The Meaning Of Operation Just Cause

Title: Operation Just Cause: Joint Operation in its True Meaning
Author: LIAN
Thesis: US invading forces were able to accomplish its mission and achieve its objectives during Operation Just Cause because half of the US troops required for the operation was already in Panama before the actual invasion, there was clear unity of command and, the operating units were able to combine and coordinate their respective capabilities to achieve common objectives.
Discussion: From 20 December 1989 to 03 January 1990, the United States Armed Forces led by the Joint Task Force South of United States Southern Command under Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner launched an offensive operation against President Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama and his Panamanian
The opposing forces on D-day were composed of 12 infantry battalions supported by the air fire support and other combat support units from the Joint Task Force South as against the four PDF battalions dispersed into company size units, composed of a mixture of military, police and paramilitary personnel, all over the country. An addition of six (6) more infantry battalions would follow in the course of the operation. Clearly the forces of President Noriega were outnumbered and subsequently overpowered by the United States forces. This principle of mass would have been relatively more difficult to achieve if they did not have the forces that were already entrenched in the country before the actual attack. Specifically the forces within Panama before the invasion was tasked to defend at the same time conduct offensive operations. The first half of their task was to provide security to the American bases, facilities and citizens along the Panama Canal. The second half was to isolate and neutralize the Panamanian Defense Force to facilitate the entry of the US Special Forces providing the first wave of attack to secure and occupy vital
Thurman was directly taking orders from President George W. Bush through then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powel but was given autonomy in the planning and execution of the operation. As proof of this autonomy, he was the one who designated Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner as commander of the Joint Task Force South that gave the latter full operational control of all fighting units in the operation. Unity of command was a critical factor in the operation since the operation required the use of several military capabilities from the different services to effectively execute the plan. Particularly, the plan required the use of the lift capability of the air force to deploy conventional ground forces (army and marines) and provide suppression fires and interdiction during deployment. Likewise, the operation required the use of the special operation units particularly the army’s Ranger and Green Berets supported by the psychological operations and civil affairs units, the navy’s SEALs and special boat units, and the air force’s air commando units. While all four services supported the operation including the other supporting commands, only Lieutenant General Stiner as Commander of JTF South directed the execution of the operation. This authority to command all the fighting