Statutory Interpretation
7. Statutory Interpretation
7.1. The Role of Statutory Interpretation
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The courts must ascertain the meaning of a statute in order to apply it.
•
Even the most well drafted statute may be capable of more than one interpretation in any particular situation – this is a function of the nature of language and the desire of opposing parties to find interpretations which favour their own case. Additionally, some statutes may be inherently ambiguous. •
The courts have developed principles to assist them in ascertaining the meaning of statutes. Although some of these are described as ‘rules’ they do not have the binding force of law and there is no universal acceptance regarding their precise meaning.
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These principles can be divided into 4 categories:
Primary Rules
Secondary Rules
Extrinsic Aids
Presumptions
7.2. Primary Rules of Statutory Interpretation
7.2.1. Nature of Primary Rules
The primary rules deal with the courts’ overall approach to interpretation. It is not possible to say, in advance, precisely which approach a court will take in a particular case. (Whichever approach is taken, the court will also make use of secondary rules, extrinsic aids and presumptions.)
7.2.2. The Traditional Rules
(a) The Literal Rule
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© Paul Chynoweth 2002
1
Traditionally, the English courts have taken a literal approach to the interpretation of statutes. The Literal Rule is the cornerstone of this approach.
The literal rule requires the courts to give the words of a statute their plain meaning. It is for a court to interpret Parliament’s intention from what it has actually said – not from what it thinks it meant to say. This can produce some surprising results as, in practice, words seldom have a single plain meaning.
Whiteley v Chappell (1868-69) LR 4 QB 147
It was a statutory offence to impersonate “any person entitled to vote” at an election. The defendant impersonated someone who was on
the
7.1. The Role of Statutory Interpretation
•
The courts must ascertain the meaning of a statute in order to apply it.
•
Even the most well drafted statute may be capable of more than one interpretation in any particular situation – this is a function of the nature of language and the desire of opposing parties to find interpretations which favour their own case. Additionally, some statutes may be inherently ambiguous. •
The courts have developed principles to assist them in ascertaining the meaning of statutes. Although some of these are described as ‘rules’ they do not have the binding force of law and there is no universal acceptance regarding their precise meaning.
•
These principles can be divided into 4 categories:
Primary Rules
Secondary Rules
Extrinsic Aids
Presumptions
7.2. Primary Rules of Statutory Interpretation
7.2.1. Nature of Primary Rules
The primary rules deal with the courts’ overall approach to interpretation. It is not possible to say, in advance, precisely which approach a court will take in a particular case. (Whichever approach is taken, the court will also make use of secondary rules, extrinsic aids and presumptions.)
7.2.2. The Traditional Rules
(a) The Literal Rule
www.lawlectures.co.uk
© Paul Chynoweth 2002
1
Traditionally, the English courts have taken a literal approach to the interpretation of statutes. The Literal Rule is the cornerstone of this approach.
The literal rule requires the courts to give the words of a statute their plain meaning. It is for a court to interpret Parliament’s intention from what it has actually said – not from what it thinks it meant to say. This can produce some surprising results as, in practice, words seldom have a single plain meaning.
Whiteley v Chappell (1868-69) LR 4 QB 147
It was a statutory offence to impersonate “any person entitled to vote” at an election. The defendant impersonated someone who was on
the
Bibliography: Wood, D., Law and the Built Environment, Macmillan, 1999, p. 16 Owens, K., Law for Non-Law Students, Cavendish, 2001, pp – 182 McLeod, I., Legal Method, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, chapters 18 & 20 Keenan, D., Smith & Keenan’s English Law, Longman, 2001, pp. 162 – 167 & 644 – 646 Card, R., Murdoch, J. & Murdoch, S., Law for Estate Management Students, Butterworths, 1998, paras