The Most Common Criticisms Of Nagel's Subjectivity Argument

Nagel’s subjectivity argument appears fairly straight-forward – Nagel asserts that there is a unique and subjective component of consciousness, and this component defeats any attempt to define consciousness in objective terms. Nagel believes that it is impossible to fully understand consciousness without the subjective experience. Intentional states cannot explain a subjective experience; therefore, the only to understand consciousness using reductionist theory would be to remove the subjective component – this would obviously be illogical.
Nagel concludes that consciousness cannot be explained by reductionists. Physicalism also fails to explain consciousness due to the subjective component. Physicalism argues that there is a physical property associated with every mental experience; therefore, due to the subjective nature of consciousness, all mental experiences are unique, and physical properties cannot accurately account for the variability and difference. The main conclusion from
Nagel’s argument is that it is unattainable to gather an objective view from conscious experience, since conscious experience is subjective.
Nagel believes there is an important connection between point-of-view and subjectivity, and Nagel uses the discussion on bats “to illustrate the connection between subjectivity and point-of-view and to make evident the importance of subjective features” (Nagel 220). Nagel fairly assumes that bats have a conscious experience since they are mammals and fairly evolved (Nagel believes it would not be fair to compare human experience to experiences of wasps or flounders since they extremely less intelligent). Bats contain a very vivid sense of its surroundings using echolocation, and this perception is extremely different to any sense that humans possess. It is very practical to understand and know how bats perceive the world since humans possess a detailed understanding of sonar; yet, humans could never truly know the bat’s point-of-view. This is because humans have never experienced the world through the eyes of a bat. Nagel strengthens his argument by expressing that human understanding is limited to the experiences tied only to being a human; even if humans could slowly transform into a bat, we could still never understand the perspective of a bat because our minds are clouded by human experiences. The only way to understand the consciousness of a bat is to have been born a bat, and then fully lived the life of a bat. Again, our understanding of a bat’s consciousness is impossible due to subjectivity.
I do not believe Nagel assumes physicalism is wrong, but I believe his stance is that physicalism is poorly understood and there is no clear distinction between the objective and subjective experience of physical states. If there was a clear distinction and a better understanding of physicalism, then we would be closer to answering the mind-body problem.
The most common criticism of Nagel’s subjective argument objects to Nagel’s emphasis on point-of-view – as Rosa Fuller presents in her article, “how significant should it [point-of-view of a bat] be to us” (Fuller 2).
Critics of Nagel express that humans do not need a first person perspective on a mental experience if we have a sufficient and thorough understanding of the experience. As in Nagel’s bat metaphor, humans possess an extremely advanced understanding of echolocation and sonar. Humans can accurately interpret how a bat perceives the world and its surroundings without having the point-of-view of a bat. As Fuller states, bats “experience recognition and purpose as rational rather than sensory categories. Its singular point of view is not limited to sensation alone” (Fuller). Due to the rationality of a bats behavior, humans can attribute objective reasoning to the subjective experience of the bat. Therefore, Nagel’s reliance on subjective experience should not be
problematic.
I do not agree with the criticism on Nagel’s subjective argument. I do believe objectivity and rationality can be found in specific aspects of an organism’s behavior, and I agree that humans can accurately decipher experience and thought-processes of different organisms in very few cases. However, I believe if we consider consciousness in its entirety, rather than in specific cases, irrationality and subjectivity becomes a major issue again. Rationality will not be found in every aspect of an organism’s behavior. Every detail within an organism’s subjective life experience cannot be predicted nor observed. Understanding consciousness of a bat requires more complex and deeper analysis than Fuller’s interpretation.
Defining irrationality is my most concerning objection to critics of Nagel’s subjective argument. I believe that it is absurd to categorize rationality and irrationality of a separate organism, because rationality is a subjective term. What appears irrational to one organism may appear completely rational to the organism being absurd, and this dissonance is due to the fact that two organisms have two separate perspectives. The most subtle and intricate wirings of our brains cause humans to perceive the world in a completely singular way that is vastly different from any other creature. Obviously, humans could never sufficiently understand the perspective of separate organisms – we barely understand our own perspective. Nagel’s subjective argument presents a fair dispute against reductionists and physicalism; it is impossible to define consciousness if philosophers choose to ignore subjective experience.