Wang Kai, 10210170049
Part 1: Why the security dilemma or spiral in NEA deteriorated after the cold war?
1. Historical legacies
A. Memory of the World War II Originating from its brutal occupation of China, the natural aversion to Japan has been preserved in part by Japan’s refusal to recognize and apologized for its imperial past. Chinese anti-Japan nationalism explodes recurrently by specific incidents—for instance, the revision of Japanese history textbook, Japanese leaders’ visit to Yasukuni Shrine. While Chinese collective memory about the somber history is still vivid and lasting, Japanese elites portray Japan as the victim, rather than the victimizer by downplaying its atrocities like the Nanjing massacre and underscoring the nuclear bomb in Japan. Chinese fear that Japan’s reconstruction of its collective memory will pose a threat to the future East Asia stability. This sentiment is shared outside China as well, particularly in Korea. Because Japan’s failure to accept responsibility for World War II, these historical memories still haunt Japan’s neighbors and amplify their concerns about future threats from Japanese military buildups. Complicated memories throughout the East Asian history also provide plenty of resource for the elites of each country to legitimize the government and justify its policy. For instance, anti-Japan media programming is designed to glorify the CCP and to reminder the Chinese about the past and future while at the same time CCP try to keep it at a controllable degree. Threats from DPRK validate Washington’s endeavor to stay in East Asia. “China threat” was capitalized to justify the hawkish policy to contain China and accelerate military buildups in Japan. The historical memories constitute a major tool for domestic politics in East Asia and contribute to the spiral of security dilemma.
B. Territorial disputes Territorial disputes (e.g., Diaoyu