Unreality of Time
McTaggart on the Unreality of Time
Leibniz emphasised the similarity between time and space. The differences are striking, however, since time, unlike space, seems to have a direction: events seem to ‘move’ in time from the past into the present and into the future.
But what does it really mean to say that events ‘move in time’? It seems rather too metaphorical to talk in these terms: an event cannot move in time in the sense in which a person can move in space.
Perhaps we should say that time itself ‘moves’ or ‘flows’. On reflection, however, this idea is also strange. If time flows, how fast does it flow? There is a silly answer: ‘at the rate of one second per second’!
But maybe the silliness of this answer suggests the emptiness of the question. ‘Flowing’ is a process that takes time; but time cannot itself take time!
Although it is difficult to understand and make clear, something like the idea that time flows or has a ‘direction’ is nevertheless deeply embedded in the way we think about time.
For example, there is nothing about the different dimensions of space – up–down, left–right, back–front – that prevents me from changing things in any one of those dimensions. But time is different: I can only change things in the present and the future.
The ‘flow’ of time seems bound up with the idea of ordering events in a certain way (called ‘A-series’ below). Let’s consider the two ways of thinking about time and events.
The first way of thinking is when we think of events as being in the past, in the present, or in the future. The First World War is in the past; it was in the present, and before that it was in the future.
This way of ordering time was labelled the ‘A series’ by the British philosopher J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925). It is sometimes called the ‘dynamic’ time series because of its relation to the metaphor of the ‘flow’ of time.
The A series is only one way we have of thinking about time. The other way is in terms of the idea of something
Leibniz emphasised the similarity between time and space. The differences are striking, however, since time, unlike space, seems to have a direction: events seem to ‘move’ in time from the past into the present and into the future.
But what does it really mean to say that events ‘move in time’? It seems rather too metaphorical to talk in these terms: an event cannot move in time in the sense in which a person can move in space.
Perhaps we should say that time itself ‘moves’ or ‘flows’. On reflection, however, this idea is also strange. If time flows, how fast does it flow? There is a silly answer: ‘at the rate of one second per second’!
But maybe the silliness of this answer suggests the emptiness of the question. ‘Flowing’ is a process that takes time; but time cannot itself take time!
Although it is difficult to understand and make clear, something like the idea that time flows or has a ‘direction’ is nevertheless deeply embedded in the way we think about time.
For example, there is nothing about the different dimensions of space – up–down, left–right, back–front – that prevents me from changing things in any one of those dimensions. But time is different: I can only change things in the present and the future.
The ‘flow’ of time seems bound up with the idea of ordering events in a certain way (called ‘A-series’ below). Let’s consider the two ways of thinking about time and events.
The first way of thinking is when we think of events as being in the past, in the present, or in the future. The First World War is in the past; it was in the present, and before that it was in the future.
This way of ordering time was labelled the ‘A series’ by the British philosopher J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925). It is sometimes called the ‘dynamic’ time series because of its relation to the metaphor of the ‘flow’ of time.
The A series is only one way we have of thinking about time. The other way is in terms of the idea of something