The Pros And Cons Of Hybrid Warfare

Looking to the east, the United States (US) Army faces a seemingly new threat; it is called “Hybrid Warfare”. In places like Ukraine, the South China Sea, and Iraq and Syria Hybrid Warfare has allowed America’s enemies to seize large areas with impunity. As such, the US Army must develop an effective way of countering this threat. Furthermore, because of the nature of Hybrid Warfare US Army Counterintelligence must be a part of the solution. Concurrently, issues such as under-manning, misuse, and unnecessary restrictions prevent US Army Counterintelligence from being utilized effectively against this threat. My proposed solution to these problems would be to create a robust, centralized US Army Counterintelligence Command.
Hybrid Warfare
is when “an adversary simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objective” (Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid vs Compound War,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1, 2009).
The goal of Hybrid Warfare is to attack an opponent in the creases of their policies, organizations, and doctrine to create advantage and exploit the opponent’s vulnerabilities. As such, Hybrid Warfare is most effective against bureaucratic organizations that are slow to react in changing Operational Environment. An example of a near-peer competitor effectively utilizing Hybrid Warfare is Russia and its “New Generation Warfare” Doctrine in the Ukraine. Russia’s “New Generation Warfare” consists of eight phases of operation with a premium on Information Operations throughout. More specifically, in phases one through five, Russian forces take advantage of the “Grey Zone” before combat to conduct operations that prepare the Battle Space. Examples of what phase one through five looks like under the Russian “New Generation Warfare” Doctrine includes propaganda to cause subversion, mutiny,
and treason and use of sabotage, espionage, and terrorism by both state and no state actors. All most all of phases one through five of the Russian model of Hybrid Warfare have a Counterintelligence nexus. Additionally, Counterintelligence organizations are perfect for preventing an enemy from using Hybrid Warfare as a tool. Counterintelligence working with Host Nation Partners, US and Allie Special Operation Forces, and General Purpose Forces can effectively mitigate, neutralize, and exploit adversaries in the Grey Zone prior to conflict. However, for US Army Counterintelligence to be effective in this endeavor US Army Counterintelligence must fix issues of miss-utilization, under-manning, and lack of empowerment at the lowest levels.
Issues currently plaguing US Army Counterintelligence include miss utilization, under-manning, reduced flexibility, and a lack of unified direction.
Within the US Army, many US Army Counterintelligence personnel are assigned to US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units. Foremost, in FORSCOM assignments US Army Counterintelligence are severely limited in what they can do within the United States. Additionally, commanders within FORSCOM do not typically understand how to utilize their Counterintelligence personnel. Because of these two things, it is common to see US Army Counterintelligence personnel filling non-Counterintelligence billets and additional duties despite being against US Army Regulation. Furthermore, even US Army Counterintelligence personnel assigned to Multidisciplinary Military Intelligence units do not fare much better because of the lack of knowledge on the part of Commander on how to employ and guide Counterintelligence personnel. At the same time, US Army Counterintelligence is undermanned with its E5 billets typically sitting at 50 percent. Therefore, in essences US Army Counterintelligence has fewer personnel than it needs, and the personnel that it does have are spread thin across units that do not employ them
properly.
My proposed solution to make the US Army more effective at fighting Hybrid Warfare is to create a US Army Counterintelligence Command. This Command will employ all US Army Counterintelligence personnel. All US Army Counterintelligence operations will run by this Command. Furthermore, this Command can remain under Intelligence and Security Command for the purpose of coordination with other intelligence disciplines.
This Command will potentially fix issues with US Army Counterintelligence that prevent it from being able to effectively counter Hybrid Threats. Assigning all US Army Counterintelligence personnel to this Command would potentially neutralize issues of miss-utilization because leaders will focus on the Counterintelligence mission and know how to properly use Counterintelligence personnel. Furthermore, this would also help mitigate under-manning by employing Counterintelligence personnel in a Counterintelligence role full time instead of having Counterintelligence personnel not able to perform their role