Stop And Frisk Research Paper

Scott R. Harvey Reasonable Suspicion Versus Burden of Proof in Current Policing
Criminal Investigation 12S-CRJU-C312-A51
Dennis Thornton
14 January 2012

Abstract
This paper will show how current “Stop and Frisk” (Terry Stop, SQF) methods exercised presently diverge greatly from the initial precedent allowed in Terry v. Ohio (1968) due to the inability to concretely define reasonable suspicion as well as the broad applications of reasonable suspicion since 1968. The most notable current representation involves The New York Police Department (NYPD) and its policy regarding Terry Stops as a proactive crime prevention and investigative tool (Ridgeway, 2006). Also considering the benefits shown in Ultimately, reasonable suspicion needs
to be defined concretely enough as to restrict improper justification for unwarranted searches and seizures.

Reasonable Suspicion Versus Burden of Proof In Current Policing

In considering the clarity of “reasonable suspicion” as a definitive standard today in relation to definition presented in Terry v. Ohio (1968) the definition of this concept is clearly imprecise. The varying results and interpretations’ leave significant flexibility for police to infringe upon individuals’ rights without the necessary burden of proof. In many cases following Terry v. Ohio the court has failed to be consistent in its decisions concerning what searches are deemed permissible and which are not, allowing varying levels of intrusiveness to individuals 4th Amendment rights (Kinports, 2007). While the US Judicial System has every intention of evaluating each circumstance on its own merits, it still must recognize that a clear line must distinguish what is probable cause and what is reasonable suspicion, and if neither of those it should be defined as to what it is. One major controversy in US cities today is the implementation of programs specifically promoting a “Stop, Question, and Frisk” policy for various reasons, including a undefined “community-caretaking effort”, without concrete results showing that their understanding of reasonable suspicion complies with the burden of proof necessary to infringe upon ones 4th Amendment right (Kinports, 2009; Ridgeway, 2006).
Currently, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has a strong “Stop, Question and Frisk” (SQF) policy which has produced controversial statistics which show the searches and seizures may not meet the burden of proving reasonable suspicion, as it is defined.
The high frequency, comprising of 506,471 encounters in 2006, quota based SQF policy has directly contributed to the reduction of violent crime although the policy appears to be fundamentally justified by a “community-caretaking objective” and not prudent reasonable suspicion towards each individual (Ridgeway, 2007; Kinports, 2009). The SQF is also used to gather demographical statistics for future reference as well as bolster officer and department productivity ratings. With this in mind, approximately 90% of the NYPD recorded SQF incidents for 2006 resulted in no criminal findings (Ridgeway, 2007). While “community-caretaking” and the reduction of crime are both viable reason for this procedure, the result provide that nine out of ten people who experienced a SQF were possibly unlawfully questioned and or searched. The NYPD now records incidents indicating the suspicion of crime in a list of checkboxes. This shows what resulted in each Terry Stop, implying accuracy and honesty are present. The results of these findings demonstrate an unclear understanding by NYPD officers of what constitutes reasonable suspicion of a
crime. In further deliberating a “Stop and Frisk” and how reasonable suspicion is defined, the positive crime prevention and detection occurrences cannot be overlooked. In Alabama v. White (1990) a confidential informant notified police of the wear about and actions of criminal activity of White. Detectives then verified a significant amount of the information provided to them by the informant, giving them the “totality of the circumstances” needed to prove reasonable suspicion (Alabama v. White, 1990). This resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court overturning an appeal to suppress evidence, concluding that the defendants 4th Amendment right was not violated in this instance. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently clarified reasonable suspicion to include more concise representations of the burden off proof needed to “Stop and Frisk”. Illinois v. Gates (1983) introduced the “totality of circumstances” approach to allow the individually unreliable information to be combined to form reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Reasonable suspicion should be more concisely defined as to better protect the integrity of the 4th Amendment and those whom it protects. A thorough but still inconclusive, definition was delivered as the Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding Alabama v. White:
“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors, quantity and quality, are considered in the totality of the circumstances, the whole picture, that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion (Alabama v. White,
1990).”
With more extensive training and increased understanding of all the concepts regarding reasonable suspicion by Police overall goals of crime reduction can be met. We must find ways to allow reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to lawfully suppressed with out unnecessary infringements to citizens 4th Amendment right.

Reference:

ILLINOIS v. GATES ET UX., 496 U.S. 325; 110 S. Ct. 2412; 110 L. Ed. 2d 301; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3053; 58 U.S.L.W. 4747. Retrieved from http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.loyno.edu/hottopics/lnacademic

ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. VANESSA ROSE WHITE, 462 U.S. 213; 103 S. Ct. 2317; 76 L. Ed. 2d 527; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 54; 51 U.S.L.W. 4709. Retrieved from http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.loyno.edu/hottopics/lnacademic

Kinports, Kit, Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 649 (2009).

Ridgeway, Greg, Analysis of the New York Police Department’s Stop, Question and Frisk Policy’s, 1776 Main St., RAND Corp., (2007)
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/TR534_FINALCompiled.pdf