Two Problems Of Easy Credit By Wayne Riggs

One of the most interesting issues that have risen when considering several theories of knowledge and what constitutes knowledge is the debate between what one can receive “credit” of knowledge for when obtaining new information. Considering various forms of luck and modes of obtaining knowledge, the issue of whether or not getting credit for knowing something is a requirement for knowledge itself is something that is highly debated by Jennifer Lackey, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Wayne Riggs, who have opposing views on the matter. In Wayne Riggs’ paper, “Two Problems of Easy Credit,” Riggs argues against both Lackey’s and Kvanvig’s claims, stating that the two issues of easy credit are rooted in innate and testimonial knowledge, and that the participation
Riggs states that giving credit for innate knowledge does not face any real obstacle; however, one must address attributability. “To be creditable with X, X must be attributable to you as an agent” (Riggs 204). By that, Riggs means to explain that in order to receive credit for knowing something, p, X is the certain way of obtaining a true belief in p, and must somehow be linked to one in at least some way by acting in a manner that will yield a true belief in p, and therefore knowledge in p and creditability in X. In the case of innate knowledge, what Lackey and Kvanvig claim is missing is attributability. However, Riggs counters their claim very simply and effectively. Though innate knowledge technically is void of any empirical factors when considering how it is obtained, one’s own cognitive faculty, or mechanism that led one to form a true belief in p, is what can be considered to be the X one needs in order to have knowledge in p. This is because the a priori cognitive ability is the reason one has a true belief in p, and therefore knowledge in p. Though nothing was done to physically obtain the knowledge that p, the cognitive ability was enough to mentally exercise a certain mental faculty in pursuit of obtaining a true belief that p. Therefore, credit is due to the testifier because of one’s own cognitive faculties having formed a true belief,
Riggs argues that to make use of one’s own cognitive abilities in forming true beliefs in cases of both innate knowledge and testimonial knowledge should entail knowledge depending on the circumstances and independent of any form of