Student Safety Case Summary
Student Safety and University Liability
Case Analysis U10a1
Introduction
Student safety and University liability are major issues of concern for all institutions of higher education. In many instances, students and parents allege institutional liability for injuries or character defamation that result from negligent student behaviors, on and off campus. Then, there are the instances in which a party, other than a student, is at fault. Each of the cases presented below represent a variation of such instances and the extent to which the legal system rendered liability.
Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25 (U.S. App, 2007)
Background
In September 2004, plaintiff Christopher Havlik, a student at Johnson & Wales University (Providence, …show more content…
Rhode Island) engaged in a physical altercation with fellow student, Ronald Ratcliff, at the intersection of Richmond and Pine Streets. During the contentious exchange, plaintiff knocked Radcliffe to the ground causing him to strike his head against the pavement. Providence police were summoned to the scene. An investigation ensued that involved varying witness testimonies provided by associates of Havlik and Radcliffe. One associate alleged that the plaintiff brandished a knife during the attack. Radcliffe, taken to the hospital by emergency transport, was diagnosed with “a concussion and fractured skull” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales University, 2007, p. 4). Upon completion of the investigation, police filed criminal charges against plaintiff. A statement regarding the altercation was submitted to campus security. The University performed its own investigation that concluded: (1) fraternity differences likely led to the fracas; and (2) plaintiff probably started the fight, and brandished a knife during the altercation. Further, one witness and his friend expressed fear of reprisal from Havlik and his fraternity brothers because of their cooperation in the investigation. Less than a week after the altercation, plaintiff received notification of temporary suspension from the University for failing to adhere to the rules of conduct as stated in the student code. The following infractions were named: physical altercation; weapon possession, and participating in illegal behavior. Plaintiff was notified of his right to a hearing which was scheduled for the next day. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf at the hearing. After deliberating, the board found plaintiff liable for assault upon another student and for taking part in “lawless behavior” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales, 2007, p. 4). Plaintiff was found not liable for having a knife. The board recommended that plaintiff be expelled from the University for failing to comply with the student code of conduct as stated in the (Code) and notified plaintiff of his right to file an appeal. On the day plaintiff was suspended; a crime alert draft was evaluated and updated by Barbara Bennett, Chief House Counsel for the University. Both notifications stated that “a blow had been struck and a knife brandished” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales, 2007, p. 4). However, the updated version revised by Bennett consisted of facts not detailed in the earlier version of the crime alert. Bennett’s report stated that: (1) members of the plaintiff’s fraternity (ZBT) were involved in the fracas; and (2) plaintiff was named as bearing sole responsibility for the incident. However, neither Bennett nor Campus Safety & Security had knowledge of the findings rendered by the board. Subsequently, plaintiff exercised his right to an appeal. Prior to filing the appeal, plaintiff and his mother met with Ronald Martel, President of University Affairs. During the meeting, Martel made disparaging remarks that accused plaintiff “of disassembling about incident” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales, 2007, p. 5) and referred to his fraternity brothers as “thugs” (p. 5). Despite the crude remarks from Martel, plaintiff moved forward with the appeal process. Plaintiff’s letter of appeal was sent to Veera Sarawgi, Vice-President, for review and consideration. Other documents necessary for the appeal process at this stage should have included: a statement of hearing procedure, the decision rendered by the board, and the University incident report. Sarawgi failed to raise issue about the existence of those documents, but did confer with Martel on whether he felt reasons existed that would result in revision or overturn of the Board’s decision. Martel did not contest the decision. Further, it was noted that Martel did not convey any disparaging remarks about plaintiff and his frat brothers to Sarawgi. On September 29, Sarawgi affirmed the board’s decision to expel plaintiff from the University. Following the expulsion, criminal assault charges were brought against plaintiff by the Providence police department. Plaintiff stood trial and was found guilty. Plaintiff sought relief in superior court, claiming his right (de novo) and was acquitted. Angry that he was prohibited from continuing his education at Johnson & Wales, plaintiff filed civil action against defendant in federal district court. Plaintiff’s suit presented three allegations: (1) defamation; (2) breach of contract; and (3) denial of reasonable appeal. The University rejected plaintiff’s allegations and motioned the court for summary judgment. The motion was granted, Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 250, 262 (D.R.I. 2007). Plaintiff moved swiftly to appeal.
Decision and Analysis
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court finding that its decision was appropriate. In the case of Havlik, it was the burden of plaintiff to present adequate discovery to convince the court that defendant was liable for his allegations of defamation, breach of contract and denial of reasonable appeal. The court referred to the Clergy Act as its foundation for considering Havlik. The Clergy Act requires proof of the following: (1) false statements were made by defendant; (2) statements were published to a non-privileged 3rd party; (3) defendant was irresponsible in publishing information; and (4) slandered party. With regard to the issue of defamation, one could perceive that the defendant erred in disseminating non-factual information about plaintiff via crime alert. However, at issue is whether defendant intended to cause harm to plaintiff by its actions, or had defendant simply exerted its right to notify campus constituents of plaintiff’s alleged crime. The Clergy Act grants authority to individual institutions to best determine how notifications should be worded and conveyed to prevent campus crimes. Further, the court referred to the concept of “qualified privilege” which may apply if one believes that it is reasonable to make comment using his/her own discretion to protect the interests of others (Kaplin and Lee, 2007). In light of those references, it is reasonable to perceive that the actions of the defendant were never intended to cause plaintiff harm; but rather, to provide timely campus notification to prevent a potentially dangerous situation. Plaintiff’s second and third allegations involved breach of contract and denial of reasonable appeal. When plaintiff entered Johnson & Wales University, he entered into a contract bound by the terms as stated in the student code of conduct, University catalog, and other official publications that define University policy. In Havlik, defendant demonstrated plaintiff was afforded due process in accordance with the guidelines as stated in the student code of conduct: (1) plaintiff was granted a hearing in front of the school board of conduct; (2) plaintiff was informed of his right to appeal the board’s decision; (3) plaintiff and his mother were granted a meeting with, Martel, Vice-President of Student Affairs; and (4) plaintiff’s appeal letter was reviewed and a decision rendered by designate, Saragwi, a second Vice-President. While it is questionable as to whether Saragwi was prejudiced in any manner by Martel or the crime alert, the fact that she sought his opinion was reasonable in light of his position at the University. Once, again, plaintiff failed to prove that defendant was derelict in adhering to policies that afford due process to students as stated in the (Code). Therefore, the court issued summary judgment in favor of the defendant against plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and denial of reasonable appeal. This case speaks clearly to the difficulty in proving claims of defamation and breach of contract. It was not unreasonable for claimant to allege that either existed based on the crime alert and comments made by Martel. Nevertheless, plaintiff was simply not able to provide evidence that the actions of defendant singled him out for unfair treatment and that defendants actions were malicious in intent.
Love v. Morehouse College, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
Background
Plaintiff, while a student at Morehouse was physically attacked in a dormitory by a student. The assailant claimed that he beat plaintiff with a baseball bat because he believed that Love was a homosexual and that Love had offended him by making a lewd facial gesture. Love alleged that defendant was aware that gay students were regularly harassed due to their sexual orientation, but did nothing to thwart the attacks. Plaintiff further alleged that the indifference displayed by defendant helped to foster a culture at the College in which homosexual students were taunted and deplored. Subsequent to the attack, plaintiff moved to file a negligence claim against defendant citing “gross negligence, premises liability, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress” (Love v. Morehouse, 2007, p. 3). Trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim, finding that although defendant owed plaintiff “a duty of reasonable care” (Love v. Morehouse, 2007, p. 3) while on its property, plaintiff failed to prove that defendant was able to foresee his injury. Plaintiff subsequently moved to appeal.
Decision and Analysis
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision to dismiss, concluding that the court was negligent in applying the correct standards for determining its judgment. Love represents a serious issue which occurs all too often among peers today, that of harassment (Kaplin and Lee, 2007). While harassment may encompass many forms that include race and sex; the harassment depicted in Love speaks to that of sexual orientation. In considering Love, the court referenced Georgia law which provides that institutions of higher education are responsible for ensuring reasonable safety for individuals on their properties. In this regard, defendant was aware of numerous instances in which gay students were physically and verbally harassed by other students. Plaintiff himself made defendant aware of harassment that he encountered on several instances; presenting proof to substantiate his claims. Nevertheless, defendant failed to impose discipline and/or enforce and establish rules of student conduct to prevent offensive student behaviors. Defendant’s indifference and lack of action helped to create a hostile environment in which gay students feared for their well-being. Further, there is no mention in Love that defendant provided sensitivity trainings and information for its students, faculty, and staff, or provided support services for gay students. Additionally, there was no mention of school policies that prohibited sexual orientation harassment or enforced discipline for infractions. In the absence of the aforementioned, it is sensible to conclude that defendant failed to exhibit a reasonable duty to protect plaintiff and other gay students on its property. Had defendant been able to provide that there was zero tolerance for this type of harassment and that proactive measures were implemented to educate and provide protection, this case may have concluded differently.
O’Connor v. Syracuse Univ., No. 7139-05, LEXIS 5893 (D. N.Y.Sept. 29, 2008)
Background
Plaintiff, O’Connor, sustained a broken ankle while attending a hockey game between Syracuse and Slippery Rock University.
Plaintiff’s injury occurred while attempting to break up a physical altercation between students, McNeil (Syracuse) and DiSanti (Slippery Rock). Subsequently, plaintiff filed civil suit against defendants’ seeking compensatory damages. Plaintiff alleged that defendant “failed or refused” (O’Connor v. Syracuse, 2008, p. 2) to disclose a witness account as conveyed by teenager Katherine Jabowski and recorded by a Syracuse officer. Jabowski recalled that an officer had indeed taken a statement from her. However, since she could not remember all of the details, she requested an opportunity to view her original statement. Plaintiff moved to have the court impose sanction against defendant for refusing to present Jabowski’s statement and the recording officer. Defendant countered that Jabowski’s statement did not exist. Nor could defendant present an officer in its employ that recalled taking the statement. Further, defendant argued “inter alia” that since plaintiff intervened in the altercation on his own accord, he was responsible for his injury. In light of that, defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff contested that his injury resulted because of defendants: (1) failure to provide adequate security for the event, ultimately leading to the altercation; and that (2) McNeil and DiSanti’s irresponsible behavior placed attendees in clear and present danger. It should be mentioned that McNeil and DiSanti motioned to have plaintiffs claim against them
dismissed.
Opinion and Analysis
The Supreme Court of New York, Albany County granted summary judgment to dismiss in favor of defendant due to plaintiff’s inability to prove negligence. O’Connor was chosen because it exemplifies alleged negligence based upon the perception of foreseeable injury. It was the burden of plaintiff to prove that defendant failed to protect his safety as well as that of the game attendees. Nevertheless, it was defendant who proved that: (1) a guard and facility manager testified that McNeil’s behavior did not raise concerns of violence; (2) there were no past occurrences of conflict between members of the hockey team and audience; (3) defendant firmly restricted alcohol usage on it premises; (4) there was no just cause to believe McNeil was intoxicated (5) staff were present to supervise the crowd; and (6) barriers were placed to restrict the crowd from the players. Those precautions as noted reflect an earnest effort on the part of defendant to safeguard the occupants on its premises. On the other hand, plaintiff’s defense was weak at best. For instance: (1) he failed to provide substantial proof that McNeil and DiSanti’s fracas was foreseeable and, as such, preventable; (2) could not prove that security was lax; (3) did not witness anything alarming about defendants’ behaviors; and (4) failed to refute defendants contention that the fracas was unforeseen. As such, the court ruled that plaintiff did not demonstrate that defendant was negligent in protecting him from harm. O’Connor represents a classic case involving tort law. Plaintiff was injured on the property of defendant; thus sues defendant for compensation. The issue is not that plaintiff was injured; there is no dispute to that fact. The issue was who bore the responsibility for plaintiff’s issue. Plaintiff took it upon himself to intervene in a physical altercation. Unfortunately, his act of valor resulted in his injury. Nevertheless, it was “his” decision that caused the injury. That he expected compensation was egregious. Therefore, the writer concurs wholeheartedly with the decision of the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claim.
Wisnia v. New York University, No. 114439/2005, LEXIS 718 (D. NY, Jan. 31, 2008)
Background
Plaintiff, Wisnia, was elected secretary of event planning for a student organization at New York University. His role encompassed managing dorm events and making food purchases. Upon returning from a food shopping trip for the dorm’s beach party, a student shoved plaintiff into a child’s wading pool. Plaintiff removed himself from the pool and continued to fool around with student. A second student intervened, pushing plaintiff and first student into the pool. Plaintiff sustained severe injuries during the fall. As such, plaintiff filed suit against defendant seeking compensatory damages in the amount of one million dollars for negligence. Defendant countered that it was plaintiff’s reckless behavior that led to his injury and moved for summary judgment to have the case dismissed.
Opinion and Analysis
The Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County granted summary judgment to dismiss in favor of New York University. The court referred to the “assumption of risk doctrine” in examining Wisnia. The doctrine holds that individuals who decide to take part in physical activities must assume that risk of injury may occur. While plaintiff may not have predicted his injury, he had to assume that aggressive play could result in physical injury. The court also referred to the doctrine “in loco parentis” which holds that institutions of higher education are usually not legally bound to protect students from the risky behaviors of other students. In Wisnia, it was plaintiff’s burden to prove: “the existence of a legal duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate causation and (4) damage” (p. 2). Defense countered with a motion to dismiss citing numerous defenses, the most pivotal, that plaintiff’s conduct led to his injury. Plaintiff subsequently argued that defendant failed to supervise the party and that is was the responsibility of defendant to ensure his safety. Therefore, plaintiff claimed that defendant was legally obligated. The court rejected plaintiff’s assertions, citing his failure to present “triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion” (Wisnia v. New York Univ., 2008, p. 4). Although the defendant had a legal duty to ensure the safety of plaintiff while on its premises, it goes beyond the scope of logical thought that “reasonable care” encompasses one’s own negligent behavior. Had plaintiff been injured as an innocent bystander, his claim of negligence would have likely been concurred by the court.
Conclusion
The cases presented here reflect an array of tort claims. Perception is often held by claimants, that the owner of land or property should be held liable for acts of negligence that may have occurred on said premises. However, the judicial system is not always so quick to agree. All but one of the cases, Love, rested the burden of proof on plaintiff. Retraction, Love, originally awarded summary judgment in favor of defendant. Its decision was based on the contention that plaintiff failed to prove that incurred injury was “foreseeable.” Judgment was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals, which found that the lower court erred in “applying the correct standards” (Love v. Morehouse, 2007. p.2). Seemingly, the court system is a pit stop for anyone who believes that someone other than his or herself is responsible for righting a self perceived wrong. While this may be the case, it is the duty of our great judicial system to ensure that every entity receives due process.
References
Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25 (U.S. App, 2007). Retrieved January 17, 2009 from http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.capella.edu/us/Inacademic.
Kaplin, W., A. & Lee, B., A. (2007). The law of higher education (4th ed., Vol. 1). San Francisco:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Love v. Morehouse College, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). Retrieved January 17, 2009 from http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.capella.edu/us/Inacademic. O’Connor v. Syracuse Univ., No. 7139-05, LEXIS 5893 (D. N.Y.Sept. 29, 2008). Retrieved January 17, 2009 from http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.capella.edu/us/Inacademic.
Wisnia v. New York University, No. 114439/2005, LEXIS 718 (D. NY, Jan. 31, 2008). Retrieved January 17,
2009 from http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.capella.edu/us/Inacademic.
Case Analysis U10a1
Introduction
Student safety and University liability are major issues of concern for all institutions of higher education. In many instances, students and parents allege institutional liability for injuries or character defamation that result from negligent student behaviors, on and off campus. Then, there are the instances in which a party, other than a student, is at fault. Each of the cases presented below represent a variation of such instances and the extent to which the legal system rendered liability.
Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25 (U.S. App, 2007)
Background
In September 2004, plaintiff Christopher Havlik, a student at Johnson & Wales University (Providence, …show more content…
Rhode Island) engaged in a physical altercation with fellow student, Ronald Ratcliff, at the intersection of Richmond and Pine Streets. During the contentious exchange, plaintiff knocked Radcliffe to the ground causing him to strike his head against the pavement. Providence police were summoned to the scene. An investigation ensued that involved varying witness testimonies provided by associates of Havlik and Radcliffe. One associate alleged that the plaintiff brandished a knife during the attack. Radcliffe, taken to the hospital by emergency transport, was diagnosed with “a concussion and fractured skull” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales University, 2007, p. 4). Upon completion of the investigation, police filed criminal charges against plaintiff. A statement regarding the altercation was submitted to campus security. The University performed its own investigation that concluded: (1) fraternity differences likely led to the fracas; and (2) plaintiff probably started the fight, and brandished a knife during the altercation. Further, one witness and his friend expressed fear of reprisal from Havlik and his fraternity brothers because of their cooperation in the investigation. Less than a week after the altercation, plaintiff received notification of temporary suspension from the University for failing to adhere to the rules of conduct as stated in the student code. The following infractions were named: physical altercation; weapon possession, and participating in illegal behavior. Plaintiff was notified of his right to a hearing which was scheduled for the next day. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf at the hearing. After deliberating, the board found plaintiff liable for assault upon another student and for taking part in “lawless behavior” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales, 2007, p. 4). Plaintiff was found not liable for having a knife. The board recommended that plaintiff be expelled from the University for failing to comply with the student code of conduct as stated in the (Code) and notified plaintiff of his right to file an appeal. On the day plaintiff was suspended; a crime alert draft was evaluated and updated by Barbara Bennett, Chief House Counsel for the University. Both notifications stated that “a blow had been struck and a knife brandished” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales, 2007, p. 4). However, the updated version revised by Bennett consisted of facts not detailed in the earlier version of the crime alert. Bennett’s report stated that: (1) members of the plaintiff’s fraternity (ZBT) were involved in the fracas; and (2) plaintiff was named as bearing sole responsibility for the incident. However, neither Bennett nor Campus Safety & Security had knowledge of the findings rendered by the board. Subsequently, plaintiff exercised his right to an appeal. Prior to filing the appeal, plaintiff and his mother met with Ronald Martel, President of University Affairs. During the meeting, Martel made disparaging remarks that accused plaintiff “of disassembling about incident” (Havlik v. Johnson & Wales, 2007, p. 5) and referred to his fraternity brothers as “thugs” (p. 5). Despite the crude remarks from Martel, plaintiff moved forward with the appeal process. Plaintiff’s letter of appeal was sent to Veera Sarawgi, Vice-President, for review and consideration. Other documents necessary for the appeal process at this stage should have included: a statement of hearing procedure, the decision rendered by the board, and the University incident report. Sarawgi failed to raise issue about the existence of those documents, but did confer with Martel on whether he felt reasons existed that would result in revision or overturn of the Board’s decision. Martel did not contest the decision. Further, it was noted that Martel did not convey any disparaging remarks about plaintiff and his frat brothers to Sarawgi. On September 29, Sarawgi affirmed the board’s decision to expel plaintiff from the University. Following the expulsion, criminal assault charges were brought against plaintiff by the Providence police department. Plaintiff stood trial and was found guilty. Plaintiff sought relief in superior court, claiming his right (de novo) and was acquitted. Angry that he was prohibited from continuing his education at Johnson & Wales, plaintiff filed civil action against defendant in federal district court. Plaintiff’s suit presented three allegations: (1) defamation; (2) breach of contract; and (3) denial of reasonable appeal. The University rejected plaintiff’s allegations and motioned the court for summary judgment. The motion was granted, Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 250, 262 (D.R.I. 2007). Plaintiff moved swiftly to appeal.
Decision and Analysis
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court finding that its decision was appropriate. In the case of Havlik, it was the burden of plaintiff to present adequate discovery to convince the court that defendant was liable for his allegations of defamation, breach of contract and denial of reasonable appeal. The court referred to the Clergy Act as its foundation for considering Havlik. The Clergy Act requires proof of the following: (1) false statements were made by defendant; (2) statements were published to a non-privileged 3rd party; (3) defendant was irresponsible in publishing information; and (4) slandered party. With regard to the issue of defamation, one could perceive that the defendant erred in disseminating non-factual information about plaintiff via crime alert. However, at issue is whether defendant intended to cause harm to plaintiff by its actions, or had defendant simply exerted its right to notify campus constituents of plaintiff’s alleged crime. The Clergy Act grants authority to individual institutions to best determine how notifications should be worded and conveyed to prevent campus crimes. Further, the court referred to the concept of “qualified privilege” which may apply if one believes that it is reasonable to make comment using his/her own discretion to protect the interests of others (Kaplin and Lee, 2007). In light of those references, it is reasonable to perceive that the actions of the defendant were never intended to cause plaintiff harm; but rather, to provide timely campus notification to prevent a potentially dangerous situation. Plaintiff’s second and third allegations involved breach of contract and denial of reasonable appeal. When plaintiff entered Johnson & Wales University, he entered into a contract bound by the terms as stated in the student code of conduct, University catalog, and other official publications that define University policy. In Havlik, defendant demonstrated plaintiff was afforded due process in accordance with the guidelines as stated in the student code of conduct: (1) plaintiff was granted a hearing in front of the school board of conduct; (2) plaintiff was informed of his right to appeal the board’s decision; (3) plaintiff and his mother were granted a meeting with, Martel, Vice-President of Student Affairs; and (4) plaintiff’s appeal letter was reviewed and a decision rendered by designate, Saragwi, a second Vice-President. While it is questionable as to whether Saragwi was prejudiced in any manner by Martel or the crime alert, the fact that she sought his opinion was reasonable in light of his position at the University. Once, again, plaintiff failed to prove that defendant was derelict in adhering to policies that afford due process to students as stated in the (Code). Therefore, the court issued summary judgment in favor of the defendant against plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and denial of reasonable appeal. This case speaks clearly to the difficulty in proving claims of defamation and breach of contract. It was not unreasonable for claimant to allege that either existed based on the crime alert and comments made by Martel. Nevertheless, plaintiff was simply not able to provide evidence that the actions of defendant singled him out for unfair treatment and that defendants actions were malicious in intent.
Love v. Morehouse College, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
Background
Plaintiff, while a student at Morehouse was physically attacked in a dormitory by a student. The assailant claimed that he beat plaintiff with a baseball bat because he believed that Love was a homosexual and that Love had offended him by making a lewd facial gesture. Love alleged that defendant was aware that gay students were regularly harassed due to their sexual orientation, but did nothing to thwart the attacks. Plaintiff further alleged that the indifference displayed by defendant helped to foster a culture at the College in which homosexual students were taunted and deplored. Subsequent to the attack, plaintiff moved to file a negligence claim against defendant citing “gross negligence, premises liability, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress” (Love v. Morehouse, 2007, p. 3). Trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim, finding that although defendant owed plaintiff “a duty of reasonable care” (Love v. Morehouse, 2007, p. 3) while on its property, plaintiff failed to prove that defendant was able to foresee his injury. Plaintiff subsequently moved to appeal.
Decision and Analysis
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision to dismiss, concluding that the court was negligent in applying the correct standards for determining its judgment. Love represents a serious issue which occurs all too often among peers today, that of harassment (Kaplin and Lee, 2007). While harassment may encompass many forms that include race and sex; the harassment depicted in Love speaks to that of sexual orientation. In considering Love, the court referenced Georgia law which provides that institutions of higher education are responsible for ensuring reasonable safety for individuals on their properties. In this regard, defendant was aware of numerous instances in which gay students were physically and verbally harassed by other students. Plaintiff himself made defendant aware of harassment that he encountered on several instances; presenting proof to substantiate his claims. Nevertheless, defendant failed to impose discipline and/or enforce and establish rules of student conduct to prevent offensive student behaviors. Defendant’s indifference and lack of action helped to create a hostile environment in which gay students feared for their well-being. Further, there is no mention in Love that defendant provided sensitivity trainings and information for its students, faculty, and staff, or provided support services for gay students. Additionally, there was no mention of school policies that prohibited sexual orientation harassment or enforced discipline for infractions. In the absence of the aforementioned, it is sensible to conclude that defendant failed to exhibit a reasonable duty to protect plaintiff and other gay students on its property. Had defendant been able to provide that there was zero tolerance for this type of harassment and that proactive measures were implemented to educate and provide protection, this case may have concluded differently.
O’Connor v. Syracuse Univ., No. 7139-05, LEXIS 5893 (D. N.Y.Sept. 29, 2008)
Background
Plaintiff, O’Connor, sustained a broken ankle while attending a hockey game between Syracuse and Slippery Rock University.
Plaintiff’s injury occurred while attempting to break up a physical altercation between students, McNeil (Syracuse) and DiSanti (Slippery Rock). Subsequently, plaintiff filed civil suit against defendants’ seeking compensatory damages. Plaintiff alleged that defendant “failed or refused” (O’Connor v. Syracuse, 2008, p. 2) to disclose a witness account as conveyed by teenager Katherine Jabowski and recorded by a Syracuse officer. Jabowski recalled that an officer had indeed taken a statement from her. However, since she could not remember all of the details, she requested an opportunity to view her original statement. Plaintiff moved to have the court impose sanction against defendant for refusing to present Jabowski’s statement and the recording officer. Defendant countered that Jabowski’s statement did not exist. Nor could defendant present an officer in its employ that recalled taking the statement. Further, defendant argued “inter alia” that since plaintiff intervened in the altercation on his own accord, he was responsible for his injury. In light of that, defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff contested that his injury resulted because of defendants: (1) failure to provide adequate security for the event, ultimately leading to the altercation; and that (2) McNeil and DiSanti’s irresponsible behavior placed attendees in clear and present danger. It should be mentioned that McNeil and DiSanti motioned to have plaintiffs claim against them
dismissed.
Opinion and Analysis
The Supreme Court of New York, Albany County granted summary judgment to dismiss in favor of defendant due to plaintiff’s inability to prove negligence. O’Connor was chosen because it exemplifies alleged negligence based upon the perception of foreseeable injury. It was the burden of plaintiff to prove that defendant failed to protect his safety as well as that of the game attendees. Nevertheless, it was defendant who proved that: (1) a guard and facility manager testified that McNeil’s behavior did not raise concerns of violence; (2) there were no past occurrences of conflict between members of the hockey team and audience; (3) defendant firmly restricted alcohol usage on it premises; (4) there was no just cause to believe McNeil was intoxicated (5) staff were present to supervise the crowd; and (6) barriers were placed to restrict the crowd from the players. Those precautions as noted reflect an earnest effort on the part of defendant to safeguard the occupants on its premises. On the other hand, plaintiff’s defense was weak at best. For instance: (1) he failed to provide substantial proof that McNeil and DiSanti’s fracas was foreseeable and, as such, preventable; (2) could not prove that security was lax; (3) did not witness anything alarming about defendants’ behaviors; and (4) failed to refute defendants contention that the fracas was unforeseen. As such, the court ruled that plaintiff did not demonstrate that defendant was negligent in protecting him from harm. O’Connor represents a classic case involving tort law. Plaintiff was injured on the property of defendant; thus sues defendant for compensation. The issue is not that plaintiff was injured; there is no dispute to that fact. The issue was who bore the responsibility for plaintiff’s issue. Plaintiff took it upon himself to intervene in a physical altercation. Unfortunately, his act of valor resulted in his injury. Nevertheless, it was “his” decision that caused the injury. That he expected compensation was egregious. Therefore, the writer concurs wholeheartedly with the decision of the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claim.
Wisnia v. New York University, No. 114439/2005, LEXIS 718 (D. NY, Jan. 31, 2008)
Background
Plaintiff, Wisnia, was elected secretary of event planning for a student organization at New York University. His role encompassed managing dorm events and making food purchases. Upon returning from a food shopping trip for the dorm’s beach party, a student shoved plaintiff into a child’s wading pool. Plaintiff removed himself from the pool and continued to fool around with student. A second student intervened, pushing plaintiff and first student into the pool. Plaintiff sustained severe injuries during the fall. As such, plaintiff filed suit against defendant seeking compensatory damages in the amount of one million dollars for negligence. Defendant countered that it was plaintiff’s reckless behavior that led to his injury and moved for summary judgment to have the case dismissed.
Opinion and Analysis
The Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County granted summary judgment to dismiss in favor of New York University. The court referred to the “assumption of risk doctrine” in examining Wisnia. The doctrine holds that individuals who decide to take part in physical activities must assume that risk of injury may occur. While plaintiff may not have predicted his injury, he had to assume that aggressive play could result in physical injury. The court also referred to the doctrine “in loco parentis” which holds that institutions of higher education are usually not legally bound to protect students from the risky behaviors of other students. In Wisnia, it was plaintiff’s burden to prove: “the existence of a legal duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate causation and (4) damage” (p. 2). Defense countered with a motion to dismiss citing numerous defenses, the most pivotal, that plaintiff’s conduct led to his injury. Plaintiff subsequently argued that defendant failed to supervise the party and that is was the responsibility of defendant to ensure his safety. Therefore, plaintiff claimed that defendant was legally obligated. The court rejected plaintiff’s assertions, citing his failure to present “triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion” (Wisnia v. New York Univ., 2008, p. 4). Although the defendant had a legal duty to ensure the safety of plaintiff while on its premises, it goes beyond the scope of logical thought that “reasonable care” encompasses one’s own negligent behavior. Had plaintiff been injured as an innocent bystander, his claim of negligence would have likely been concurred by the court.
Conclusion
The cases presented here reflect an array of tort claims. Perception is often held by claimants, that the owner of land or property should be held liable for acts of negligence that may have occurred on said premises. However, the judicial system is not always so quick to agree. All but one of the cases, Love, rested the burden of proof on plaintiff. Retraction, Love, originally awarded summary judgment in favor of defendant. Its decision was based on the contention that plaintiff failed to prove that incurred injury was “foreseeable.” Judgment was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals, which found that the lower court erred in “applying the correct standards” (Love v. Morehouse, 2007. p.2). Seemingly, the court system is a pit stop for anyone who believes that someone other than his or herself is responsible for righting a self perceived wrong. While this may be the case, it is the duty of our great judicial system to ensure that every entity receives due process.
References
Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25 (U.S. App, 2007). Retrieved January 17, 2009 from http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.capella.edu/us/Inacademic.
Kaplin, W., A. & Lee, B., A. (2007). The law of higher education (4th ed., Vol. 1). San Francisco:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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