Nihal Kececi, and Mohammad Modarres Center for Technology Risk Studies Department of Materials and Nuclear Engineering University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA ABSTRACT In this paper, the Goal Tree Success Tree and Master Logic Diagram (GTST-MLD) is proposed to model software development life cycle to ensure software quality based on meeting the criteria for high integrity safety systems. The GTST-MLD- based software development life cycle framework allows one to (1) show how a local change affects other phases of development; (2) GTST-MLD hierarchically represent software development life cycle so as to identify missing and incomplete requirements; (3) it is easy to automate on computers, to expand and update.
1.0 Introduction
Safety-critical systems are becoming increasingly important to developers, customers and regulatory agencies. Many problems and difficulties exist in assuring safety in safety-critical computing which comes to light sometimes in the software itself and sometimes in the software development process. Many factors seem to influence the performance of software, such as, software process model, quality measurement techniques and tools, and management control methodologies. It is indeed widely accepted that the assessment of software can not be limited to verification and testing of the end product, i.e. the computer code. Other factors like the quality of the processes and management control methods also have an important impact on software performance. Several software implementations of nuclear safety systems have failed due to costly delays caused by difficulties in coordination the development and qualification process. For example, The P20 Project of Chooz B nuclear power plant [1], the shutdown system of Darlington Nuclear Power Plant [2], and the primary protection system (PPS) of Sizewell B Nuclear Power Plant [3]. The predominant belief today is that quality
References: 1. 2. 3. 4. Appell B. Putting in a Replacement for Controbloc P20 AT Chooz B. Nuclear Eng.Int.1992; 37:45-58. Craigen, D., Gerhart, S., and Ralston T. Case Study: Darlington Nuclear Generating Station. IEEE Software 1994; 11: 30-32. Hughes, G., Boettcher D.B. Developments in Digital Instrumentation for Nuclear Electric’s (UK) Power Plant. Nuclear Energy 1993; 32: 41-52. Modarres, M. Functional Modeling of Complex Systems Using a GTST-MPLD Framework. Proceeding of the 1st International Workshop of Functional Modeling of Complex Technical Systems, Ispra, Italy 1993 IEEE 1058.1 IEEE Standard for Software Project Management Plan. 1987 IEEE 1074 IEEE Standard for Developing Software Life Cycle Process 1995. IEEE 730.1 IEEE Standard for Quality Assurance Plans. 1989 IEEE 730.2 IEEE Guide to Software Quality Assurance Planning. 1993 IEC 880. Software for Computers in the Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Stations 1986. IEEE 121.9 IEEE Standard for Software Maintenance 1992. IEEE 1228. IEEE Standard for Software Safety Plans 1994. IEEE 1012. IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plan 1986. IEEE 828. IEEE Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans. 1983. IEEE 1042. IEEE Guide to Software Configuration Management. 1987. IEEE 830. IEEE Guide to Software Requirements Specification. 1984. IEEE 1016. IEEE Recommended Practice for Software Design Descriptions. 1986. Schweiggert, F., Schoitsch, E. Qualitatssicherung in der Software, OCGComputerakademie, Seminarunterlagen. 1985. Lawrence J. D. Software Reliability and Safety in Nuclear Reactor Protection Systems. NUREG/CR-6101 UCRL-ID-114839 , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 1993. NUREG-0800: HICB-BTP-14, Guidance on Software Reviews for Digital ComputerBased Instrumentation and Control Systems (Draft). 1998. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.