The Failure Of The Easter Offensive In Vietnam
The Easter Offensive By 1972, President Nixon had been in office for four years, dealing with the inherited quagmire that was Vietnam. With both sides tiring of the seemingly endless cycle of successes and setbacks, the North Vietnamese military decided to mount an invasion into South Vietnam commencing on Good Friday of that year. This was done in order to better their position at the Paris Peace accords, which would be closing soon, by gaining control of more land and crippling Nixon’s political power. This essay will address how even after more than two decades at war, the North Vietnamese and the American/South Vietnamese forces alike drastically underestimated their opponents, which resulted in the bloodiest recorded engagement of the war and an ultimately losing outcome
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on both sides of the battles collectively known as the Easter Offensive.
Before the Offensive had even begun, the defending side, despite tracking that there would be attacks after Tet, misjudged basic factors such as “the timing, magnitude, and location of the invasion” (Herring 304).
Even though the increase of forces north of the demilitarized zone and movement of tank battalions through Laos and Cambodia was known, it was brushed off by military leaders as insignificant and an impending invasion as “not possible” (Andrade 62). The Southern commander of I Corps was so confident in this assessment that no preparations were made to stave off an attack, and no air support was on hand during a planned rotation of two of the 3rd ARVN’s regiments that inconveniently took place during the early days of April. Yet invade the North did, with startling triumphs in the first couple weeks. In a three-pronged attack, the North Vietnamese army overran the defences around Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc. To prevent the complete loss of the cities, Nguyen Van Thieu “was forced to commit most of his reserves to defend the threatened towns” and in doing so allowed “the NLF to take the offensive in the Mekong delta and in the heavily populated regions around Saigon” (Herring
304).
The Southern Vietnamese and their allies were not the only ones to sell short the capabilities of their enemies however. Hanoi reasoned “that domestic pressures would prevent Nixon from putting new forces into Vietnam” and with a dwindling six thousand American combat troops left in the country, they would be victorious (Herring 304). The aforementioned domestic pressures referenced the timing of the Offensive starting concurrently with the U.S. Presidential campaign season. In attempting to secure reelection, the Northern Vietnamese hoped that Nixon would be cautious in any retribution out of fear of losing his position. In defiance of this assumption, Nixon initiated the “mining of Haiphong harbor, a naval blockade and massive, sustained bombing of North Vietnam” (Herring 307). While the Chinese helped sweep the harbor for mines, and both the Soviets and Chinese continued to bolster their ally with arms, funds, and reinforcements, both governments strongly suggested that Hanoi settle with the Americans and with Saigon. Additionally, while the Northern Army took out a significant portion of the enemy forces, they took similar losses and with the renewal of American bombings they eventually had to call the retreat. The incorrect conjecture that a lack of American combat troops would lead to assured victory failed to take into account President Nixon’s ability and willingness to increase strikes against key targets, eventually crippling the North’s ability to continue the offense for several years.
While the President was able to control many military matters, he was not as easily able to reign in the negative trend in American media coverage. Though our own reporters are not usually considered the enemy, the American administration’s failure to effectively deal with the American media coverage severely impacted the President’s freedom of movement on several key measures later on that were intended to help the war effort. The unfavorable bias started to pick up with the image The Execution of a Vietcong Guerilla by Eddie Adams shortly after the Tet Offensive, and images such as The Napalm Girl by Nick Ut released during the Easter Offensive reinforced to the public that the cost of the war was running too high for no reward. While transparency is commendable, Nixon’s ability to gain the economic and military resources for his Generals was inhibited by congressional blocks, which were so empowered by the negative public opinion formed based on media coverage.
In conclusion, the points covered in this essay were that the North Vietnamese underestimated the American administration’s commitment to keeping their allies afloat, the South Vietnamese and their US advisors dismissed the possibility of a North Vietnamese invasion as absurd, and the American administration was unable to curtail the media coverage of the distasteful events happening on the ground which led to the disillusionment of the general populace with regards to their support of prolonging the war to ensure victory. By the end of the conflict in the fall of 1972, the North Vietnamese army had taken an estimated 100,000 casualties and the South Vietnamese army had suffered 122,000 in combined KIA, wounded, and MIA. As such, it is clear that even after more than two decades at war, the North Vietnamese and the American/South Vietnamese forces alike drastically underestimated their opponents, which resulted in the bloodiest recorded engagement of the war and an ultimately losing outcome on both sides of the battles collectively known as the Easter Offensive.
on both sides of the battles collectively known as the Easter Offensive.
Before the Offensive had even begun, the defending side, despite tracking that there would be attacks after Tet, misjudged basic factors such as “the timing, magnitude, and location of the invasion” (Herring 304).
Even though the increase of forces north of the demilitarized zone and movement of tank battalions through Laos and Cambodia was known, it was brushed off by military leaders as insignificant and an impending invasion as “not possible” (Andrade 62). The Southern commander of I Corps was so confident in this assessment that no preparations were made to stave off an attack, and no air support was on hand during a planned rotation of two of the 3rd ARVN’s regiments that inconveniently took place during the early days of April. Yet invade the North did, with startling triumphs in the first couple weeks. In a three-pronged attack, the North Vietnamese army overran the defences around Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc. To prevent the complete loss of the cities, Nguyen Van Thieu “was forced to commit most of his reserves to defend the threatened towns” and in doing so allowed “the NLF to take the offensive in the Mekong delta and in the heavily populated regions around Saigon” (Herring
304).
The Southern Vietnamese and their allies were not the only ones to sell short the capabilities of their enemies however. Hanoi reasoned “that domestic pressures would prevent Nixon from putting new forces into Vietnam” and with a dwindling six thousand American combat troops left in the country, they would be victorious (Herring 304). The aforementioned domestic pressures referenced the timing of the Offensive starting concurrently with the U.S. Presidential campaign season. In attempting to secure reelection, the Northern Vietnamese hoped that Nixon would be cautious in any retribution out of fear of losing his position. In defiance of this assumption, Nixon initiated the “mining of Haiphong harbor, a naval blockade and massive, sustained bombing of North Vietnam” (Herring 307). While the Chinese helped sweep the harbor for mines, and both the Soviets and Chinese continued to bolster their ally with arms, funds, and reinforcements, both governments strongly suggested that Hanoi settle with the Americans and with Saigon. Additionally, while the Northern Army took out a significant portion of the enemy forces, they took similar losses and with the renewal of American bombings they eventually had to call the retreat. The incorrect conjecture that a lack of American combat troops would lead to assured victory failed to take into account President Nixon’s ability and willingness to increase strikes against key targets, eventually crippling the North’s ability to continue the offense for several years.
While the President was able to control many military matters, he was not as easily able to reign in the negative trend in American media coverage. Though our own reporters are not usually considered the enemy, the American administration’s failure to effectively deal with the American media coverage severely impacted the President’s freedom of movement on several key measures later on that were intended to help the war effort. The unfavorable bias started to pick up with the image The Execution of a Vietcong Guerilla by Eddie Adams shortly after the Tet Offensive, and images such as The Napalm Girl by Nick Ut released during the Easter Offensive reinforced to the public that the cost of the war was running too high for no reward. While transparency is commendable, Nixon’s ability to gain the economic and military resources for his Generals was inhibited by congressional blocks, which were so empowered by the negative public opinion formed based on media coverage.
In conclusion, the points covered in this essay were that the North Vietnamese underestimated the American administration’s commitment to keeping their allies afloat, the South Vietnamese and their US advisors dismissed the possibility of a North Vietnamese invasion as absurd, and the American administration was unable to curtail the media coverage of the distasteful events happening on the ground which led to the disillusionment of the general populace with regards to their support of prolonging the war to ensure victory. By the end of the conflict in the fall of 1972, the North Vietnamese army had taken an estimated 100,000 casualties and the South Vietnamese army had suffered 122,000 in combined KIA, wounded, and MIA. As such, it is clear that even after more than two decades at war, the North Vietnamese and the American/South Vietnamese forces alike drastically underestimated their opponents, which resulted in the bloodiest recorded engagement of the war and an ultimately losing outcome on both sides of the battles collectively known as the Easter Offensive.