Sensations and Brain Processes- Smart
Philosophy of Mind
In his article Sensations and Brain Processes, Jack Smart argues from a materialist point of view of the mind, namely that the brain is the source of sensory perception and the locus of conscious experience. Smart uses the term ‘nomological danglers’ to describe how mental states, such as sensation are traditionally considered over and above physiological explanation, but that his view of the mind is superior, because it explains away these nomological danglers. He addresses eight standard critiques of this view with his own rebuttals. Initially, he notes that sensations are believed to originate from another, non-physical state, because they have different ‘psychic’ qualities from physical properties (Objection 3), people need not know a thing about neurophysiology to be able to report about their sensory experiences (Objection 1) and just as the theory of the humors was proven wrong, this extant theory about the brain, too, may be misleading (Objection 2). Smart effectively responds to these queries, claiming that these objections are not direct attacks on his theory. To the later objections, he goes on to refine his argument by drawing a distinction between ‘experience’ and ‘brain processes’ (151). He admits that a person may translate his or her sensory experience into words such as green, round, salty, loud, but that a neurosurgeon will not see traces of blue or round in the brain itself. This distinction does not mean that the experience is not being shaped by brain processes. For those who claim that sensations are private and the brain processes are public (Objection 6), Smart suggests that this categorical convention is deeply rooted in behavioral studies and needs to be overcome in order to better understand what is actually occurring in the brain. And for those who claim that ‘experience cannot be composed of stuff’ he replies that something cannot come from ghost nothings, including experiences that humans have. Smart
In his article Sensations and Brain Processes, Jack Smart argues from a materialist point of view of the mind, namely that the brain is the source of sensory perception and the locus of conscious experience. Smart uses the term ‘nomological danglers’ to describe how mental states, such as sensation are traditionally considered over and above physiological explanation, but that his view of the mind is superior, because it explains away these nomological danglers. He addresses eight standard critiques of this view with his own rebuttals. Initially, he notes that sensations are believed to originate from another, non-physical state, because they have different ‘psychic’ qualities from physical properties (Objection 3), people need not know a thing about neurophysiology to be able to report about their sensory experiences (Objection 1) and just as the theory of the humors was proven wrong, this extant theory about the brain, too, may be misleading (Objection 2). Smart effectively responds to these queries, claiming that these objections are not direct attacks on his theory. To the later objections, he goes on to refine his argument by drawing a distinction between ‘experience’ and ‘brain processes’ (151). He admits that a person may translate his or her sensory experience into words such as green, round, salty, loud, but that a neurosurgeon will not see traces of blue or round in the brain itself. This distinction does not mean that the experience is not being shaped by brain processes. For those who claim that sensations are private and the brain processes are public (Objection 6), Smart suggests that this categorical convention is deeply rooted in behavioral studies and needs to be overcome in order to better understand what is actually occurring in the brain. And for those who claim that ‘experience cannot be composed of stuff’ he replies that something cannot come from ghost nothings, including experiences that humans have. Smart