The Nuclear Threat During the Berlin Crisis

Mark Dissen
4/15/2013
Nuclear Arms Race Term Paper

The Nuclear Threat During the Berlin Crisis
Introduction
On November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech at a Soviet-Polish meeting in Moscow that would ultimately culminate into one of the most profound crises of the Cold War. The Soviet leader accused the Western Powers of violating the 1945 Potsdam Agreement and sabotaging the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and recommended that the Federal Republic abandon, “the hope that we shall cease to support the German Democratic Republic.” (Address by Premier, 1958). Soon after, Khrushchev delivered a speech giving an ultimatum to the allies and gave them six months to demilitarize West Berlin. The Allies ' subsequent refusal and the resulting tension put both the U.S.S.R. and the United States in a particularly dangerous situation. Although it is unlikely that full-out thermonuclear war would have resulted from the Berlin Crisis, there was a very real threat of a limited nuclear strike or conventional warfare to both of the superpowers until the tension over Berlin was assuaged.

Although November 1958 marked the official beginning of the crisis, Berlin had been a source of contention between the US and the Soviets from the initial division of Germany after WWII (Tine, 2005). The three territorial zones in Western Germany, controlled by France, Britain, and the US, contrasted greatly with the Soviet-controlled East, which upheld socialism. Berlin itself was divided in a similar fashion. However, when the Soviets severed the connection between West Berlin and non-Soviet zones in June 1948, substantial tension with the allies ensued. In fact, this led to the famous Berlin Airlift, which is when the allies flew supplies to Western Berlin over the Soviet controlled territory in East Germany. In May 1949, the blockade was put to an end, but the rigidity among the powers in Germany remained. (Tine, 2005)

Tension between the Allies and Soviets
For almost a decade, Germany carried on in relative harmony. Of course, the amicability came to an end when Nikita Khrushchev made his speech. So why exactly did Khrushchev become suddenly disruptive and put an end to the peace? The exact answer is uncertain, but it was likely a mixture of an increase in Soviet confidence and economic pursuits. Sputnik had led to a spike in Soviet self-assurance, and Khrushchev may have felt powerful enough to risk a crisis with the Western Powers. (Barker, 1963) There was a clear Soviet technological lead, which could have made the USSR especially emboldened. Additionally, Eastern Berlin was struggling economically while the allied-occupied German territory was flourishing. (Barker, 1963) Khrushchev probably wanted to put a halt to the transfer of economic resources and the “brain drain” that was occurring from the East into the West. Even though Khrushchev made claims like, “Western Germany is building an army which the German militarists envisage as stronger than the armies of Britain and France,” and credited a disregard for the Potsdam Agreement as his reasoning for his demands, it is probable that he was at least partially motivated by these other factors (Speech by Soviet Premier, 1958).

Tensions and the consequent threat of war between the two forces rose dramatically when the allies chose to reject Khrushchev 's demands and reasserted their right to have free access to Berlin (Barker, 1963). The situation actually ended up being a blunder for the USSR in the short-term because the brain drain from the East only worsened during the 6-month period and the number of refugees increased (McLaughlin, 1999). The four powers agreed to a summit in early 1959 to find a resolution to the problems, which was followed by direct negotiations between Khrushchev and Eisenhower at Camp David. At this point, President Eisenhower was attempting to use military strength as his primary negotiation tool. It was his policy that it was necessary to accumulate military power in order to make peace with the Soviets, and was recorded saying, "We are arming in order to make it possible for us to achieve disarmament." (Memo of Conversation, March 1960) Although no actual solution was reached, it was decided that no ultimatums should be enforced and that the situation would be resolved in Paris in May 1960. This reduced tension was only temporary, however, and the potential for war never truly disappeared.

Unfortunately, the U-2 incident in 1960 essentially obliterated the potential of the Paris Summit. An American spy plane that was on a reconnaissance mission of the USSR was shot down and publicly denounced. A Soviet note to the United States even highlights the potent negative affect and the consequent rejuvenated tensions that the U-2 plane had on US-USSR relations:

"One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations on the part of leading figures of the United States of America, that the Government of the United States of America, like the Soviet Government, also strives for improvement of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, for relaxation of international tension, and strengthening of trust between states." (Soviet Note, 1960)

In addition to the U-2 incident, Khrushchev 's recognition that the US was serious about defending Berlin caused the Paris Summit to fail, as pointed out by Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler (Memo of Conversation, June 1960). As a result of the lack of a resolution from the Paris Summit, Khrushchev continued his threats to eliminate the access of the United States and its Western allies to Berlin. This meant that the potential for war and even the use of nuclear weapons would not be nullified and would continue to hang over America and the USSR. Khrushchev continued until August 4, 1961, when the United States President John Kennedy received an agreement from NATO to defend Berlin by force, should it be necessary (Genovese, 2013). On August 13, 1961, the Berlin Wall was constructed. Despite the United States ' reaction with a build up of conventional forces in the end of August, this actually marked the beginning of the end of the Berlin Crisis and a general relief of tension (Hershberg, 2013). Although the wall symbolized the distrust between Western and Eastern forces, the wall also exhibited Khrushchev 's acceptance that there was not going to be a unified Berlin and that the Allied forces would be staying in the West. The Berlin Wall allowed for for the possibility of a "live and let live" policy, which was less dangerous than Khrushchev attempting to take over. On the other hand, the incident at Checkpoint Charlie in October of 1961 was a tension-filled pinnacle of the Berlin Crisis that could have ended horribly. (Trauschweizer, 2006) The world was threatened by war as US and Soviet militaries began to mobilize along the checkpoint and lined up tanks and aimed at each other, causing a standoff. Had Bobby Kennedy and the KGB Spy Georgi Bolshakov not been successful at disarming Checkpoint Charlie and one of the nations had fired at one another, then the chances of an ultimate launch of a nuclear weapon would have been very real.

Potential use of Nuclear Weaponry Although attempts at diplomacy had been made ever since Khrushchev 's first ultimatum speech, the Eisenhower and United States administration were keenly aware that the Soviet Union posed a nuclear threat to the United States (Hershberg, 2013). In fact, Eisenhower had created a special subcommittee, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC), under the National Security Council to assess the threat of nuclear war. This is a reflection of the president 's concern throughout the Berlin Crisis of serious nuclear danger to United States security. This fear, combined with Eisenhower 's ideology that an increase in arms was necessary for disarmament, contributed to huge expansion of the nuclear stockpile in the late 1950 's. (Burr, 2004) Although certain contingency plans involved the use of nuclear weaponry, neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy ever seriously considered initiating a nuclear strike without being already seriously threatened by the Soviet Union (Jenson, 1979). There was never any true threat of a thermonuclear war without the Soviets first attacking first. Therefore, the only true chance of the United States resorting to its nuclear arsenal lied within retaliation to the Soviets.

In November 1958, the NESC gave a briefing of a potential retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union in the event of a surprise attack. The plan called for immense retaliation that called for one weapon dropped on every Soviet city with a population greater than 25,000. (Memorandum, 1958) General Nathan Twining, the former chief of staff for the Air Force, responded to this briefing by recommending that a contingency plan for a "minimum reliance on post-H-hour communications," that followed the NESC study be put into place (Notes by the Secretaries to the JCS, 1959). This plan, which outlined a massive retaliation on the USSR in the event of Soviet nuclear aggression. would indeed be created and be named the Single Integrated Operational Plan-62 (SIOP-62).

Even Eisenhower, who coined the term "massive retaliation", was frightened by the idea of SIOP-62 and claimed that is "frighten[ed] the devil out of me," and that there "was obviously a limit -- a human limit---to the devastation which human beings could endure." (Minutes of Meeting, 1958). The plan disclosed, among other things, that over 3200 nuclear bombs would be used on 1060 targets in the Soviet Union, China, and their allies in a preemptive attack (SIOP-62 included preemptive and retaliatory options), targets included enemy nuclear weapons, government control centers, and at least 130 cities, and that it would take three 80 kiloton bombs to destroy a city similar to Nagasaki. (Burr, 2004) Clearly, the implications of SIOP-62 were enormous and posed a threat not only to the United States ' enemies, but on human kind as a whole. Nevertheless, the plan was approved in late 1960.

Kennedy, who maintained a "flexible response" foreign policy that contrasted with Eisenhower 's, was also scared of the idea SIOP-62 (Hershberg, 2013). Indeed, upon being briefed about SIOP-62 by General Lemnitzer and General Power, Kennedy responded by asking questions about the idea of "redundant destruction" (overkill), the possibility of false alarms, and whether it was possible to avoid bombing urban areas (Memo of Conference, 1961). Kennedy was noticeably in favor of alternate solutions, and relied on Carl Kaysen, his Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, to develop alternatives to SIOP-62. In September of 1961, Kaysen recommended a limited "first strike" option.

Kaysen 's first-strike approach outlined a contingency plan that called for preemptive, limited strike on Soviet ICBMs in the instance of an imminent Soviet nuclear attack on the US. This plan was was not as violent as SIOP-62, though it did not entirely exclude civilian casualties (Kaysen to Taylor, 1961). On the other hand, even Kaysen admitted that his plan opened up the United States to more risk because a Soviet nuclear retaliation would still be possible afterward (Kaysen to Taylor, 1961). Kaysen did try to convince Kennedy, however, that a more limited contingency plan would encourage the Soviets to respond in a similar fashion that would avoid strictly urban areas and would "minimize[e] the force of the irrational urge for revenge." (Kaysen to Taylor, 1961). Several government documents exhibit Kennedy 's sincere reluctance and fear to resort to nuclear weapons, so it is very likely that he would have utilized a more restrictive retaliation approach like this one rather than an all out nuclear strike like the one suggested in SIOP-62. Consequently, the world had never really been in a significant amount of danger of full-out nuclear war.

However, some of the United States administration was more accepting of SIOP-62 and a massive strike than Kennedy. General Power, for instance, never fully supported the idea of a limited strike and was in favor of a massive retaliation policy. In fact, he was reported to have ranted during a briefing, "Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win!" (Kaplan, 1983). General Power suggested to Kennedy that he accept a massive retaliation plan on multiple occasions, but Kennedy never showed any concrete signs of accepting his advice.

Robert McNamara appeared to be on the other end of the spectrum along with Kaysen, General Maxwell Taylor, and others. McNamara believed that a full first strike option would be infeasible and destabilizing. (Kennedy Administration, 1997) These administration members generally believed that a massive first-strike would still be unsuccessful and that even attempting to mobilize for such a tactic would only propel the arms race between the United States and the USSR. McNamara proposed a build up in conventional war arms and a smaller focus on nuclear weapons (Kennedy Administration, 1997). Along theses same lines, Kennedy was recorded as claiming that, "I am convinced that we would not be able to achieve tactical surprise, especially in the kinds of crisis circumstances in which a first-strike capability might be relevant. Thus, the Soviets would be able to launch some of their retaliatory forces before we had destroyed their bases." (Draft Memo, 1961)

How Realistic an Attack Actually Was In reality, even a limited nuclear strike was unlikely to happen during the Berlin Crisis. The superpowers ' nuclear arsenals were in fact used more as a negotiation tool for political and defensive purposes than a means of aggression. President Kennedy once encouraged the nation to, " Let us never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate," and possessing nuclear weapons is what made this policy feasible (Hershberg, 2013). Maintaining an ultimate destructive force allows a country to be confident and not make concessions to other conventionally stronger, threatening states. Khrushchev also apparently understood this theory, as evidenced by the Tsar Bomba in 1961, when the USSR set off 58 megatons of nuclear weapons as essentially nothing more than an intimidation tactic. Later, Robert McNamara would encourage presidents Kennedy and Johnson to use nuclear build-up as a deterrent to war, under the theory that mutually assured destruction (MAD) would ensure that neither the USSR nor the US would use ever use nuclear weapons on each other (Hershberg, 2013).

Nikita Khrushchev even demonstrated his dislike of nuclear weapons and his horror in the effect they could potentially have on multiple occasions during his leadership. In his Pen Pal Letters with Kennedy, Khrushchev makes expressions such as, "I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you?" and exhibits his fear of war, especially when it would include nuclear warfare (Telegram from the embassy, 1962). Although the Pen Pal series is majorly a product of the Cuban Missile Crisis rather than the Berlin Crisis, Khrushchev 's overarching attitude towards war and nuclear weapons most likely remained consistent throughout the entire period.

In reality, nuclear weapons were used by both nations more as a negotiation tool rather than an actual military threat. Both parties consistently built up their nuclear obvious, but it is apparent that the leaders of the United States and the USSR knew exactly what the implications of the use of nuclear weapons were and did not intend to use them. For example, Kennedy often made implications that he wanted to give the Soviets options rather than backing them entirely into a corner and force them to use militaristic solutions. In one speech, he directly stated that, "We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all - out nuclear action." (Kennedy, 1961) That did not stop him from using his access to weapons of destruction to reinforce his policy of not "negotiating out of fear." Furthermore, Kennedy used the threat of nuclear weapons domestically to get elected in the first place. Running on a platform of being "tough on the Soviets," which not only meant upgrading America 's nuclear capabilities, but also actually exploited the public 's fear of bombs. Similarly, Khrushchev repeatedly confessed his fear of nuclear war, but also insisted on a false "missile gap" for the sake of making the Soviets appear stronger than the US. (Jenson, 1979)

Reasonability of Nuclear Policy Looking back, the use of nuclear weapons as a negotiation tool was dangerous, though inevitable. A sort of prisoner 's dilemma arose when both the USSR and USA were able to use the weapons for political purposes, and there was certainly not enough trust between the two powers to actually avoid the matter. Since the Soviets and Americans were the two biggest rivals at that point in history, the threat of using bombs against each other was sure to happen. This was surely a very dangerous method to commence negotiations, however. Each country would have been expected to follow through with their threats or be shamed on a global scale; that is why there was an actual threat of limited nuclear or conventional warfare. Even though none of the leaders on either side actually ever truly intended to use their arsenal, it was possible that a situation would have arisen that there was such immense international political pressure that one of the countries felt forced to use them or at least pursue traditional military measures. Despite the fact that negotiations using nuclear threats was inevitable, the proliferation should have been put to an end earlier.

Once the leaders of the two powers realized that the other country was pursuing a brinkmanship tactic, the parties should have assuaged the situation fast rather than drawing it out and allowing events like the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis to happen. When nuclear weapons were new, it would be expected to use them politically. On the other hand, it was incredibly irresponsible take the politics to a point where the country may have felt forced to drop a bomb even if they did not actually want to. Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Eisenhower relied on using a nuclear threat too heavily, and should have undertaken other means of less dangerous negotiations first. Instead, the leaders demonstrated a tendency to use them as a primary tool and to begin with a using terror instead of resorting to it only when needed. The negotiation tactics were especially reckless considering that it set a standard for international politics. Had the USSR and United States refrained from using thermonuclear war so prominently, then perhaps Iran and North Korea would not attempting to utilize the same stratagem today. By allowing nuclear weapons to become an acceptable tool for negotiation, the Cold War participants demonstrated that nuclear threats can be successful and productive. Consequently, the world is not as safe as it would have been. Also, both Russia and the United States are seen as hypocrites when they insist that other nations refrain from nuclear provocation.

Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and their administrations undertook high-risk tactics during the Berlin Crisis. Because of the fluctuating tension between America and the USSR, which was very heated at particular points, there was a serious risk of a military attack. However, the countries would not have allowed full-out nuclear war to occur because their leaders all had a stroke of humanitarianism in them, but there was still potential for a limited nuclear strike and war. Even so, allowing the situation to escalate as much as it did highlights irresponsibility by both parties. Fortunately, the United States and Soviet Union, along with rest of the world, were very lucky that events played out the way that they did.

Works Cited

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