4th Amendment rights, as they were acquired during a search without probable cause.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and stated there was no violation of the petitioners’ 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
The court rules that based on Officer McFadden’s experience, he had reason to believe the petitioners were involved in suspicious behavior, namely, casing a store to rob it later, and under that basis of thought, there existed the probability that they could be armed and dangerous, giving Officer McFadden reasonable grounds to search the petitioners for a weapon in order to preserve his own safety as well as that of others around them.

ADAMS V. WILLIAMS (1972)
FACTS:
Sergeant John Connolly was approached by an informant and told that individual was seated in a car nearby and armed with a gun in his waist. Sergeant Connolly approached the vehicle, asked the driver (Robert Williams) to open the door, at point which he rolled down the window instead. Sergeant Connolly then reached inside the car and pulled a fully loaded revolver from Williams’ waist, precisely where the informant told him it was. After Williams was arrested for unlawful possession of a pistol, other officers arrived and performed a search incident to arrest, and they found heroin, a machete, and a second revolver in Williams’ car. Williams was then convicted of illegal possession of a firearm.

PROCEDURE:
Respondent Robert Williams was convicted in a Connecticut State Court of illegal possession of a handgun found during a “stop and frisk”, as well as of possession of heroin that was found during a full search incident to his weapons arrest.
Williams; petition for federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the District Court, but the Court of Appeals granted relief.
This Court held that evidence introduced at Williams’ trial had been obtained by an unlawful search of his person and car, and thus the State Court judgments of conviction should be set aside.
ISSUES:
The respondent contends that the initial seizure of his pistol, upon which rested the later search and seizure of the drugs and the weapons, was not justified by the informant’s tip. He claims that absent a more reliable source, or some corroboration, Sgt. Connolly’s actions were unreasonable and constituted a violation of the respondent’s 4th Amendment rights.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of Appeals and held that there was no violation of the respondent’s 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
The court believed that Sgt. Connolly acted justifiably in acting on his informant’s tip, and acting on the basis of Terry v. Ohio, had reason to believe that the suspect was potentially dangerous since the informant told him he was carrying a gun on his waist (which was later verified), thus justifying his immediate search of the respondent.

FLORIDA V. J.L. (2000)
FACTS:
On October 13, 1995, Miami-Dade police received an anonymous call that a young black male with a plaid shirt on at a particular bus stop was carrying a gun. There is no audio recording and nothing is known about the informant. After the police received the tip, two officers arrived at the bus stop and saw three black males, with one of them wearing a plaid shirt but none acting suspiciously. One of the officers approached J.L., who was wearing the plaid shirt, frisked him and found a gun. The officers searched the other two but found nothing. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18.

PROCEDURE:
Moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search, and the trial court granted his motion.
The intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida said the court was invalid under the Fourth Amendment.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more evidence to corroborate it, sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that person.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the State Supreme Court and held that the search of J.L. was unreasonable under the 4th Amendment.

RATIONALE:
The court held that anonymous tips are generally less reliable than tips from known informants and can form the basis for reasonable suspicion only if accompanied by specific indicia of reliability. Although the tip provided an accurate description of the suspect, it does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity, and reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.

ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW (2000)
FACTS:
On September 9, 1995 Officers Nolan and Harvey were in the last of a four car caravan in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions. As the caravan passed 4035 West Van Buren, Officer Nolan observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque bag. Wardlow saw the officers, and then fled until the officers cornered him with their squad car. Officer Nolan then exited his car, and stopped the respondent, and while conducting a protective pat-down, squeezed the bag the respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officer then opened the bag and found a .38 caliber handgun with five rounds of ammunition. The officers arrested Wardlow. The Illinois trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, ruling the gun was recovered during a lawful frisk. Wardlow was then convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

PROCEDURE:
The Illinois trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk.
Illinois Appellate Court reversed Wardlow’s conviction, concluding that the gun should have been suppressed because Officer Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify and investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.
Illinois Supreme Court agreed. It argued that the sudden flight in such an area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether or not the officers violated respondent Wardlow’s 4th Amendment rights by stopping him and whether taking flight from officers constitutes exercising one’s right of refusing to respond to an officer’s questioning.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate and State Supreme Court and ruled that the officers under the circumstances had reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop and frisk of the respondent.

RATIONALE:
The court ruled that the respondent’s unprovoked flight in a high crime area upon noticing the police is not necessarily indicative of wrong-doing, but it is certainly suggestive of such, and that the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior, justifying Officer Nolan’s suspicions that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity and attempting to investigate further.

UNITED STATES V. HENSLEY (1985)
FACTS:
On December 4, 1981, two armed men robbed a tavern in the Cincinnati suburb of St. Bernard, Ohio. Six days later, a St. Bernard police officer, Kenneth Davis, interviewed an informant who stated that the driver of the getaway car was the respondent Thomas Hensley. Officer Davis then obtained a written statement from the informant and immediately issued a wanted flyer to other police departments in the Cincinnati metropolitan area, which twice stated Hensley was wanted for investigation of aggravated robbery, and asked other police departments to pick up and hold Hensley in the event he were located, as well as cautioning and to consider Hensley armed and dangerous. The St. Bernard’s wanted flyer was received by teletype in the headquarters of the Covington Police Department on December 10, 1981. The flyer was read aloud at each change of shift between December 10 and December 16, 1981. Some of the officers were acquainted with Hensley and periodically looked for him in places he was known to frequent. On December 16, 1981, Officer Terence Eger saw a white Cadillac convertible stopped in the middle of a Covington street, where he spotted Hensley in the driver’s seat and asked him to move on. As Hensley was driving away, Officer Eger inquired by radio whether there was a warrant outstanding for Hensley’s arrest and before he could get an answer, two other officers in separate patrol cars interrupted to say there might be an Ohio warrant outstanding on Hensley. The two officers subsequently testified that they had heard or read on the flyer on several occasions, and that the flyer sought for a stop for investigation only, and that in their experience the issuance of such a flyer was usually followed by the issuance of an arrest warrant. While the dispatcher checked to see whether a warrant had been issued, Officer Cope drove to an address where Hensley occasionally stayed while Officer Rassache went to check a second location. The dispatcher had some difficulty in confirming whether a warrant had been issued and unable to locate the flyer, she called the Cincinnati Police Department on the mistaken belief that the warrant originated there. While the dispatcher was on hold, Officer Cope stopped a white Cadillac driven by Hensley. Before Cope left his patrol car, the dispatcher told him she was on hold while Cincinnati was hunting for the warrant. Cope approached Hensley’s car with his service revolver drawn and pointed into the air and had Hensley and another passenger step out of the car. Moments later, Officer Rassache arrived in a separate car and recognized the passenger Albert Green, a convicted felon. Rassache stepped to the open passenger door and saw the butt of a revolver protruding from underneath the passenger’s seat. Green was then arrested. A second handgun wrapped in a blanket was then found the middle of the front seat and a third gun was found in a bag in the back seat. After the discovery of these weapons, Hensley was also arrested. After state handgun charges were dismissed, Hensley was indicted for being a convicted felon in possession of firearms.

PROCEDURE:
He moved to suppress the handguns from evidence on the grounds that the Covington police had impermissibly stopped him in violation of the 4th Amendment, which was denied.
Hensley was then convicted and sentenced to two years in federal prison.
The United States Court of Appeals then reversed the decision, stating that the Covington police could not justifiably conclude that a warrant had been issued for Hensley’s arrest, nor could they stop him while they attempted to find out whether the warrant had been in fact been issued.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether or not the police had a reasonable suspicion to stop Hensley, considering the lack of familiarity with the specifics of the flyer and whether the evidence used to convict Hensley was obtained constitutionally.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the police had reasonable grounds on which to stop Henley and the evidence obtained that was later used against him was not in violation of Henley’s 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
The court reasoned that if a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person had committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to ask questions, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information. Having stopped Hensley, the Covington police were entitled to seize evidence in plain view in the course of a lawful stop, and having arrested the passenger gave the officers probable cause to conduct a lawful search.

UNITED STATES V. SHARPE (1985)
FACTS:
On June 9, 1978, DEA Agent Cooke was on patrol in unmarked vehicle near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, in an area under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. Cooke then noticed a blue pickup truck with an attached camper shell traveling in tandem with a blue Pontiac Bonneville. Observing that the truck was riding low in the rear and that the camper didn’t bounce or sway when the truck drove over bumps, Agent Cooke concluded that it was heavily loaded, and Cooke began to follow the two vehicles for 20 miles. He then decided to make an investigative stop and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher responded to the call, and after he caught up, the pickup and the Pontiac turned off the highway and into a campground road, but eventually got back on the highway. At this point, Agent Cooke asked officer Thrasher to signal for the vehicles to stop. Thrasher pulled alongside the Pontiac, and motioned for him to stop, and as Sharpe (the respondent) moved the Pontiac into the right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and Thrasher’s patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck while Cooke pulled up behind the Pontiac. Cooke approached the Pontiac, identified himself, and requested identification. Cooke then attempted to radio Thrasher to determine whether he had been successful in stopping the pickup truck, but was unable to make contact for several minutes, at which point Cooke then radioed the local police for assistance, and two officers from Myrtle Beach arrived. Asking the two officers to maintain the situation, Cooke left to join Thrasher. In the meantime Thrasher had stopped the pickup, and patted down the driver. The driver, Savage, said the truck belonged to a friend and he was taking it to have its shock absorbers fixed. When Thrasher told Savage that he would be held until Cooke arrived, Savage became nervous and asked to leave, to which Thrasher replied that he was not free to leave. When Agent Cooke arrived, he noticed the bill of sale for the truck matched the same name as Sharpe’s license. Cooke twice sought permission to search the camper but Savage declined, explaining he was not the owner of the truck. Cooke then put his nose against the rear window and reported that he smelled marijuana. Without seeking Savage’s permission Cooke opened the camper and saw a large number of burlap-wrapped bales resembling bales of marijuana that Cooke had seen in previous investigations, at which point he placed Savage under arrest and left him with Thrasher. Cooke then returned to the Pontiac and arrested Sharpe and another passenger. Several days later, Cooke supervised the unloading of the truck, which contained 43 bales and acting without a search warrant, Cooke had eight randomly selected bales sampled, which chemical tests later showed to be marijuana. Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and were convicted.

PROCEDURE:
U.S District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the respondent’s motion to suppress the contraband, and respondents were convicted.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions.
The Government petitioned for certiorari.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the case for further consideration in the light of the intervening decision of in US v. Ross.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals again reversed the convictions.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether an individual may be detained for 20 minutes, when detention is necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited investigation of the suspected criminal activity.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of The Court of Appeals and ruled that the officers and Agent Cooke had not violated the petitioner’s 4th Amendment rights.

RATIONALE:
The court concluded that Agent Cooke, given the circumstances surrounding him, pursued his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner, and thus did not detain the respondent for an unreasonable amount of time that would be considered a violation of his 4th Amendment rights of seizure.

MICHIGAN DEPT. OF STATE POLICE V. SITZ (1990)
FACTS:
In 1986, the Michigan Department of State Police established a sobriety checkpoint program, in which checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehicles would be checked and if officers detected any signs of intoxication, the officers would direct them to a location out of traffic flow where further tests for intoxication would be taken, and if a driver would be found intoxicated, he/she would be arrested. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately. The respondents filed a complaint with the Circuit Court of Wayne County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints. Each respondent is a licensed driver in the State of Michigan who regularly travels throughout the State in his automobile. After the trial, in which two of the drivers were arrested for driving under the influence, the court ruled that the Michigan program violated the 4th Amendment. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of that program violated the 4th Amendment.

PROCEDURE
Respondents filed a Complain in the Circuit Court of Wayne County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints.
The Court ruled that the Michigan program violated the Fourth Amendment and Art of the Michigan Constitution.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that the program violated the Fourth Amendment.
After the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner’s application for leave to appeal, we granted certiorari.
ISSUES:
Does the sobriety checkpoint program, which stops all vehicles passing through a particular state road in order for police to check if motorists are driving a vehicle while intoxicated, violate the petitioners’ 4th Amendment rights if there is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for stopping them?

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that the sobriety checkpoint program does not violate the 4th Amendment rights of drivers.

RATIONALE:
The court reasoned that in the balance of the state’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which the system can reasonably said to advance that interest, versus the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped weighs in favor of the state program.

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND (2000)
FACTS:
In August 1998, Indianapolis police began to operate vehicle checkpoints on roads in order to interdict drugs. The city conducted six such roadblocks between August and November of that year, stopping 1,161 vehicles and arresting 104 motorists (55 for drug-related crimes and 49 for offenses unrelated to drugs). At each checkpoint location, the police stop a predetermined number of vehicles, with approximately 30 officers stationed at the checkpoint. At least one officer approaches the vehicle, advises the driver to produce a license and registration while searching for signs of impairment and conducting an open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside. A narcotics-detection dog walks around the outside of each stopped vehicle. The officers may conduct a search only by consent or based on the appropriate suspicion. The city set it up this way so that each stop, absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause, would last 5 minutes or less. Checkpoints are considered weeks in advance, based on such considerations as area crime statistics and traffic flow. Respondents James Edmond and Joell Palmer were each stopped at a narcotics checkpoint in September 1998. They then filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the class of all motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped in the future at the Indianapolis checkpoints, claiming that the roadblocks violate the 4th Amendment and the seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. Respondents moved for a preliminary injunction, which was denied by the District Court, but it was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals.

PROCEDURE:
Respondents filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the class of all motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped in the future at the Indianapolis drug checkpoints.
After claiming that the roadblocks violated the 4th amendment of the U.S. constitution and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana constitution, the respondents moved for a preliminary injunction.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the 4th amendment.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints contravened the 4th amendment.
Certiorari was granted, and they affirmed.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether or not the roadblocks violate the 4th Amendment rights of search and seizure by arbitrarily stopping vehicles.
HOLDING:
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the Court of Appeals and declared the practice violated the 4th Amendment rights of motorists.

RATIONALE:
Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing and not policing a border or ensuring highway safety, the program contravenes the 4th Amendment. The court stated that it cannot sanction stops only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.

FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF COUNTY OF BURLINGTON (2012)
FACTS:
In 1998, petitioner Albert Florence was arrested after fleeing from officers in Essex County, New Jersey, was charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner entered a guilty plea to two lesser offenses and was sentenced to pay a fine in monthly installments. In 2003, after he fell behind on his payments, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He paid the outstanding balance less than a week later; but for some unexplained reason, the warrant remained in a statewide computer database. Two years later, in Burlington County, New Jersey, petitioner and his wife were stopped in their automobile by a state trooper, and based on the outstanding warrant, the officer arrested petitioner, where he was held for six days in the Burlington County Detention Center before being transferred to the Essex County Correctional Facility. Burlington County jail procedures require every arrestee to shower with a delousing agent. Officers would check arrestees for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as they disrobed. Petitioner also claims he was also instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around and lift his genitals. When petitioner was transferred to the Essex County Correctional Facility, he removed his clothing and went through pretty much the same process. After a mandatory shower, during which his clothes were inspected, petitioner was admitted into the facility, where he was released the next day after the charges against him were dismissed. Petitioner sued the governmental agencies that operated the jails, one of the wardens, and certain other defendants for violations of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights, maintaining that persons arrested for a minor offense could not be required to remove their clothing and expose the most private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part of the intake process. Afterwards, the court granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on the unlawful search claim and concluded that any policy of strip-searching non-indictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violated the 4th Amendment. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the procedures described by the District Court struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the security needs of the two jails.

PROCEDURE
Petitioner sued the government entities that operated jails, one of the wardens, and certain other defendants once he was released and charges were dismissed.
The suit was commenced in the U.S. district court for the district court of New Jersey.
After discovery, the court granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on the lawful search claim. It concluded that any policy of “strip searching” non-indictable offenders without any reasonable suspicion violated the 4th amendment.
A divided panel of the U.S. court of appeals for the 3rd circuit reversed, holding that the procedures described by the district court struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the security needs of the two jails.
The federal courts of appeals have come to differing conclusions as to whether the 4th amendment requires correctional officials to exempt some detainees who will be admitted to a jails general population from the searches at issue.
Certiorari granted.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether or not it is in violation of the 4th Amendment for a correctional official to require detainees who have been charged with a minor offense to remove their clothing and expose their most private areas to close visual inspection if there is not a reason to suspect he/she is concealing a weapon, drugs or other contraband,

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and asserted that the search did not violate the 4th Amendment rights of the petitioner.

RATIONALE:
Jails and prisons face grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang members who go through the intake process, and contraband smuggled in by new detainees does as well. Inmates who might be thought to pose the least risk have been caught smuggling prohibited items into a jail, so it justifies that the correctional officers perform a thorough search in order to ensure their own safety and that of the inmates. There is a substantial interest in preventing new inmates, either from their own free will or as a result or coercion, from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is admitted into the general population.

HAYES V. FLORIDA (1985)
FACTS:
A series of burglary-rapes occurred in Punta Gorda, Florida in 1980. Police found fingerprints on the doorknob of one of the victims’ bedroom, and a herringbone shoe print pattern near the victim’s front porch. Police had interviewed petitioner Hayes along with 30 or 40 other men who fit the description of the assailant. The investigators, based on little information and without a warrant, decided to visit Hayes at his home to fingerprint him, or to arrest him if he was uncooperative. When they arrived at Hayes’ home, the police spoke to him on his front porch, and when he expressed reluctance to voluntarily go with the officers for fingerprinting, the police explained that they would arrest him instead, prompting Hayes to say it would be preferable to go with the officers than be arrested. The police also took a pair of herringbone tennis shoes in plain view. When Hayes was fingerprinted, the police determined that they matched those gathered at the home and placed him under formal arrest. Before the trial, Hayes attempted to suppress the evidence, claiming it was the fruit of an illegal detention, but was denied the motion and was subsequently convicted of the burglary and sexual battery committed at the scene where the fingerprints were found. The District Court of Appeal of Florida then affirmed the conviction, stating that although the police had no probable cause or consent, under Terry v. Ohio, the police could transport Hayes and fingerprint him on the basis of reasonable suspicion.

PROCEDURE
Petitioner placed under formal arrest.
Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress the fingerprint evidence, claiming it was the fruit of an illegal detention.
The trial court denied the motion and admitted the evidence without expressing a reason.
Petitioner was convicted of the burglary and sexual battery committed at the scene where the fingerprints were found.
The district court of appeal of Florida, second district, affirmed the conviction.

ISSUES:
The issue is whether the 4th Amendment allows police to transport a suspect to a station house for finger-printing without his consent and without probable cause or prior judicial authorization.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, stating that Hayes’ 4th Amendment rights were violated.

RATIONALE:
The court reasoned that there was no probable cause, no consent was given to be taken from his home to a police station, and no judicial authority for such a detention for fingerprinting purposes, and neither reasonable suspicion or probable cause would entitle the officers to make a warrantless entry into a person’s home for the purpose of getting fingerprints.

DUNAWAY V. NEW YORK (1979)
FACTS:
On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a pizza parlor in Rochester, New York, was killed during an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, Detective Anthony Fantigrossi was told by another officer that an informant--a jail inmate awaiting trial for burglary—had implicated petitioner in the crime. Although Fantigrossi learned nothing that supplied enough information to warrant an arrest, he nevertheless ordered other detectives to pick him up and bring him in. After being located in a neighbor’s house, the petitioner was taken into custody (although he was told he was not under arrest, he would have been physically restrained if he had attempted to leave), and driven to police headquarters, placed in an interrogation room and questioned by officers after being given warnings by Miranda v. Arizona, where the petitioner eventually waived counsel and made statements and drew sketches that incriminated him in the crime.

PROCEDURE
After his motions to suppress the statements and sketches were denied, he was convicted of attempted robbery and felony murder.
The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Court’s supervening decision in Brown v. Illinois, in which the petitioner also made inculpatory statements after receiving Miranda warnings during the interrogation—on less than probable cause.
The County Court later determined that the petitioner’s motion to suppress should have been granted but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal.

ISSUES:
The issues at hand are whether the Rochester police violated the petitioner’s rights when, without probable cause, took him into custody to a police station and interrogated him, and if statements (confessions) offered by the petitioner, who was detained without probable cause or a warrant, are rendered moot due to the fact that he was the subject of an illegal arrest.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals and stated that the Rochester police violated the petitioner’s 4th and 14th Amendment rights and the confession extracted was the fruit of an unlawful arrest and therefore moot.

RATIONALE:
The Court stated that in the less than two hours that elapsed between the illegal arrest and the confession there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever that would untaint the confession itself, giving it a strong causal connection to the arrest, and to admit the confession in such a case would allow police to violate the 4th Amendment with impunity.

NEW YORK V. HARRIS (1990)
FACTS:
On January 11, 1984, NYC police found the body of Ms. Velma Staton murdered at her apartment. Various facts gave the officers probable cause to believe the respondent, Bernard Harris, had killed her. On January 16, 1984, three officers went to Harris’s apartment to take him into custody, but not with an arrest warrant. The three officers knocked on the door, displayed their guns and badges, and Harris let them in. Once inside, the officers read Harris his Miranda rights, and Harris acknowledged he understood the warnings, at which point he began to answer the officers’ questions, and subsequently reportedly admitted that he had killed Ms. Staton. Harris was then arrested, taken to the police station, where he was again read his Miranda rights and signed an inculpatory statement. The police then read Harris his Miranda rights a third time, and videotaped an incriminating interview between Harris and a district attorney, even though Harris had indicated that he wanted to end the interrogation.

PROCEDURE
The trial court suppressed Harris’ first and third statements but not the second statement (the written one made at the police station) and it was admitted in court. Following a bench trial, Harris was convicted of second-degree murder.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed and deemed the station house statement inadmissible.

ISSUES:
The issue specifically focuses on the second statement made at the station, and whether or not it should have been suppressed, as Harris did not consent to let the police enter his home and that he was taken into custody without an arrest warrant.

HOLDING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals and ruled that Harris’ second statement was admissible in court.

RATIONALE:
The Court stated that although he was illegally detained, Harris’ second statement, made at the station was not the product of being in unlawful custody. The police already had probable cause to question Harris prior to his arrest; therefore his subsequent statement was not an exploitation of the illegal entry into his home.