Similarities Between World War I And The Cold War

The realist way of looking at the international system is through calculated moves, with the goal being to win security for the state, which is measured in power. To better understand how war acts as a means to this end, scholars have proposed many theories. The three most plausible theories are offensive realism, the power transitions theory, and defensive realism. After applying these theories—offensive realism, power transitions, and defensive realism—to World War I and the Cold War, this paper examines them in the context of the present climate of Eastern Europe, and argues that while great power war will occur in the next fifteen years, it is not imminent.

Offensive Realism
Mearsheimer puts forth the theory of offensive realism,
Two major eras, the Pax Britannica and the present period of United States unipolarity, describe the major wars of the twentieth century, and can explain occurrences or anticipate future events of the twenty-first century. As one hegemon fades, the world enters a period of instability, because all the latent powers compete to become the next hegemon. In the years leading up to World War I, the power of Great Britain was fading, while the power of Germany and Russia was on the rise. The United States was not yet ready or able to play the role of hegemon. This led the world into a period of multipolarity and caused conflict. Following World War II, at the dawn of the Cold War, the world was in a state of bipolarity, as the United States and the Soviet Union vied for influence. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States held the most power in the world and continues to maintain this control into the present. Critics of this theory cite the fact that the eras in which it divides history into are too broad and as a result there is little evidence that shows whether this theory will fit other scenarios, or if it was just the product of coincidence. As this theory looks at history as a long narrative, it establishes a cyclical pattern of a state’s rise to power followed by its ultimate fall. It is impossible to gain power and maintain it
The first indications of possible war occurred when Russian troops covertly invaded Eastern Ukraine and claimed Crimea. This did not prompt war because the Ukraine is not part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO considers an attack on one of its members to be an attack on all. However, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are members, and an attack “would legally obligate the United States and most of Europe to declare war on Moscow” (Fisher 2015). Both Russia and the United States are carrying out military exercises, strategically moving troops and attempting to intimidate the other in Eastern Europe. Just last week, Russia moved nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad, an enclave bordering Poland and Lithuania. While the Russian Defense Ministry claimed it was part of a routine drill, many believe the action was to “express displeasure with NATO,” especially in light of President Putin’s suspension of the treaty about the disposal of weapon-grade plutonium with the United States (Solovyov et al. 2016). Russia’s willingness to use nuclear weapons not only harkens back to the Cold War tensions, but also illustrates the imperative that NATO must tread carefully. As Russia’s conventional military is much weaker than the NATO forces, Russia fears that nuclear deterrence would not be